Hayes v. Hayes

Decision Date30 September 1874
PartiesAMHERST HAYES et al.v.MARIA B. HAYES et al.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

WRIT OF ERROR to the Circuit Court of Rock Island county; the Hon. G. W. PLEASANTS, Judge, presiding.

Mr. WILLIAM H. GEST, for the plaintiffs in error.

Messrs. CONNELLY & MCNEAL, for the defendants in error.

Mr. JUSTICE BREESE delivered the opinion of the Court:

This is a writ of error to the Rock Island circuit court, to reverse a decree entered therein on the chancery side of that court, in a proceeding commenced by bill on behalf of Amherst Hayes and others, claiming to be the heirs at law of the Rev. Harvey H. Hayes, deceased, and against his widow, Maria B. Hayes, who, with one Carlos L. Bascom, had taken out letters of administration on the estate of the decedent.

It appears by the bill that Dr. Hayes died on the 20th July, 1867, at Rock Island, leaving Maria B. Hayes, his widow, and no child or children, nor descendant of any child, and no parents. Letters of administration were granted by the county court of Rock Island county August 5, 1867. The bill alleges that deceased was a resident of the State of Iowa at the time of his death, within the view of the law of that State as to distribution of the personal estate of an intestate; that the appraisers have certified to the widow the sum of eighteen hundred and thirty-two dollars as the “widow's award,” and complains that she claims the whole of the personal estate. The prayer of the bill is, that this award be set aside, and the whole surplus, after the debts are paid, may be distributed according to the law of Iowa.

An issue was made up on the question, where was the deceased domiciled at the time of his death, within the meaning of the law as to the distribution of the personalty. This issue was tried by the court, by consent, without a jury, and the court found that this State was the domicile of the deceased, so far as the succession to his personalty was concerned. The plaintiffs in error insist that this finding is against the evidence.

We have given the testimony, voluminous as it is, a careful reading and full consideration, and have reached the conclusion it supports the decree.

It is said by authoritative text-writers, that the term “domicile,” in its ordinary acceptation, means the place where a person lives or has his home. In a strict legal sense, that is properly the domicile of a person, where he has his true, fixed, permanent home and principal establishment, and to which, whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning. Story's Confl. of Laws, 39, § 41. It is further said, actual residence is not indispensable to retain a domicile after it is once acquired; but it is retained, animo solo, by the mere intention not to change it and adopt another. Ib. 42, § 44.

Testing this case by these rules, the finding was clearly right. It is not denied that the domicile of Dr. Hayes, from 1852 to May, 1860, was Rock Island, at which time, there being some disagreement with his wife, she went from their home in Rock Island on a visit of uncertain duration to her relatives in Washington city, and he himself went to Bentonsport, in the State of Iowa, to supply a pulpit there for one year. Before he left Rock Island he rented the homestead and a part of the furniture, storing the balance on the premises. When the year expired he engaged for another year, which terminated in the spring of 1862, when he left, spending the spring and summer in visiting his wife in Washington and his friends in the East. In the fall of 1862 he returned to this State, visiting some of his relatives, and spent the winter with a brother, Gordon Hayes, living at Brighton, Iowa. In the spring of 1863 he accepted an invitation to supply a pulpit at Kossuth, Iowa, for one year, and after its expiration he renewed the engagement for another year, but...

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32 cases
  • Maksym v. the Bd. of Election Commissioners of The City of Chicago
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 24 d1 Janeiro d1 2011
    ...a legal status that, once acquired, can be “retained, animo solo, by the mere intention not to change it and adopt another.” Hayes v. Hayes, 74 Ill. 312, 314 (1874). Since Smith was decided, however, our supreme court has explained unequivocally that “it is elemental that domicile and resid......
  • Maksym v. the Bd. of Election Commissioners of The City of Chicago
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • 27 d4 Janeiro d4 2011
    ...the outcome in that decision turned solely on intent, a principle that is consistent with the legal concept of domicile. See Hayes v. Hayes, 74 Ill. 312 (1874). Unfortunately, Smith was not this court's last pronouncement on the issue. Later decisions, namely Pope v. Board of Election Commi......
  • Reynolds v. Lloyd Cotton Mills
    • United States
    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • 14 d3 Maio d3 1919
    ... ... Croom et al., 7 Fla. 200; Shaw ... v. Shaw, 98 Mass. 158. But the doctrine does not need ... the citation of authorities in its support. Hayes et al ... v. Hayes et al., 74 Ill. 312. A person sui juris may ... change his domicile as often as he pleases. There must be a ... voluntary ... ...
  • Schultz v. Chicago City Bank & Trust Co.
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • 11 d4 Novembro d4 1943
    ...with actual residence in another jurisdiction, coupled with the intention of making the last-acquired residence a permanent home. Hayes v. Hayes, 74 Ill. 312; 17 Am.Jur. 601. An essential element in the acquisition of a new domicile is the abandonment of the former one. The facts of actual ......
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