Hazlet v. Gaunt

• Decision Date: 14 October 1952
• Docket Number: No. 16890,16890
• Citation: 250 P.2d 188,126 Colo. 385
• Parties: HAZLET et al. v. GAUNT et al.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 188

250 P.2d 188

126 Colo. 385

HAZLET et al. v. GAUNT et al.

No. 16890.

Supreme Court of Colorado, en Banc.

Oct. 14, 1952.

Maurice W. Konkel, Sterling, Isaac Mellman, Denver, for plaintiffs in error.

Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., H. Lawrence Hinkley, Deputy Atty. Gen., Wilbur Rocchio, Asst. Atty. Gen., for State Commissioner of Education.

Lyman P. Weld, Longmont, Emory L. O'Connell, Denver, for all defendants in error except State Commissioner of Education.

MOORE, Justice.

We will herein refer to the parties as they appeared in the trial court, where plaintiffs in error were plaintiffs and defendants in error were defendants.

Plaintiffs are citizens and taxpayers residing in Adams county, and their places of residence are within school districts which were added, in whole or in part, to School District No. 27 under procedures authorized by The School District Reorganization Act of 1949. Chapter 224, page 636, Session Laws of Colorado 1949. In their complaint, the legality of the reorganization of the new district was questioned upon constitutional, and other, grounds. They alleged that the defendant members of the school board for the new district were proceeding under the purported powers designated to them by said Act to issue bonds in the sum of $936,000 for school purposes, and that the contemplated bond issue would be illegal and without authority of law.

The prayer of plaintiffs' complaint was for judgment that all acts of defendants performed in the capacity of the County Committee on school reorganization, together with all acts of defendants performed in the capacity of members of the newly created school district and as public officials in furtherance of said reorganization, be declared null and void, and that defendants be enjoined from further acts based upon the validity of said reorganization.

Defendants in their answer placed all material questions of fact in issue. Trial was to the court and resulted in judgment in their favor. Plaintiffs seeking a reversal of this judgment bring the case here by writ of error.

The School District Reorganization Act of 1949 establishes procedures for the reorganization of school districts and defines in detail the steps to be taken in the accomplishment of that objective. The selection of a County Committee is authorized and this body is empowered to set in motion a chain of events which ultimately leads to an election to determine whether the plan of reorganization, which the committee and State Commissioner of Education approve, shall become effective. These procedures were followed in the instant case. An election was held in conformity with the statute, whereby the proposed reorganization of school districts was approved by a majority of the voters casting ballots under the qualifications fixed by the Act.

Section 14 of the Act provides, inter alia:

'The plan for reorganization shall contain a specific proposal for the equitable adjustment and distribution of all, or any part, of the properties and cash assets of the districts involved.'

Section 22 of the Act provides, inter alia:

'Electors voting in said election shall be taxpaying electors, shall be of the age of twenty-one years, citizens of the United States, and shall have resided in the State for twelve months immediately preceding the election and shall have resided in the area of the 'proposed district' for at least ninety days immediately preceding said election.'

Section 25 of the Act provides, inter alia:

'If a majority of the votes cast in the area of the 'proposed new district' shall vote in favor of said reorganization the same 'new district' shall upon the sixtieth day after certification of the results of said election to the County Superintendent, be and become a body corporate under the name, style and number in the plan, and in that name may take, hold and convey property, both real and personal, and be a party to suits and contracts in the same manner and to the same extent as municipal corporations of this state; * * *.'

The said Act further provides that, in determining the boundaries of a new district, 'present district boundaries may be disregarded, and districts, or parts of districts may be included in a new district proposed to be organized, * * *.' Section 15. In those instances where the new district embraces all the area of a former district, the school funds, except those for the retirement of bonded indebtedness, and assets of the old district become the property of the new district. Where only a portion of an old district is included within the area of the new district the moneys of the former are apportioned as provided by section 66, chapter 146, '35 C.S.A. Section 29.

Section 30 of the Act provides, inter alia, that:

'When a 'new district' formed under this Act shall embrace all of a Union or County High School district such Union or County High School District shall be automatically dissolved and the properties and funds, except funds then on hand or to be received under existing tax levies, after providing for all outstanding indebtedness and obligations, except bonded indebtedness, shall become the property of the 'new district".

The new district involved in this cause is described as District No. 27. It extends the old District No. 27 to include all of three former separate districts and portions of four others. Old District No. 27 included the city of Brighton and surrounding area, most of which is heavily populated, whereas the districts absorbed in whole or in part are for the most part rural areas with comparatively few inhabitants. By the reorganization, the area of District No. 27 was doubled and the assessed valuation of included properties was increased from $7,980,230 to $9,360,440.

Plaintiffs contend that the provisions of the statute, fixing the qualifications of voters and authorizing formation of the new district upon majority vote of the qualified electors within the entire district, result in the sparsely inhabited rural districts being forced against the will of a majority of the inhabitants thereof to become part of the new district. It is argued by counsel for plaintiffs that this amounts to a violation of their constitutional right to due process of law. They further assert that the Act contravenes sections 2 and 15 of Article IX of the Constitution of Colorado, which read as follows:

Section 2: 'The general assembly shall, as soon as practicable, provide for the establishment and maintenance of a thorough and uniform system of free public schools throughout the state, wherein all residents of the state, between the ages of six and twenty-one years, may be educated gratuitously. One or more public schools shall be maintained in each school district within the state, at least three months in each year; any school district failing to have such school shall not be entitled to receive any portion of the school fund for that year.'

Section 15: 'The general assembly shall, by law, provide for organization of school districts of convenient size, in each of which shall be established a board of education, to consist of three or more directors to be elected by the qualified electors of the district. Said directors shall have control of instruction in the public schools of their respective districts.'

It further is argued that since the area included within the new district is nearly doubled, children are not provided a 'thorough and uniform system of free public schools', and that the enlarged district is not designed to serve a particular community in that it is not compact and is not of 'convenient size' as required by section 15 of Article IX above quoted. Finally, it is contended that the Act in question amounts to unlawful delegation of legislative power to the County Committee.

Questions to be Determined

First: In authorizing procedures for the reorganization of school districts, does the legislature have the power to provide for the inclusion of existing districts, or portions thereof, in a new proposed district, and to direct transfer of assets of the existing districts to the new one, notwithstanding the fact that the existing districts and a majority of the electors residing therein may in fact oppose the reorganization and the resultant transfer of assets?

This question is answered in the affirmative. We direct attention to the fact that plaintiffs in this action appear as individual citizens and taxpayers living in areas included within school districts affected by the reorganization plan in question. They allege that they have paid taxes in support of public school districts and that said districts have been abolished by the action of the defendants. No school district, through its authorized officers, appears in objection to the proposed reorganization. Before an individual taxpayer could successfully contend that he was denied property without due process of law, because of the inclusion or exclusion of the area occupied by him from a reorganization of school districts, it would be necessary to accept as a premise the proposition that an individual taxpayer has an interest in school property which is protected by the constitution against deprivation thereof without due process of law. We think it is well established that an individual taxpayer has no such property interest in assets devoted to school purposes.

In Gorrell v. Bevans, 66 Colo. 67, 179 P. 337, we said:

'The territory of the district is not its property, but merely within its 'jurisdiction,' if we may so use that word. The Legislature changes the boundaries of counties and other quasi municipal corporations at will, without violating anybody's constitutional rights, which it could not do if the land were property. There is, therefore, no question of due process of law concerning the transfer of the territory.

'The argument that the schoolhouse or some interest therein is the property of the directors or individual taxpayers, and that by...