Head v. State
| Decision Date | 25 February 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. S92A1249,S92A1249 |
| Citation | 426 S.E.2d 547,262 Ga. 795 |
| Parties | HEAD v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Steven P. Berne and Michael Mears, Atlanta, for Head.
Robert E. Wilson, Dist. Atty., Stone Mountain Judicial Circuit, Robert W. Houman, Asst. Dist. Atty., Decatur and Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Atlanta, for the State.
Stacy Y. Cole, Asst. Dist. Atty., Decatur.
Rachelle L. Strausner, Staff Atty., Atlanta.
Susan V. Boleyn, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Law, Atlanta.
The appellant, Keevin Cornelius Head, was convicted and sentenced for the malice murder of Carol Williams Murdaugh, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. 1 For the following reasons, we affirm.
The victim, Murdaugh, was reported missing on July 15, 1991. On July 29, based on a lead about Head's involvement with the victim, Head was arrested on an outstanding probation violation. Head was questioned about the disappearance of Murdaugh and gave four separate statements. The third and fourth statements Head made were incriminating. In the third statement, Head stated that he considered himself to be romantically involved with the victim. Head further stated that on the day of the crime he and the victim were arguing while riding in his car when the victim told the appellant that he was a "nobody in her life." According to Head, during the same car trip, he took out his gun to show it to the victim and, when he attempted to grip it, it accidentally fired and hit her in the head.
After this statement, Head agreed to lead the detectives to the body, but then stalled, and, when asked why he was stalling, admitted that he did not want the detectives to find the body because he knew that it would reveal that he had been lying to them in his pre-trial statements about how the shooting took place. Head did, however, voluntarily lead police officers to the victim's shallow grave.
In Head's fourth statement, which was given after he had led police to the body, Head related essentially the events as those he had related in his third statement except that he added that the gun fired accidentally approximately six or seven times.
The desk clerk at the motel where Head had been staying at the time of the incident contradicted the version of events that Head gave in his statements. She stated that Head called her on the morning of July 16, 1991, and informed her that he and the victim had ridden around; that he had pulled over and asked the victim to get out and walk and talk; and that as they walked he put a gun to the victim's head and shot her several times. The desk clerk also testified that Head had told her at some point during the two weeks before the victim's death that he had decided to shoot the victim because she was not interested in their relationship because Head had refused to loan her $500.
Forensic evidence showed that the type of pistol used by Head could not have been converted to an automatic mode that might have allowed the gun to accidentally unload multiple shots into the victim. Moreover, there was testimony that the location of the bloodstains in the car and the location of the bullet holes in the victim's body showed that the shooting did not take place in the car.
There was also evidence introduced at trial that at the time of the homicide Head had previously been convicted of two counts of criminal attempt to commit theft by taking.
Head did not testify at trial and did not offer any other witnesses in his defense.
1. In his sixth enumeration of error, Head contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his murder conviction. However, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found Head guilty of malice murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
2. In his first enumeration of error, Head contends that the trial court expressed partiality to the victim in refusing to accept Head's plea of guilty to voluntary manslaughter and that the court therefore abused its discretion in refusing to accept the plea. We find no error. Although the trial court did state that its job was to protect the rights of the victim and the accused, that the crime was a "black on black crime," and that there were not many people there "on behalf of the victim," a review of the lengthy discussions concerning the guilty plea make clear that the trial court refused to accept Head's plea of guilty to voluntary manslaughter because the court believed there was insufficient evidence to support that crime and not because the court was partial toward the victim. The court did not err in rejecting the plea. See Pass v. State, 227 Ga. 730(3), 182 S.E.2d 779 (1971); Echols v. State, 167 Ga.App. 307(1), 306 S.E.2d 324 (1983); Uniform Superior Court Rule 33.9 ().
3. In his second enumeration of error, Head argues that his pre-trial statements should not have been entered into evidence.
a. Concerning his first statement, Head contends he was informed he would be questioned about the probation violation warrant and was not informed he would be questioned about the disappearance of Murdaugh. He also contends he requested an attorney before questioning began. However, the transcript of the Jackson-Denno hearing contains evidence showing that Head was informed he would be questioned about the Murdaugh case, that he was read his Miranda rights, that he signed a waiver-of-rights form, and that he did not invoke his right to an attorney. This evidence supports the trial court's findings that Head was informed of the nature of the charges against him and waived his Miranda rights. Because we must defer to the trial court's findings unless clearly erroneous, and because the court's findings were not clearly erroneous, we find no error in the court's decision to admit Head's first statement into evidence. Terry v. State, 259 Ga. 165, 169(2), 377 S.E.2d 837 (1989).
b. Head next contends that his last three statements should have been suppressed because he was not re-advised of his Miranda rights and because the officers denied him food and sleep over the approximately 26 hour period in which the four statements were made. Head also contends he was threatened with the electric chair if he did not cooperate.
However, again, the transcript of the Jackson-Denno hearing contains evidence supporting the trial court's findings that Head was not denied food and sleep, that he was not threatened, and that he freely and voluntarily waived his rights and made the statements. White v. State, 255 Ga. 210, 212, 336 S.E.2d 777 (1985). Moreover, the transcript supports the trial court's finding that Head was fully re-advised of his Miranda rights before the third statement, and was asked before the second and fourth statements if he understood the rights of which he had previously been informed. We conclude that Head was adequately apprised of his rights. See Newberry v. State, 260 Ga. 416, 419(4), 395 S.E.2d 813 (1990).
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court did not err in admitting the last three statements into evidence.
4. In Counts 1 through 6 of his indictment Head was indicted respectively of the following: malice murder; felony murder with the underlying offense being aggravated assault; felony murder with the underlying offense being possession of a firearm by a convicted felon; aggravated assault; possession of a firearm by a convicted felon; and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. Appellant moved the court during pre-trial motions to bifurcate the trial on Count 5 from Counts 1 through 4 and Count 6. The trial court denied the motion. The jury returned a verdict finding appellant guilty of all six charged counts. 2
In his third enumeration of error, Head contends the court committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury about the limited relevance to the indictment as a whole of Count 6. However, because Head relies on cases dealing with problems arising in murder trials from counts involving the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, we read this enumeration as attacking the trial court's failure to instruct the jury as to the relevance of Count 5 of the indictment. In this regard, we find no error.
As the appellant concedes, in Head v. State, 253 Ga. 429, 432, 322 S.E.2d 228 (1984), we held that, upon request, a trial court must give a limiting instruction concerning the evidence of prior convictions. Head, however, contends that in Kellum v. State, 258 Ga. 536, 371 S.E.2d 405 (1988), we modified the rule of Head so as to place an affirmative duty on a trial court to give a limiting instruction even absent a request. Kellum does contain language to the effect that a trial court "shall " give a limiting instruction and does not predicate the necessity for the instruction upon a request by the defendant. However, the opinion in Kellum is silent regarding whether a request to charge was made in that case, and if one was made, Kellum would be consistent with Head. In any event, we hold that to the extent Kellum appears to negate the requirement of a request to charge, Kellum is overruled. We so hold, first, because we have reiterated the...
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