Hayes v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co.

• Decision Date: 31 March 1967
• Citation: 417 S.W.2d 804,57 Tenn.App. 254
• Parties: Sharon Anne HAYES, h/n/f. etc., Appellant, v. HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY COMPANY, Appellee. Mrs. Anne S. HAYES, Appellant, v. HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY COMPANY, Appellee. Mark Steven HAYES, b/n/f. etc., Appellant, v. HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY COMPANY, Appellee.
• Court: Tennessee Court of Appeals

Page 804

417 S.W.2d 804

57 Tenn.App. 254

Sharon Anne HAYES, h/n/f. etc., Appellant, v. HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY COMPANY, Appellee.

Mrs. Anne S. HAYES, Appellant, v. HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY COMPANY, Appellee.

Mark Steven HAYES, b/n/f. etc., Appellant, v. HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY COMPANY, Appellee.

Court of Appeals of Tennessee, Middle Section.

March 31, 1967 Certiorari Denied by Supreme Court Aug. 7, 1967.

McAllen Foutch, Smithville, and Bryson & Bryson, Woodbury, for appellants.

Stephenson, Lackey & Holman, Nashville, for appellee.

OPINION

PURYEAR, Judge.

On March 9, 1962, the appellant, Sharon Anne Hayes, by next friend, Mark David Hayes, recovered a judgment for $15,000.00 damages against William Rutland in the Circuit Court of Dekalb County, Tennessee. On the same date the appellants, Mrs. Anne S. Hayes and Mark Steven Hayes, recovered judgments against Rutland in the same Court for damages in the sum of $2,000.00 and $1,000.00 respectively.

The Circuit Court suits in which such judgments for damages were rendered originated out of an automobile accident involving a truck driven by Rutland on the 25th day of December, 1960. This vehicle, which was a 1948 model Chevrolet, three-quarters ton truck, was purchased by Rutland from one Paul Curtis, a used car dealer in Alexandria, Tennessee, on or about November 14, 1960. As consideration for this Chevrolet truck, Rutland traded to Curtis a 1950 model Ford pick-up truck and paid Curtis $75.00 in cash.

On the day that this trade was made, Rutland left his 1950 model Ford truck on the Curtis lot, took the license plates off of it and placed them on the 1948 model Chevrolet truck, all with the consent and knowledge of Curtis.

There is a sharp conflict of evidence as to when Curtis transferred title certificate to the Chevrolet truck to Rutland and this conflict will be discussed later in this opinion.

After recovering the aforesaid judgments in Circuit Court against Rutland, the appellants each filed a bill in the Chancery Court of Davidson County, against the appellee alleging the recovery of such judgments and further alleging that at the time of the accident in question the appellee herein, Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, was the insurer under a certain garage liability policy issued to Curtis, which policy contained the following provision, to-wit:

'III. Definition of Insured--

(2) Any person while using an automobile covered by this policy, and any person or organization legally responsible for the use thereof, provided the actual use of the automobile is by the named insured or with his permission.'

In these bills the appellants further allege that at the time of the accident in question, which resulted in the foregoing judgments in their favor, Rutland was operating the Chevrolet truck as an additional insured under the above quoted provision of the garage liability policy issued by Hartford.

The bill further alleges that such judgments were unpaid and prayed for recovery against Hartford for the amount of such judgments, together with interest and statutory penalty, and for general relief.

To all three of these bills, Hartford filed an answer admitting that it did issue to Paul Curtis a garage liability policy, which was in force at the time of the sale in question, but expressly denied that the Chevrolet truck was the property of Curtis at the time of the accident, and further expressly denying that Rutland was an additional insured under the terms and provisions of such policy.

The cases were tried before the Chancellor upon depositions, documentary evidence and stipulations, as a result of which trial the Chancellor concluded that Rutland was the owner of the Chevrolet truck in question at the time of the accident and that Rutland was not an additional insured under the terms and provisions of the garage liability policy.

On July 20, 1966, the Chancellor entered a decree dismissing all three of the bills, from which action of the Court dismissing such bills, the appellants have prayed and perfected their appeals to this Court and have filed a single assignment of error which is as follows:

'The trial court erred to the prejudice of the appellants (complainants) in holding and adjudging that William Rutland was not an additional insured under its garage liability policy issued to Paul Curtis, in dismissing their consolidated suits, with costs, and in failing to decree the relief sought therein.'

