Heath v. L.E. Schwartz & Son, Inc., A90A2149

• Decision Date: 15 March 1991
• Docket Number: No. A90A2149,A90A2149
• Citation: 199 Ga.App. 452,405 S.E.2d 290
• Parties: HEATH v. L.E. SCHWARTZ & SON, INC., et al.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 290

405 S.E.2d 290

199 Ga.App. 452

HEATH v. L.E. SCHWARTZ & SON, INC., et al.

No. A90A2149.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

March 15, 1991.

Rehearing Denied March 29, 1991.

Certiorari Denied May 15, 1991.

Reynolds & McArthur, Charles M. Cork III, Macon, for appellant.

Jones, Cork & Miller, Wallace Miller III, Rufus D. Sams III, Macon, for appellees.

SOGNIER, Chief Judge.

Gordon Heath brought suit against L.E. Schwartz & Sons, Inc. ("Schwartz") and Samuel Mays, seeking damages for injuries he allegedly incurred in a collision between the van Heath was driving and the truck driven by Mays and owned by Schwartz. The jury awarded Heath $516,961.41. Apparently unsatisfied with the verdict, Heath appeals.

The transcript reveals that at the time of the accident in March 1987, appellant was 54 years old and was driving a van specially equipped to accommodate appellant's wheelchair, which he had been using since contracting polio in 1949. The evidence sharply conflicted whether the collision that occurred was unavoidable, and the $768,830.42 in special damages claimed by appellant as resulting from the collision were vigorously contested.

Appellant's sole enumeration of error is that the trial court erred by refusing to give his request to charge no. 11 "that [appellees] bore the burden of proving [appellant's] contributory negligence." (Emphasis supplied.) An examination of that requested charge reveals that in the final sentence, appellant specifically sought to limit the instruction to a consideration of whether appellees, as defendants, had "the burden to prove [their] contentions that [appellant] was contributorily negligent." (Emphasis supplied.) Other than the charge placing the burden of proof on appellant to make out his case by a preponderance of the evidence, it is uncontroverted that no reference was made to appellees' burden of proof as to affirmative defenses, not even the affirmative defense of contributory negligence as requested by appellant. The trial court did, however, charge the jury that "if [appellant's] negligence was the sole cause of his injury and damage, if he was negligent, then he could not recover," an abbreviated charge which embodies the principle of contributory negligence as it has existed in Georgia for well over one hundred years. See, e.g., Central R. Co. v. Brinson, 64 Ga. 475, 478-479 (1880). For an enlightening discussion of the distinction between contributory and comparative negligence, see Whatley v. Henry, 65 Ga.App. 668, 674-675, 16 S.E.2d 214 (1941). The trial court also instructed the jury on comparative negligence, proximate cause, and pre-existing injury.

Pretermitting the question whether the incompleteness of appellant's request to charge no. 11 (its final sentence limiting consideration of affirmative defenses to contributory negligence, without addressing the burden on a defendant to prove the affirmative defense of comparative negligence) provided a basis for the trial court's refusal to give the requested charge, even assuming, arguendo, that the trial court's failure to give appellant's request to charge was error, that error does not require reversal here. "[I]t has long been the rule that when a verdict has been returned in favor of the plaintiff, errors in the giving of the charge, in omissions from the charge or in the refusal of requests which go to the matter of liability only are harmless to the plaintiff and afford no ground for reversal at his instance. [Cits.]" Maloy v. Dixon, 127 Ga.App. 151, 155-156 (2)(b), 193 S.E.2d 19 (1972). Because contributory negligence, as explained in the instruction given the jury in the case sub judice, serves to bar a plaintiff from recovering any damages when the jury determines that the plaintiff's negligence was the sole proximate cause of his own injuries, it follows that the jury must have rejected the theory of contributory negligence when it renders an award of damages in the plaintiff's favor. Hence, case law has long noted that an award of damages "renders harmless any error committed by the court in charging the jury on ... contributory negligence. [Cits.]" Butler v. Anderson, 163 Ga.App. 547 (2), 295 S.E.2d 216 (1982). The harmless nature of such an error is especially evident where the jury was charged as to comparative negligence, proximate cause, and pre-existing injuries as alternative bases for reducing damages, as in the case sub judice, since evidence was adduced supporting each of these charges and thus the jury would have been authorized to reduce appellant's damages on any of these grounds. Maloy, supra 127 Ga.App. at 167, 193 S.E.2d 19; Jones v. Scarborough, 194 Ga.App. 468, 469 (1), 390 S.E.2d 674 (1990).

The cases relied upon by appellant in support of his argument, Meacham v. Barber, 183 Ga.App. 533, 535-536 (2), 359 S.E.2d 424 (1987) and Whitehead v. Seymour, 120 Ga.App. 25, 26 (1), 169 S.E.2d 369 (1969), are distinguishable by the fact that the verdicts rendered therein were in favor of the defendants, not the plaintiff. Nor do we find any merit in appellant's argument seeking to distinguish the principle set forth in Maloy and Butler, supra, on the basis that the omitted charge here did not involve liability simply because it may have impacted on the amount of damages awarded by the jury. The requested charge's omission in an otherwise applicable instruction on contributory negligence can hardly be said to have more impact on the jury's decision on damages than a situation, such as in Butler, supra, in which an abstractly correct, but otherwise inapplicable, charge on contributory negligence is given.

Contrary to the dissent's position, we cannot reach the issue whether reversible error was committed by the trial court's failure to give appellant's requested charge in regard to appellees' burden of proof as to the affirmative defense of comparative negligence, in that (1) appellant's requested charge (which ultimately limited consideration of appellees' burden of proof only to the affirmative defense of contributory negligence, without mentioning comparative negligence), even had it been given, would not have corrected the alleged error regarding appellees' burden of proof as to comparative negligence, see generally Marlow v. Lanier, 157 Ga.App. 184, 185, 276 S.E.2d 867 (1981) (party cannot complain if trial court gives incomplete charge where incompleteness arose from instructions requested by party), and (2) appellant's enumeration does not encompass any error in regard to the trial court's failure to charge the jury regarding a defendant's burden to prove the affirmative defense of comparative negligence. See generally Jones v. Farrington, 194 Ga.App. 10, 11 (3), 389 S.E.2d 776 (1989) (enumeration of error may not be enlarged to include issues not set forth in the enumeration). Nor do we agree that the sequence of the charges given by the trial court, by first informing the jury how damages could be apportioned should they find both parties were negligent (comparative negligence), then second informing the jury that plaintiff could recovery nothing if his negligence was the sole proximate cause of his injuries (contributory negligence), somehow caused the contributory negligence charge as given to mutate, so that it no longer meant what it clearly stated: that a finding by the jury that appellant was the sole cause of his injuries, i.e., contributorily negligent, would completely bar appellant's recovery. "The principles of law involved in a case must necessarily be given in charge to the jury seriatim. 'The court can not crowd every legal principle involved in a case in a separate and distinct paragraph.' [Cit.]" City Council of Augusta v. Hammock, 85 Ga.App. 554, 555, 69 S.E.2d 834 (1952). No reversible error is presented here either because the charge...