Hazleton v. City of Atlanta

• Citation: 87 S.E. 1043,144 Ga. 775
• Decision Date: 26 February 1916
• Docket Number: 280.
• Parties: HAZLETON ET AL. v. CITY OF ATLANTA.
• Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

87 S.E. 1043

144 Ga. 775

HAZLETON ET AL. v. CITY OF ATLANTA.

No. 280.

Supreme Court of Georgia

February 26, 1916

Syllabus by the Court.

The ordinance of the city of Atlanta regulating the licensing and operation of what are known as "jitney busses," and requiring the giving, by the person operating such vehicle of an indemnity bond in the sum of $5,000 for each vehicle so operated, is not invalid on the ground that it violates article 7, § 2, par. 1, of the Constitution of this state (Civ. Code 1910, § 6553), which provides that all taxation shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects; nor on the ground that it is discriminatory against persons engaged in the business of operating such vehicles, and in favor of other persons operating taxicabs and like vehicles, which the plaintiffs in error contend are of the same class as jitney busses.

Such ordinance is not invalid on the ground that it imposes upon persons operating jitney busses a much larger license fee than that imposed upon persons operating taxicabs; nor on the ground that the graded license fee imposed by such ordinance (being $75 for a motor bus having a seating capacity of four persons or less, including the driver, $100 for a motor bus having a seating capacity of more than four and less than eight persons, $175 [$125?] for each motor bus having a seating capacity of more than seven and less than ten persons, and $150 for each motor bus having a seating capacity of more than ten persons) is unreasonable.

Nor is such ordinance invalid on the ground that the requirement of the indemnity bond is unreasonable and oppressive as to the amount thereof. Greene v. City of San Antonio (Tex. Civ App.) 178 S.W. 6; Ex parte Sullivan (Tex. Cr. App.) 178 S.W. 537; City of Memphis v. State ex rel. Ryals (Tenn.) 179 S.W. 631; Ex parte Dickey (W. Va.) 85 S.E 781, L.R.A. 1915F, 840, and note; Le Blanc v. City of New Orleans (La.) 70 So. 212.

The majority of the court are of the opinion that, except as to those grounds dealt with in the foregoing headnotes, the grounds of attack upon the ordinance brought into question in this case, claiming that it is unconstitutional, because violative of certain specified sections and provisions of the Constitution of this state and of the federal Constitution are too general to raise a question for decision by the court. While the ordinance is referred to as a unit, a casual reading of it discloses that it is made up of many units, each containing a different provision regulatory of the business of operating motor busses, commonly called "jitneys," or "jitney busses." Many of these provisions are absolutely independent of others embodied in the same ordinance or general body of municipal laws upon the subject, many of which are clearly free from all of the objections presented, and could stand and be enforced, even if certain of the provisions embraced in this general ordinance were stricken out upon the ground that they are unconstitutional and invalid. In this respect the case is controlled by the ruling in the case of Rooks v. Tindall, 138 Ga. 863, 76 S.E. 378. Evans, P.J., and Lumpkin, J., are of the opinion that the case is not in this respect controlled by that just cited, and that the ruling there made on the question of practice should not be extended. They are of the opinion that other grounds of objection to the ordinance in question, as being violative of certain specified sections of the state and federal Constitutions, are sufficiently made to require a ruling upon them. They concur in the judgment as to the points ruled on the merits, but dissent from the ruling on the question of practice. A decision on the merits of the points thus sought to be made being eliminated by the ruling of the majority of the court, they concur in the judgment of affirmance.

Beck and Hill, JJ., dissenting.

Injunction by J. F. Hazleton and others against the City of Atlanta. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiffs bring error. Affirmed.

Ordinance regulating "jitney busses" held not discriminatory.

On the 9th day of April, 1915, the city of Atlanta, through its governing body, adopted the following ordinance, to take effect after five days:

"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation, either as principal, agent, or employé, to use occupy, or operate upon any of the streets or public places of the city of Atlanta any motor bus, or to act as driver or chauffeur thereof, without complying with the provisions of this ordinance applying to such ownership, operation, or to the position of driver or chauffeur thereof, or any of the regulations herein ordained.

Sec. 2. That a 'motor bus,' as the term is used in this ordinance, is hereby defined to be any motor-propelled vehicle operated over the streets and public places of the city, for the purpose of carrying passengers for hire, which receives and discharges passengers along the route traversed by said vehicle. This definition does not apply to any street or interurban railway, or motor-propelled vehicles used exclusively for sight-seeing purposes, or to motor-propelled vehicles used exclusively as hotel busses, or to any motor-propelled vehicle which is rented from a fixed stand in the street, or from a private or public garage, and the destination of which is under the direction of the passenger or passengers transported therein. The term 'driver' is hereby defined as a person driving a 'motor bus.' The term 'motor bus' is further ordained to include machines or cars called 'jitneys' or 'jitney busses.'

Sec. 3. It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation, either as owner, lessee, or possessor in any right, to engage in the business of operating a motor bus without first obtaining a license therefor from the city clerk and complying with the following requirements:

(1) The payment of a license fee for each motor bus, which license is hereby ordained as follows: First. For each motor bus having a seating capacity of four persons or less including driver, $75.00. Second. For each motor bus having a seating capacity of more than four and less than eight persons, including driver, $100.00. Third. For each motor bus having a seating capacity of more than seven and less than ten persons, including driver, $175.00. Fourth. For each motor bus having a seating capacity of more than ten persons, including driver, $150.00. This license is fixed for a period of one year, no license to be issued for a period of less than six months.

(2) Said clerk shall not issue such license until the applicant shall file with the clerk statement in writing, giving the number of busses proposed to be operated, the seating capacity of each, name of applicant, and his or her address or place of business. The statement shall furthermore describe the bus or busses to be used, and shall also give the make of each car, factory number, motor number, and number of passengers each bus is capable of carrying.

(3) The applicant, before receiving said license, shall file a written statement clearly setting forth the route upon which the bus or busses are to be operated and the terminal points of such routes. However, the licensee may change these routes at any time by filing a statement to that effect with the mayor and general council before making the change.

(4) If the applicant be a corporation, it shall, before receiving the license, file with the clerk a certified copy of its charter, accompanied with the statement showing the amount of capital actually paid into the corporation, and the names and places of residence of all the officers thereof.

(5) Such applicant shall likewise file with the city clerk, and from time to time as changes are made, a list stating the name, age, and residence of each driver employed by said applicant, or as soon

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