Hazle v. Ford Motor Co.

• Decision Date: 03 July 2001
• Docket Number: Docket No. 116162, Calendar No. 9.
• Citation: 464 Mich. 456,628 N.W.2d 515
• Parties: Blossom J. HAZLE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY and Ford-UAW Retirement Board of Administration, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

628 N.W.2d 515

464 Mich. 456

Blossom J. HAZLE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY and Ford-UAW Retirement Board of Administration, Defendants-Appellants.

Docket No. 116162, Calendar No. 9.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued April 4, 2001.

Decided July 3, 2001.

Thomas E. Marshall, P.C. (by Thomas E. Marshall and Janice Williams-Jones), Troy, MI, for the plaintiff-appellee.

Kienbaum, Opperwall, Hardy & Pelton, P.L.C. (by Elizabeth Hardy and Eric J. Pelton), Birmingham, MI, for the defendants-appellants.

Opinion

YOUNG, J.

After being denied a promotion, plaintiff filed suit on the ground that she had been discriminated against on the basis of her race, in violation of the Michigan Civil Rights Act. M.C.L. § 37.2101 et seq. The trial court granted summary disposition in favor of defendants, but the Court of Appeals reversed.

We granted leave in order to further clarify the proper application of the burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), for the purpose of analyzing proofs in discrimination cases. We now reverse the Court of Appeals decision and reinstate the trial court's order granting summary disposition to defendants.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff is a black woman with an undergraduate degree in English. She has also completed a portion of the course work required for a master's degree in industrial relations.

In July 1980, plaintiff began working as a pension clerk for the Ford-UAW Retirement Board of Administration, which administers pension benefits for the UAW retirees of Ford Motor Company. Plaintiff was responsible for processing various types of retirement applications, which included "filing, typing ... answering the phone and helping retirees and surviving spouses and company union rep[resentatives] with problems regarding pensions." She also set up medical evaluations for disability retirement applicants.

In late 1994, when the longtime manager of plaintiff's office decided to retire, the board placed the following advertisement:

OFFICE MANAGER

Seeking individual with an Office Manager background to direct the activities of a 6 person office responsible for the administration of pension benefits for over 85,000 pensioners of a major automotive retirement plan.

The qualified individual should have a BS degree in finance or accounting, have strong communication skills, and have office experience directing the work of others. The position is responsible for preparation of the payroll and accounts payable, maintenance of administrative records, and other retirement plan activities.

Plaintiff applied for the job. Among the other applicants were Christine Ewald, another of the pension clerks,¹ and Michelle Block, an outside candidate.² Each is white. Block's réesumée indicated that she recently had been employed as "supervisor of financial and management reporting" at a medical laboratory and, before that, had been "sales audit supervisor" for a fortytwo store chain of automotive parts retailers.

In a letter on Ford Motor Company stationery, plaintiff was informed that she would be given an interview. The letter also stated that her resume had been "reviewed and determined to satisfy the requirements outlined for this opening."

Two members of the board, Donald Harris, a UAW employee, and Mark Savitskie, who worked for Ford, interviewed the candidates for the office manager position. On the basis of the resumes and interviews,³ the two selected Block, whom the board then hired. Plaintiff learned of the board's hiring decision in a second letter from Ford, which thanked her for her interest in the position. The Ford letter reiterated to plaintiff that "[her] experience and education were in line with our expectations and the requirements of the position."

Fourteen months after learning that she would not be promoted, plaintiff filed the present suit in circuit court. Proceeding under the Civil Rights Act, she alleged that defendants "did not offer the position of Office Manager to Plaintiff because Plaintiff is an African-American."

Defendants moved for summary disposition. Although defendants' motion and brief did not indicate expressly which part of the court rule they were relying on, it is evident that they were seeking summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). Defendants argued that plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas, supra. They further argued that, even if plaintiff could offer a prima facie case, she failed to offer evidence that defendants' stated reason for hiring Block, that she was more qualified, was a mere pretext for discrimination.

