Haynes v. Hamilton County

• Decision Date: 29 August 1994
• Parties: Kathleen HAYNES, Plaintiff-Appellant, Bobby Henson and Martha Henson Taylor, as Parents and Natural Guardians of Rebecca Ann Henson, Deceased, Plaintiffs-Appellants, David Scroggins, d/b/a Scroggins Used Cars, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HAMILTON COUNTY, Tennessee, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Page 606

883 S.W.2d 606

Kathleen HAYNES, Plaintiff-Appellant, Bobby Henson and Martha Henson Taylor, as Parents and Natural Guardians of Rebecca Ann Henson, Deceased, Plaintiffs-Appellants, David Scroggins, d/b/a Scroggins Used Cars, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HAMILTON COUNTY, Tennessee, Defendant-Appellee.

Supreme Court of Tennessee at Knoxville.

Aug. 29, 1994.

Robert W. Sauser, Luther, Anderson, Cleary & Ruth, P.C., Chattanooga, for appellants.

B. Stewart Jenkins, Jenkins & Bradshaw, Chattanooga, for appellant Kathleen Haynes.

Russell King, Chattanooga, for appellants Bobby Henson and Martha Henson Taylor.

Roger E. Jenne, Jenne, Scott & Sellers, Cleveland, for appellant David Scroggins.

O. Michael Carter, Sp. Counsel to Office of Hamilton County Atty., Chattanooga, for appellee.

John A. Day, Past President, TTLA, Nashville, J. Anthony Farmer, President, TTLA, R. Sadler Bailey, Member, TTLA, Memphis, for amicus curiae, Tenn. Trial Lawyers Ass'n.

Robert H. Watson, Jr., John C. Duffy, Watson, Hollow & Reeves, Knoxville, for amicus curiae, Tenn. Mun. League.

OPINION

ANDERSON, Justice.

This appeal arises out of a high-speed police chase of a traffic violator which ended in tragedy when the violator's car crossed the center line out of control and collided with a third vehicle, killing all three teen-age occupants.

We granted this appeal to reconsider this Court's holding that law enforcement personnel are not liable for injuries resulting from an accident between a vehicle being pursued by the police and an innocent third party because, as a matter of law, police "conduct" in initiating or continuing the high-speed chase is not a proximate cause of the accident. See Kennedy v. City of Spring City, 780 S.W.2d 164 (Tenn.1989) (Drowota, J., dissenting), and Nevill v. City of Tullahoma 756 S.W.2d 226 (Tenn.1988) (Drowota, J., dissenting).

Relying on our previous decisions, the trial court in this case granted the defendant, Hamilton County's motions for summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

We have concluded that where negligent police conduct exists in initiating or continuing a high speed chase, it is possible for that negligent conduct to be the proximate cause of injuries to innocent third parties. We reach that conclusion because we are convinced our holdings in Nevill and Kennedy interpret the statute, Tenn.Code Ann. § 55-8-108(e) (1988), too narrowly by limiting negligent police "conduct" to the physical operation of the officer's own vehicle and by excluding all other conduct, including the police officer's decision to initiate or continue the high-speed chase. The rule we now adopt follows the public policy established by the legislature, comports with the clear language of the statute, and is consistent with the better-reasoned rule adopted by a growing majority of the states. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals' judgment is reversed and the case remanded to the trial court. To the extent that the decisions in Nevill and Kennedy conflict with our ruling herein, they are overruled.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On Saturday evening, March 17, 1990, at approximately 7:00 p.m., Gregory Allen Gilliam, drove a red Corvette onto Dayton Pike from the Golden Gallon market located at Sequoyah and Dayton Pike in Soddy Daisy, Tennessee. At the same time, Sergeant Alan Brown of the Hamilton County Sheriff's Department drove onto Dayton Pike from Sequoyah, directly behind Gilliam. Sergeant Brown noticed that the Corvette had no taillights. After following Gilliam for a short distance, Sergeant Brown observed the Corvette accelerate and pass a car by driving in the left hand turn lane, fishtailing as it did so. At that point, Sergeant Brown determined that Gilliam was speeding and driving recklessly by traveling 55 miles per hour in a 40 mile-per-hour speed zone.

