Haynie v. Knights Templars & Masons' Life Indemnity Co.

• Decision Date: 08 June 1897
• Parties: Haynie, Guardian, et al., Appellants, v. The Knights Templars and Masons' Life Indemnity Company
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

41 S.W. 461

139 Mo. 416

Haynie, Guardian, et al., Appellants, v. The Knights Templars and Masons' Life Indemnity Company

Supreme Court of Missouri

June 8, 1897

Appeal from Saline Circuit Court. -- Hon. Richard Field, Judge.

Agreed statement on which the case was tried:

"It is admitted that the defendant is a corporation duly organized under the laws of the State of Illinois, as an insurance company on the assessment plan. That since the 18th day of June, 1888, it has been doing business in the State of Missouri, as an insurance company upon the assessment plan it having at that time and all times since complied with the laws of the State of Missouri, in reference to insurance companies on the assessment plan, and being at said time and all times since authorized by the laws of said State and certificate duly issued by the insurance department of said State so to do; that on the 6th day of June, 1889, Jacob Greenabaum made his application in writing to the defendant to become a member of said company (defendant); that such application so made by said Greenabaum contained among others the following question and answer:

"'Q. On what basis as to amount of benefits do you desire to be admitted?' To which question said Greenabaum answered 'A. $ 5,000 and all money paid in assessment for the first five years except in case of my suicide or self-destruction sane or insane, voluntary or involuntary then the amount should only be the money paid in assessment,' and that said application contained the further statement: 'And I do hereby agree that the statements and representations contained in the foregoing application and declaration shall be the basis of the contract between me and the Knight Templars and Masons' Life Indemnity Company; I further agree if accepted to abide by the constitution, rules, and regulations of the company as they now are or may be constitutionally changed hereafter.' That such application was forwarded to the company at its general office in the city of Chicago and that thereafter the defendant issued and delivered to the said Greenabaum the certificate of membership sued on in this case.

"It is further agreed that said Greenabaum paid all the assessments and dues made upon or demanded of him by defendant company, and had complied with all requirements and kept all the covenants specified in said certificate to be by him kept, except as to taking his own life, which condition is as follows: 'In case of the self-destruction of the holder of this policy whether voluntary or involuntary, sane or insane . . . . this policy shall become null and void and the widow and heirs, or devisees of said member, shall have no claim for benefits on this company, provided that in case of such self-destruction or suicide of the holder of this policy, then this company will pay to his widow and heirs or devisees only such an amount on this policy as the member shall have paid to this company on this policy in assessments on the same without interest.' That on the eleventh day of January, 1893, the said Greenabaum died from the effect of a wound caused by a pistol shot, which pistol was discharged intentionally, not accidentally, while in the hand of the said Greenabaum, and that the immediate effect thereof was the death of said Greenabaum, and that at the time the said Greenabaum was insane to such an extent as to be unable to form an intent to take his own life; that due proof of the death of said Greenabaum was made as required by said certificate.

"It is further admitted that an assessment made upon the members of the defendant association as provided in the policy by-laws, and constitution of defendant, would produce at least the amount of $ 5,000. That the amount said Greenabaum has paid in assessments to defendant company amounted to the sum of $ 252.15, for which sum defendant admits its liability."

Affirmed.

Davis & Duggins and Boyd & Murrell for appellants.