In their well reasoned briefs, counsel for appellants state in substance that the real issue before the Court in these cases is whether or not the seller, Curtis, or the purchaser, Rutland, owned the Chevrolet truck in question at the time of the accident.

Counsel for the appellants insist that title to the Chevrolet truck in question did not pass to Rutland until after the accident, because it was after the accident that Curtis indorsed or assigned the certificate of title to such truck to Rutland.

The sharpest conflict in the evidence is on the question of when the certificate of title was actually assigned by Curtis to Rutland.

On this question, Rutland testified that at the time delivery was made in November, 1960, Curtis promised to assign and deliver to him the certificate of title, but never did it until some time in January, 1961, after the accident had occurred.

Rutland testified in substance that, before the accident he made several attempts to get the certificate of title from Curtis, but, for some reason unknown to him, Curtis did not deliver it to him and that finally in January, 1961, after he got out of the hospital, he went to see Curtis and took with him a friend of his, Mr. Gordon Walker, a Justice of the Peace. He further testified that it was at this time, in the presence of Walker, that Curtis assigned and delivered the certificate of title to him and acknowledged the assignment before his wife Mrs. Evelyn Curtis, which assignment was dated November 14, 1960.

He further testified that when this date of November 14, 1960, was placed on the assignment, Walker told Mrs. Curtis it should not be dated back to November 14, 1960, but she paid no attention to him.

Walker testified that he was present at the time this certificate of title was assigned, that the date of such assignment was some time around the middle of January, 1961, and when he saw that it was being dated back, he told Curtis that should not be done, but this suggestion was not heeded by either Mr. or Mrs. Curtis.

Counsel for appellants insist that title to the 1948 Chevrolet truck involved in the accident remained in Curtis until he assigned and delivered the certificate of title thereto on some date in January, 1961, after the accident occurred.

Counsel specifically insist that the transfer was not accomplished because of failure of Curtis to comply with the following Code Sections:

'Section 59--319. Transfer of Title.--(a) In order to transfer title to any motor vehicle coming within the title provisions of chapters 1 through 6 of this title, the owner shall indorse an assignment and warranty of title upon the certificate of title, if in his possession, for such vehicle with a statement of all liens or encumbrances thereon, which statement shall be verified under oath by the owner, and he shall deliver the certificate of title and title card to the purchaser or transferee at the time of delivering the vehicle, except as provided in § 59--330. (This exception applies to a vehicle to be dismantled.) (b) Any owner desiring to transfer title to any motor vehicle coming within the title provisions of chapters 1 through 6 of this title, whose certificate of title is being held by a lienor, may, in lieu of executing the assignment provided on the reverse side of his certificate of title, execute and deliver to the transferee a separate bill of sale which shall show the name and address of the lienor in whose possession his certificate of title is being held and all such other information as may be required by the reasonable rules and regulations of the commissioner, and which bill of sale shall be signed by the seller, whose certificate shall be acknowledged before a notary public, together with his title card.'

'59--321. Transfers to dealers.--When the transferee of a vehicle is a dealer who holds the same for resale and lawfully operates the same under dealer's registration plates, such transferee shall not be required to obtain a new registration of said vehicle or be required to obtain a new certificate of title, but such transferee, upon transferring his title or interest to another person, shall execute an assignment and warranty of title upon the certificate of title, if in his possession or if in the possession of lienor, or he shall execute a bill of sale and deliver the same to the person to whom such transfer is made, together with his evidence of ownership, which assignment or bill of sale shall be acknowledged before a notary public.'

In his memorandum opinion (tr. pp. 36, 37, 38 and 39) the learned Chancellor found as a fact that the certificate of title was not executed on November 14, 1960, but in January, 1961, as insisted by Rutland and Walker, and we agree with this conclusion of the Chancellor. The Chancellor further concluded as follows:

'However, the Court is of the opinion that the rights of the parties are not determined by the time at which the 'title papers' were executed nor by the time of their delivery but by the acts of the seller and the buyer and their intention. At common law and under the Uniform Sales of Goods Act, T.C.A. 47--101, etc., the payment of the purchase price by the buyer and the delivery to him of the article so purchased by the seller constitutes a completed transaction and vest the buyer with title to the property sold. He has complete control of it and the seller no longer has any interest therein. The sale of an automobile is governed by the Uniform Sale of Goods Act as is other...