Intending to stop Gilliam, Sergeant Brown turned on his blue lights. Instead of stopping, however, Gilliam continued to accelerate. Sergeant Brown turned on his siren, and a high-speed chase ensued. Gilliam's speed reached, and perhaps exceeded, 100 miles per hour, with Sergeant Brown in hot pursuit with siren screaming and blue lights flashing. Both vehicles passed a number of cars, both oncoming, and traveling in the same direction. Although Sergeant Brown did not turn off his lights or his siren during the two and one-half to three mile chase, he had slowed his vehicle in heavy traffic in the 8400 block of Dayton Pike when he saw a ball of fire about a block away. Gilliam had lost control of the Corvette, crossed the center line, and collided head-on with a vehicle being driven by 19-year-old James Guffey, and occupied by Guffey's half-sister, Catherine Forester, age 16, and his friend, Rebecca Henson, age 17. All three teenagers died in the collision. Sometime later, it was determined that the Corvette Gilliam was driving had been reported as stolen.

Wrongful death actions were instituted against Hamilton County by the parents of the dead teenagers. The owner of the Corvette also sued for property damage. By agreement, the cases were consolidated for trial. The plaintiffs' allegations of negligence against Hamilton County were substantially the same, specifically that:

it was unreasonable, unnecessary and grossly negligent for the Sheriff's deputy to continue to pursue the Defendant Gilliam at speeds in excess of 100 miles per hour given the conditions existing on the highways at the time and further given the ability of law enforcement agencies to take other more appropriate means to intercept and stop the Defendant Gilliam, any of which procedures would have been more appropriate than the high speed chase which resulted in the death of three individuals.

Hamilton County moved for summary judgment as to all plaintiffs, and the trial court judge granted the motions, concluding that Sergeant Brown's conduct in initiating and continuing the pursuit of Gilliam was not, as a matter of law, the proximate cause of the accident that resulted. The Court of Appeals reluctantly affirmed the trial court, relying on our previous decisions.

We articulate below the reasons for the adoption of a new rule which requires a reversal of the Court of Appeals. In applying the rule, we consider the foregoing facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, as we are required to do in an appeal from a summary judgment.

"CONDUCT"

We begin our analysis with an examination of the statutes enacted by the legislature which govern the liability of Hamilton County for the actions of its Deputy Sheriff. Tenn.Code Ann. § 29-20-202 (1980) provides that the County's immunity is removed for the negligent operation of a motor vehicle by any employee. Hamilton County, however, remains immune from liability arising from its employees' negligent conduct to the extent authorized by Tenn.Code Ann. § 55-8-108 (1993). That statute, in part, provides:

(a) The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle, ... when in the pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law, ... may exercise the privileges set forth in this section, but subject to the conditions herein stated.

(b) The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle may:

(1) Park or stand, irrespective of the provisions of this chapter;

(2) Proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign, but only after slowing down as may be necessary for safe operation;

(3) Exceed the speed limits so long as life or property are not thereby endangered; and

(4) Disregard regulations governing direction of movement or turning in specified directions.

....

(d) The foregoing provisions shall not relieve the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons, nor shall such provisions protect the driver from the consequences of the driver's own reckless disregard for the safety of others.

(e) Notwithstanding the requirement of this section that drivers of authorized emergency vehicles exercise due regard for the safety of all persons, no municipality or county nor the state or any of its political subdivisions, nor their officers or employees, shall be liable for any injury proximately or indirectly caused to an actual or suspected violator of a law or ordinance who is fleeing pursuit by law enforcement personnel. The fact that law enforcement personnel pursue an actual or suspected violator of a law or ordinance who flees from such pursuit shall not render the law enforcement personnel, or the employers of such personnel, liable for injuries to a third party proximately caused by the fleeing party unless the conduct of the law enforcement personnel was negligent and such negligence was a proximate cause of the injuries to the third party.

(Emphasis added). The statute provides absolute immunity from liability to the County for the injury or death of a fleeing suspect. Certain privileges are also afforded to drivers of emergency vehicles with regard to other persons. However, drivers of emergency vehicles participating in high speed chases are clearly required to exercise "due regard for the safety of all persons," including innocent third parties. In addition, such drivers may exceed the speed limit only if they do not endanger life or property. Moreover, the 1986 amendment to the statute--subsection (e)--which deals specifically with such hot pursuit chases, explicitly provides that law enforcement personnel will be liable when the "conduct of the law enforcement personnel was negligent and such negligence was a proximate cause of the injuries to the third party."

Our first inquiry, therefore, is what constitutes negligent "conduct?" In Nevill, supra, the trial court concluded, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, that the police officers' negligence, both in commencing pursuit and continuing pursuit of a traffic violator at speeds from 75 to 100 miles per hour for the time and distance involved, and in failing to obtain permission to engage in the pursuit in violation of...