(1) The provision in the policy sued on to the effect that said contract or policy shall be void "in case of self-destruction of the holder of this policy, whether voluntary or involuntary, sane or insane, then this policy shall become null and void," is a void provision and stipulation under the statutes. R. S. 1889, sec. 5855; Keller v. Travelers Ins. Co., 58 Mo.App. 557. (2) The answer admits that defendant is an insurance company, and the courts have so held. Knights Templars and Masons Life Indem. Co. v. Berry, 46 F. 439. (3) The language of section 5855, Revised Statutes 1889, is plain. It refers to all suits upon policies issued by any company doing business in this State. Is this section repealed by the act of 1887, page 199, being article 3, Revised Statutes 1889? In the revision of 1889 the act of 1887 was incorporated in the same chapter (89) and section 5855 was retained as a part of the law governing insurance companies. (4) The provision at the end of section 5869, was evidently intended to regulate assessment plan companies, in their dealing with the State, and to affect their liability only to the State, in so far as doing business is concerned and not intended to repeal section 5855, nor to permit assessment plan companies to come into the State independent of the general insurance law. (5) There can be no such thing as "involuntary suicide." It would mean an accident or death by accident -- Ins. Co. v. Crandall, 120 U.S. 527 -- and these words should be rejected as of uncertain meaning and void. Penfold v. Life Ins. Co., 85 N.Y. 317. (6) The agreed statement of facts shows that the insured died from the effects of a wound caused by a pistol shot, which pistol was discharged intentionally, not accidentally, while in his hand, and that at the time he was insane to such an extent as to be unable to form an intent to take his own life. The condition in the policy does not attach where there is an absence of intent. Edwards v. Ins. Co., 20 F. 661; Penfold v. Ins. Co., 85 N.Y. 317; Newton v. Ins. Co., 76 N.Y. 426; Kirts v. Ins. Co., 29 F. 198, 201, 202; Streeter v. Western Ins. Co., 65 Mich. 199; Bigelow v. Berkshire Ins. Co., 93 U.S. 284. (7) The burden is on the defendant to prove intentional suicide, and if the evidence is conflicting the policy will be enforced. Ingersol v. Ins. Co., 47 F. 272; Meacham v. Ins. Co., 120 N.Y. 237; Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tillman, 19 S.W. 294; Walcott v. Ins. Co., 64 Vt. 221; Waycott v. Ins. Co., 24 A. 992; Bacon on Benefit Soc., sec. 336, p. 676.

Hugh C. Smith for respondent.

(1) That section 5855 does not apply to insurance companies doing business in this State on the assessment plan is no longer, if it ever was, an open question. Hanford v. Massachusetts Benefit Association, 122 Mo. 50; Sparks v. Knight Templars & Masonic Life Indt. Co., 61 Mo.App. 109; Theobald v. Knights of Pythias, 59 Mo.App. 87; R. S. 1889, sec. 5869. (2) Respondent insists that notwithstanding deceased was unable to form an intent to take his life, that the condition of the policy, i. e., "in case of his self-destruction, whether voluntary or involuntary, sane or insane," was valid and binding upon the deceased, as it is upon the parties hereto, and that no recovery can be had, except for the amount paid in assessments on said policy. Adkins v. Ins. Co., 70 Mo. 27; Hanford v. Ins. Co., supra; Sparks v. Life Indemnity Co., supra; Theobald v. Knights of Pythias, supra; De Gogorza v. Ins. Co., 65 N.Y. 232; Biglow v. Ins. Co., 93 U.S. 284; Riley v. Ins. Co., 25 F. 315; Salentine v. Ins. Co., 24 F. 159; Billings v. Ins. Co., 64 Vt. 78; Scarth v. Ins. Co., 75 Iowa 364; Dennis v. Ins. Co., 84 Cal. 570; 74 Mich. 592 and 611. (3) The contract between deceased, and respondent was, that in case of the self-destruction of said Greenabaum, "whether voluntary or involuntary, sane or insane, . . . . the policy should become null and void . . . . provided that in case of the self-destruction or suicide of the holder then this company will pay . . . . only such an amount on this policy as the member shall have paid to this company on this policy in assessments without interest." This was a valid agreement binding on all. A case exactly in point is Salentine v. Ins. Co., 24 F. 159.

Robinson, J. Judges Brace, Macfarlane and Burgess do not sit. Barclay, C. J., Gantt and Sherwood, JJ., concur.

OPINION

In Banc.

Robinson J.

-- This suit was instituted by the guardian of the heirs of one Joseph Greenabaum on the policy of insurance set out in the above agreed statement of facts for $ 5,000 in the first count of the petition, and for the further sum of $ 300, the amount of assessments alleged to have been paid to the defendant company by the said Greenabaum on said policy during his lifetime, in the second count. Defendant by answer admitted the making, issuance, and existence of the policy sued upon, and set out in full many of its conditions, terms and requirements, among which are the following: "In case of the self-destruction of the holder of this policy whether voluntary or involuntary, sane or insane . . . . the policy shall become null and void and the widow and heirs or devisees of such member shall have no claims for benefits on this company, provided that in case of such self-destruction or suicide of the holder of this policy, then this company will pay to his widow and heirs or devisees only such an amount on this policy as the member shall have paid to this company on this policy in assessments on same, without interest." And further pleaded that as a basis for the certificate or policy that was issued by defendant to said Greenabaum a written application signed by him was sent to the defendant company containing among others this question and his answer thereto: "On what basis as to amount do you desire to be admitted? Answer: $...