Distinctive Printing and Packaging Co. v. Cox

• Decision Date: 21 July 1989
• Docket Number: No. 87-654,87-654
• Citation: 443 N.W.2d 566,232 Neb. 846
• Parties: DISTINCTIVE PRINTING AND PACKAGING COMPANY, Appellant, v. Verlyn R. COX et al., Appellees.
• Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Page 566

443 N.W.2d 566

232 Neb. 846

DISTINCTIVE PRINTING AND PACKAGING COMPANY, Appellant, v. Verlyn R. COX et al., Appellees.

No. 87-654.

Supreme Court of Nebraska.

July 21, 1989.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Constitutional Law: Equal Protection. Neb. Const. art. III, § 18, concerns itself with disparate treatment in much the same manner as does the language of U.S. Const. amend. XIV, which prohibits a state from making or enforcing any law which denies any person within its jurisdiction "the equal protection of the laws."

2. Constitutional Law: Legislature: Statutes. Although the power of classification rests with the Legislature of this state, a statute which makes an artificial and baseless classification violates Neb. Const. art. III, § 18.

3. Constitutional Law: Legislature: Statutes. The Legislature is permitted to classify persons as long as, absent implication of a fundamental right or suspect classification, the categorization has a rational basis.

4. Constitutional Law: Equal Protection: Statutes: Proof. One attacking a statute as violative of equal protection under Neb. Const. art. III, § 18, has the burden of proving there is no rational basis for the classification.

5. Constitutional Law: Legislature: Statutes: Presumptions. In every constitutional challenge there attaches the presumption that all acts of the Legislature are constitutional, with all reasonable doubts resolved in favor of constitutionality.

6. Legislature: Statutes. When the Legislature seeks to inaugurate reforms in the area of economics or social welfare, it need not choose between attacking every aspect of the problem or not attacking the problem at all, as long as the action has a rational basis and is free from invidious discrimination.

7. Constitutional Law: Torts. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 43-801 (Reissue 1988) is related both to the legitimate governmental purpose of compensating property damage victims and at least in part compensating personal injury victims, and to the legitimate governmental purpose of deterring juvenile delinquency.

8. Constitutional Law: Equal Protection: Liability. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 43-801 (Reissue 1988) does not violate either the prohibition against special legislation contained in Neb. Const. art. III, § 18, or the equal protection clause of U.S. Const. amend. XIV on the ground that the liability of parents of children who intentionally inflict personal injury is limited and the liability of parents whose children intentionally inflict property damage is not.

9. Constitutional Law: Statutes: Liability. Whether vicarious liability can be imposed depends on whether the statute imposing such liability represents a proper exercise of the police power of the state.

10. Constitutional Law: Statutes. Statutes which are reasonably designed to protect the public safety, health, morals, and general welfare do not violate the Constitution where the statute operates uniformly on all within a class which is reasonable.

11. Constitutional Law: Due Process: Liability. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 43-801 (Reissue 1988) violates neither the due process clause contained in Neb. Const. art. I 12. Statutes: Liability: Damages: Penalties and Forfeitures. A statute which imposes liability for actual damages and additional liability for the same act exacts a penalty.

§ 3, [232 Neb. 847] nor that contained in U.S. Const. amend. XIV on the ground that it imposes vicarious liability.

13. Statutes: Liability: Damages: Penalties and Forfeitures. A statute which imposes liability only for actual damages exacts no penalty.

14. Criminal Law: Words and Phrases. A fine is a certain payment of money imposed as punishment for an offense; it is a pecuniary punishment imposed by a lawful tribunal upon a person convicted of crime or misdemeanor.

15. Constitutional Law: Damages: Penalties and Forfeitures. Punitive, vindictive, or exemplary damages contravene Neb. Const. art. VII, § 5, and thus are not allowed.

16. Damages: Penalties and Forfeitures. Punitive damages are given to the plaintiff over and above the full compensation for the injuries, for the purpose of punishing the defendant, of teaching the defendant not to again engage in the injurious conduct, and of deterring others from following the defendant's example.

17. Legislature: Statutes: Public Policy. The wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute is for the Legislature alone.

Richard E. O'Toole and Mark A. Weber, of Walentine, O'Toole, McQuillan & Gordon, Omaha, for appellant.

P. Shawn McCann, of Sodoro, Daly & Sodoro, Omaha, for appellee Cox.

Gordon M. Ryan, of Ryan & Seidler, Omaha, for appellee Hernandez.

Eugene P. Welch, of Gross, Welch, Vinardi, Kauffman & Day, P.C., Omaha, for appellee McCormick.

