Hayward Union High School Dist. of Alameda County v. Madrid
| Decision Date | 30 April 1965 |
| Citation | 234 Cal.App.2d 100,44 Cal.Rptr. 268 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | HAYWARD UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT of ALAMEDA COUNTY, State of California, a public corporation, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Hazel A. MADRID, Joseph P. Cambra, Maria Constance Cambra, Albert M. Cambra, Edith Dolin, Luther Dolin, Eva A. Caramiho, Nora Williams and Mary Robeiro Lewis Pereria, Defendants and Appellants. Civ. 21483. |
Augustin Donovan, Edises, Grossman & Grogan, Oakland, Aubrey Grossman, San Francisco, for appellants.
J. F. Coakley, Dist. Atty., James E. Jefferis, Deputy Dist. Atty., Oakland, for respondent.
Defendants and cross-complainants Hazel A. Madrid, Joseph P. Cambra, Maria Constance Cambra, Albert M. Cambra, Edith Dolin, Luther Dolin, Eva A. Caramiho, Nora Williams and Mary Robeiro Lewis Pereria, appeal from the 'Order Granting Motion to Strike Answer, for Summary Judgment, and for Judgment on Pleadings' filed May 9, 1962, and the two Decrees Quieting Title entered June 21, 1962; from the Order dated August 2, 1962 denying motion to set aside the decrees and ordering entry nunc pro tunc as of May 14, 1962 of Summary Judgment and Judgment on Pleadings in favor of plaintiff and quieting plaintiff's title; and from the judgment entered thereon August 31, 1962 nune pro tunc as of May 14, 1962, and from the Order dated November 1, 1962 denying defendants' motion to set aside the order of August 2, 1962 and the judgment of May 28, 1962 which ordered entry of the Quiet Title decrees.
1. Which orders and judgments are appealable?
2. Did Judge Snook have power to order judgment entered on Judge Sherwin's order?
3. Plaintiff's duty (a) to show that it is entitled to judgment on its complaint, (b) to show that there are no triable issues on the cross-complaint.
4. Were the Summary Judgment and Judgment on the Pleadings proper?
In 1957, plaintiff filed a quiet title action against Thomas Bartlett Russell, certain designated other defendants, and 'all persons'. None of the defendants and cross-complainants concerned with this appeal were personally named but appeared under the 'all persons' coverage. Said defendants answered and cross-complained and plaintiff filed an answer to the cross-complaint.
On January 17, 1961, the default of defendant Russell, the other defendants named in the complaint and all persons was entered. As the appealing defendants had already answered and cross-complained, the default did not affect them, and in November 1961, upon motion, the issues concerning the appealing defendants were severed from those concerning the defaulting defendants and set for trial. 1
On December 18, 1961, plaintiff noticed motions for judgment on the pleadings and summary judgment and to strike defendants' answer and cross-complaint. The matter was heard by Judge Sherwin. On April 25 a minute order was entered granting the motions. On May 9, 1962, a formal order was signed by Judge Sherwin striking defendants' answer and dismissing their cross-complaint and also granting the motions for summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings. No formal judgment was entered. Defendants appeal from this order. As it is not appealable (see Code Civ.Proc. § 963), the appeal from it must be dismissed.
Judge Sherwin being no longer in office, plaintiff on May 28, 1962 appeared ex parte before Judge Chamberlain, and a minute order granting plaintiff Decrees Quieting Title was entered that day. On June 20, 1962, Judge Chamberlain signed two decrees quieting title in favor of plaintiff. They were entered June 21. The decrees dealt with different parcels of land. One decree affected the lands conveyed to plaintiff by defendants and their predecessors. The other decree (designated as 'decree recorded at reel 612, image 774-5 Official Records Alameda Co.') dealt with lands of Russell et al in which defendants had no interest. Defendants appealed from both decrees. However, on May 19, 1964 their appeal from the latter decree was dismissed by this court. So the latter decree is not before the court at this time. Defendants moved under Section 473, Code of Civil Procedure, for an order setting aside the two decrees. On August 2, 1962, an order signed by Judge Snook, before whom the motion was heard, was filed. This order denied the motion to set aside the decrees, and also ordered the clerk to enter nunc pro tunc, as of May 14, 1962 and pursuant to the order of Judge Sherwin, summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings. On August 31, the clerk entered judgment accordingly, nunc pro tunc as of May 14. Defendants appeal from both the order and the judgment. The order being an order after final judgment (the decrees of Judge Chamberlain were purportedly final judgments) the order is appealable (Code Civ.Proc. § 963). Obviously, the judgment entered by the clerk is appealable.
