Hayward v. Ramick
| Decision Date | 06 January 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 37883,37883 |
| Citation | 248 Ga. 841,285 S.E.2d 697 |
| Parties | Mark Jeffrey HAYWARD, et al. v. Drayton RAMICK. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
G. Hughel Harrison, Lawrenceville, for Mark Jeffrey Hayward et al.
Herman L. Fussell, Charles V. Choyce, Jr., Stokes & Shapiro, Atlanta, for Drayton Ramick.
This case raises an issue of the constitutionality of the Georgia Parental Liability for Minor Children's Torts Act, Ga. Laws 1976, page 511 (Code Ann. § 105-113). A second issue relates to the admission of certain evidence contended to be in violation of provisions of the Georgia Juvenile Code. Code Ann. § 24A-2401(b).
Appellee alleged in his complaint that Mark Hayward (15) and Tony Wheat (15) burglarized his home causing certain property damage and was, therefore, liable under the theory of intentional tort. The parents of the two boys were also named defendants on the theory, inter alia, contained in Code Ann. § 105-113. That statute provides: "... every parent ... having in custody and control over a minor child or children under the age of 18 shall be liable in an amount not to exceed Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) for the wilful or malicious acts of said minor child or children resulting in damage to the property of another...."
The jury found in favor of the plaintiff and awarded damages against the boys and a sum against each parent within the $500 limit provided in the statute.
(1) The parents complain that their motion for directed verdict should have been granted on the ground the statute seeks to impose vicarious liability upon them without fault, contrary to the due process clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions.
We note that the predecessor of the statute under attack was enacted in 1956. Ga.Laws 1956, p. 699. For our purposes, the two statutes are similar except that the 1956 statute required an act of vandalism resulting in injury to the person or property of another. This court construed the word vandalism (wilful or malicious acts as are intended to destroy property) to have the effect of limiting application of the statute to damage to property and thus exclude personal injury. Vort v. Westbrook, 221 Ga. 39, 142 S.E.2d 813 (1965). In 1966 the General Assembly repealed the 1956 statute and enacted a new provision which eliminated the word "vandalism" and expressly included "death, injury or damage to the person or property, or both, of another." Ga.Laws 1966, p. 424. Five years later this court declared this later act unconstitutional. Corley v. Lewless, 227 Ga. 745, 182 S.E.2d 766 (1971). It was pointed out in Corley that other states had similar statutes, some of which had been upheld in constitutional challenges. Kelly v. Williams, Tex.Civ.App., 346 S.W.2d 434; General Insurance Co. v. Faulkner, 259 N.C. 317, 130 S.E.2d 645; Mahaney v. Hunter Enterprises, Wyo., 426 P.2d 442. There were features which the Corley opinion found to distinguish the Texas, North Carolina and Wyoming statutes from the Georgia statute: (1) scope limited to property damage; (2) limitation of $300 or $500 as to recovery; (3) the recovery in the nature of penalties, not having compensation of injured parties as the objective. On the other hand, it was found that the Georgia statute was not penal in nature but was intended to provide compensation for those injured. This court then wrote that the statute imposed "vicarious tort liability solely on the basis of the parent-child relationship." Without further analysis, it was held that the statute violated due process.
Following the hint laid down in Corley, supra, the General Assembly passed our present statute in 1976. Ga.Laws 1976, page 511. The expressed intent was to provide for aid in controlling juvenile delinquency and not to compensate victims for the conduct of children. A $500 limit of liability was enacted. In this case we are faced with a due process attack made upon the 1976 statute.
Corley, supra, stands alone among a number of opinions dealing with the constitutionality of parental responsibility statutes in various jurisdictions. The other statutes have uniformly been upheld. See, Vanthournout v. Burge, 69 Ill.App.3d 193, 25 Ill.Dec. 685, 387 N.E.2d 341 (1979) and cases cited therein. Some courts have accepted the distinction this court found in our previous statute, Rudnay v. Corbett, 53 Ohio App.2d 311, 374 N.E.2d 171, and others have not. In re Sorrell, 20 Md.App. 179, 315 A.2d 110, 115 (1974). While we do not reaffirm Corley, we do hold that the legislature has met the objections to Corley in the new statute with which we now deal.
Setting aside the history of our statute and prior decisions for the moment, we will...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Distinctive Printing and Packaging Co. v. Cox
...255, 722 P.2d 31 (1986), rev. denied 302 Or. 159, 727 P.2d 129; Bryan v. Kitamura, 529 F.Supp. 394 (D.Haw.1982); Hayward v. Ramick, 248 Ga. 841, 285 S.E.2d 697 (1982); Piscataway Tp. Bd. of Ed. v. Caffiero, 86 N.J. 308, 431 A.2d 799 (1981), appeal dismissed 454 U.S. 1025, 102 S.Ct. 560, 70 ......
-
William George T., In re
...one that makes parents or guardians liable in an amount not to exceed $5,000. See Ga.Code Ann. § 51-2-3 (Supp.1991). InHayward v. Ramick, 248 Ga. 841, 285 S.E.2d 697 (1982), the court held the new statute constitutional explaining there is a rational relationship between imposing liability ......
-
Waugh v. State
...does not disclose the 'disposition of a child' nor is it 'evidence adduced in a hearing in juvenile court.' " Hayward v. Ramick, 248 Ga. 841, 843-844(2), 285 S.E.2d 697 (1982). Accordingly, OCGA § 15-11-38(b) was not violated by the admission of the testimony. See also Houser v. State, 173 ......
-
Fairfax MK, Inc. v. City of Clarkston
...389 S.E.2d 329. This test includes the requirement that the regulation be neither arbitrary nor capricious. Hayward v. Ramick, 248 Ga. 841, 843(1), 285 S.E.2d 697 (1982); Rockdale County v. Mitchell's Used Auto Parts, 243 Ga. 465, 254 S.E.2d 846 (1979). However, the prohibition against arbi......