Plaintiff responded that Block was in fact not qualified, and that she committed "réesumé fraud" in representing her educational and employment background.⁴ Noting that Block's alleged misrepresentations did not surface until after discovery began in this case, the trial court granted defendants' motion, concluding as follows:

The Court is satisfied that I don't have to get to the pretext issue, because we haven't established a prima facie case of discrimination. The Court's going to kick it under (C)(10).

The Court of Appeals reversed over the dissent of Judge Kelly.⁵

We granted defendants' application for leave to appeal. 463 Mich. 928, 619 N.W.2d 535 (2000).

II. Standard of Review

We review de novo a trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition. A motion for summary disposition brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual support of a claim. After reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, a trial court may grant summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) if there is no genuine issue concerning any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Smith v. Globe Life Ins. Co., 460 Mich. 446, 453, 597 N.W.2d 28 (1999).

III. Analysis

A. Direct Versus Indirect Evidence of Discrimination

Plaintiff claims that defendants discriminated against her on the basis of race in violation of M.C.L. § 37.2202(1)(a), which provides, in relevant part:

(1) An employer shall not do any of the following:

(a) Fail or refuse to hire or recruit, discharge, or otherwise discriminate against an individual with respect to employment, compensation, or a term, condition, or privilege of employment, because of religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex, height, weight, or marital status.

In some discrimination cases, the plaintiff is able to produce direct evidence of racial bias. In such cases, the plaintiff can go forward and prove unlawful discrimination in the same manner as a plaintiff would prove any other civil case. DeBrow v. Century 21 Great Lakes, Inc. (After Remand), 463 Mich. 534, 537-539, 620 N.W.2d 836 (2001); Matras v. Amoco Oil Co., 424 Mich. 675, 683-684, 385 N.W.2d 586 (1986). For purposes of the analogous federal Civil Rights Act, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has defined "direct evidence" as "evidence which, if believed, requires the conclusion that unlawful discrimination was at least a motivating factor in the employer's actions." Jacklyn v. Schering-Plough Healthcare Products Sales Corp., 176 F.3d 921, 926 (C.A.6, 1999); see also Harrison v. Olde Financial Corp., 225 Mich.App. 601, 610, 572 N.W.2d 679 (1997).

In many cases, however, no direct evidence of impermissible bias can be located. In order to avoid summary disposition, the plaintiff must then proceed through the familiar steps set forth in McDonnell Douglas, supra at 802-803, 93 S.Ct. 1817. The McDonnell Douglas approach allows a plaintiff "to present a rebuttable prima facie case on the basis of proofs from which a factfinder could infer that the plaintiff was the victim of unlawful discrimination." DeBrow, supra at 537-538, 620 N.W.2d 836. Although originally created for use in race discrimination cases, we have adopted the McDonnell Douglas approach for use in age and gender discrimination cases brought under the Michigan Civil Rights Act as well. See Lytle v. Malady (On Rehearing), 458 Mich. 153, 172-178, 579 N.W.2d 906 (1998). Because plaintiff here has offered no direct evidence of race discrimination, she is constrained to rely on the McDonnell Douglas framework.

Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must first offer a "prima facie case" of discrimination. Here, plaintiff was required to present evidence that (1) she belongs to a protected class, (2) she suffered an adverse employment action, (3) she was qualified for the position, and (4) the job was given to another person under circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. Lytle, supra at 172-173, 579 N.W.2d 906; see also Texas Dep't. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254, n. 6, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); McDonnell Douglas, supra at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817.⁶

When the plaintiff "has sufficiently established a prima facie case, a presumption of discrimination arises." Lytle, supra at 173, 579 N.W.2d 906. In Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978), the Court explained that the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case raises an inference of discrimination "because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors."

However, the fact that a plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas does not necessarily preclude summary disposition in the defendant's favor. As the Supreme Court explained in Burdine, supra at 254, n. 7, 101 S.Ct. 1089:

The phrase "prima facie case" not only may denote the establishment of a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption, but also may be used by courts to describe the plaintiff's burden of producing enough evidence to permit the trier of fact to infer the fact at issue. McDonnell Douglas should have made it apparent that in the Title

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