HASTINGS, C.J., and BOSLAUGH, WHITE, CAPORALE, SHANAHAN, GRANT, and FAHRNBRUCH, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff-appellant, Distinctive Printing and Packaging Company, seeks to recover $178,495.94 in damages from defendants-appellees, Verlyn R. Cox; his wife, Martha L. Cox; and Susana Hernandez, under the provisions of the parental liability statute, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 43-801 (Reissue 1988), asserting the defendants' respective resident minor sons willfully and intentionally set fire to plaintiff's property. So far as is relevant to this appeal, the defendants demurred on the ground that plaintiff's petition failed to state a cause of action because the statute is unconstitutional on state and federal equal protection and due process grounds. The district court sustained the demurrers and thereafter dismissed plaintiff's petition. In its appeal to this court, plaintiff asserts that the district court's dismissal of its action on the ground that the foregoing statute is unconstitutional in its entirety is erroneous. Pursuant to this court's order, the parties have also explored whether the statute suffers constitutional infirmity by imposing excessive fines for the failure to control one's errant children, or otherwise exacts penalties or punitive damages. Determining that the statute, whether wise or unwise, is constitutional, we reverse the district court's order of dismissal and remand the cause for further proceedings.

EQUAL PROTECTION

The statute reads as follows:

The parents shall be jointly and severally liable for the willful and intentional infliction of personal injury to any person or destruction of real and personal property occasioned by their minor or unemancipated children residing with them, or placed by them under the care of other persons; Provided, that in the event of personal injuries willfully and intentionally inflicted by such child or children, damages shall be recoverable only to the extent of hospital and medical expenses incurred but not to exceed the sum of one thousand dollars for each occurrence.

§ 43-801.

Defendants first contend that limiting the liability of parents whose children Although the power of classification rests with the Legislature of this state, a statute which makes an artificial and baseless classification violates article III, § 18. Snyder v. IBP, inc., 229 Neb. 224, 426 N.W.2d 261 (1988). The Legislature is permitted to classify persons as long as, absent implication of a fundamental right or suspect classification, the legislative categorization has a rational basis. Willis v. City of Lincoln, 232 Neb. 533, 441 N.W.2d 846 (1989); School Dist. No. 46 v. City of Bellevue, 224 Neb. 543, 400 N.W.2d 229 (1987). The defendants do not suggest that the statute involves a fundamental right or suspect classification. Thus, the task is one of determining whether a rational basis exists for the classification at issue. See, Payless Drug Stores v. Brown, 80 Or.App. 255, 722 P.2d 31 (1986), rev. denied 302 Or. 159, 727 P.2d 129; Bryan v. Kitamura, 529 F.Supp. 394 (D.Haw.1982); Hayward v. Ramick, 248 Ga. 841, 285 S.E.2d 697 (1982); Piscataway Tp. Bd. of Ed. v. Caffiero, 86 N.J. 308, 431 A.2d 799 (1981), appeal dismissed 454 U.S. 1025, 102 S.Ct. 560, 70 L.Ed.2d 470. The defendants, being the parties attacking the statute as violative of equal protection under article III, § 18, and the 14th amendment, have the burden of proving there is no rational basis for treating the parents of children causing personal injury differently from the parents of children causing property damage. Otto v. Hahn, 209 Neb. 114, 306 N.W.2d 587 (1981).

                inflict intentional personal injury but not limiting the liability of parents whose children inflict intentional property damage denies the latter class of parents equal protection of the law.  Neb. Const. art.  III, § 18, prohibits the Nebraska Legislature from, among other things, passing any law which grants "any special or exclusive" privilege or [232 Neb. 849] immunity, and further provides that, except for certain matters relating to loans and installment sales, "where a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted."   Thus, article III, § 18, concerns itself with disparate treatment in much the same manner as does the language of U.S. Const. amend.  XIV, which prohibits a state from making or enforcing any law which denies any person within its jurisdiction "the equal protection of the laws."   See, Drennen v. Drennen, 229 Neb. 204, 426 N.W.2d 252 (1988);  Porter v. Jensen, 223 Neb. 438, 390 N.W.2d 511 (1986)
                

In analyzing the questions presented by this appeal, we must bear in mind that in every constitutional challenge there attaches the presumption that all acts of the Legislature are constitutional with all reasonable doubts resolved in favor of constitutionality. Landon v. Pettijohn, 231 Neb. 837, 438 N.W.2d 757 (1989); Otto v. Hahn, supra.

We begin by noting that other courts considering the matter have generally concluded that parental liability statutes such as § 43-801 are rationally related to the legitimate governmental purposes of compensating victims and deterring juvenile delinquency. See, Bryan v. Kitamura, supra; Alber v. Nolle, 98 N.M. 100, 645 P.2d...