Defendants then moved under Code Civ.Proc. § 473 to set aside Judge Snook's order and the judgments entered thereon. This motion was denied by Judge Kroninger November 1. Defendants appeal from the order of denial. This order being after final judgment is likewise appealable.
Appeals properly before us are:
(1) Judge Chamberlain's June 21 decree quieting title in plaintiff.
(2) Clerk's judgment of August 31 based on Judge Snook's order and entered nunc pro tunc as of May 14.
(3) The August 2 order of Judge Snook denying motion under Section 473 to set aside the Chamberlain decrees and entering nunc pro tunc the May 14 judgments.
(4) Judge Kroninger's denial of defendants' motion to set aside the clerk's judgment of August 31.
From this hodge podge of orders it clearly appears that before the court are two basic matters: 1) the propriety of granting plaintiff judgment on the pleadings and summary judgment striking answer and cross-complaint and quieting plaintiff's title, and 2) if these judgments were properly granted, whether they should have been set aside on grounds permitted by Section 473. The Judge Chamberlain decrees of June 21.
The decree quieting plaintiff's title against defendants is a default decree, it reciting that no appearance had been made on behalf of any of the defendants. The theory on which the decree is based, as shown in its recitals, is that Judge Sherwin in his April 25 order had granted plaintiff's motion to strike defendants' answer and cross-complaint, and hence defendants no longer were before the court. Although Judge Sherwin's order is not appealable, it is reviewable on the appeal from the decrees based thereon. Judge Sherwin's order was not a final order. To be effective, it was necessary that judgment be entered thereon. This had not been done at the time of the Chamberlain decrees. Hence defendants were not in default and not being in default, the court had no jurisdiction to enter the quiet title decree based upon the theory that defendants had defaulted. The decree is void and must be reversed.
The court erred in denying defendants' motion to set aside the void decree and in ordering entry of judgment to quiet title thereon. The motion was made on the additional valid ground that defendants had no knowledge that the case was to be treated as uncontested or as a default case.
Judge Snook's order not only denied (erroneously as we have shown) defendants' motion to set aside the Chamberlain decree, but also directed the clerk to enter judgment nunc pro tunc pursuant to Judge Sherwin's order. The portion of the order directing entry of judgment on Judge Sherwin's order depends for its validity on the validity of the latter's order granting summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings and striking defendants' answer and cross-complaint. 2
The Summary Judgment.
The rules on summary judgment have been succinctly set forth in the recent case of Stationers Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 62 A.C. 427, 431-432, 42 Cal.Rptr. 449, 452, 398 P.2d 785, 788:
Plaintiff's complaint was the ordinary quiet title type. In addition to their answer, which was merely a general denial, defendants filed a cross-complaint, and later filed a second amended answer and cross-complaint. 3
The cross-complaint alleged that defendants deeded the parcels in question to plaintiff. Parcels 1-7 were deeded in 1946; parcel 8 in 1944. Grantors of parcels 1-7 admitted the deeds were duly accepted by resolutions of the district, though the grantor of parcel 8 denied acceptance by resolution.
Validity of the deeds, however, was disputed on numerous grounds. The allegations of the cross-complaint with respect to these grounds are summarized below:
First Cause of Action
This count applies to five of the eight grantors....
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