Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority v. Leibowitz

• Decision Date: 26 September 1994
• Docket Number: No. S94A0938,S94A0938
• Citation: 448 S.E.2d 435,264 Ga. 486
• Parties: METROPOLITAN ATLANTA RAPID TRANSIT AUTHORITY et al. v. LEIBOWITZ, et al.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 435

448 S.E.2d 435

264 Ga. 486

METROPOLITAN ATLANTA RAPID TRANSIT AUTHORITY et al. v. LEIBOWITZ, et al.

No. S94A0938.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Sept. 26, 1994.

Charles N. Pursley, Jr., Jo Lanier Meeks, Pursley, Howell, Lowery & Meeks, Susan B. Forsling, Office of the County Atty., Atlanta, for Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority.

J. Corbett Peek, Jr., James Garland Peek, Peek & Whaley, Atlanta, for Leibowitz.

CARLEY, Justice.

In a total taking, business property was condemned by appellant-Condemnors. The issue of appellee-Condemnees' just and adequate compensation was tried before a jury. Condemnors appealed to the Court of Appeals from the judgment entered on the jury's verdict. The eight Judges on the Court of Appeals who participated were equally divided as to affirmance or reversal based upon the resolution of one enumeration of error. Accordingly, the case was transferred to this court pursuant to Art. VI, Sec. V, Par. V of the Ga. Const. of 1983.

1. Condemnor's relevant enumeration of error states:

[t]he trial court erred in charging the jury that it could award relocation expenses, including the costs to build out a new replacement facility, without instructing the jury that [it] must first find that the property taken is unique under one of three uniqueness tests authorized by Georgia law.

As a separate element of just and adequate compensation, our Constitution allows the owner of a business located on condemned property to recover "damages to his business caused by the necessity of removing the same to another location and the expenses incident to such removal." Bowers v. Fulton County, 221 Ga. 731, 736(2), 146 S.E.2d 884 (1966). "However, recoverable relocation costs would not include the costs of renovating any newly [acquired] business premises." (Emphasis in original.) MARTA v. Funk, 263 Ga. 385, 387, 435 S.E.2d 196 (1993).

Insofar as recoverable relocation expenses are concerned, "the issue of uniqueness is not related [there]to...." MARTA v. Mobasser, 212 Ga.App. 260, 262(2), 441 S.E.2d 441 (1994). "Bowers does not mandate that evidence of uniqueness of the property be shown before relocation expenses are allowable." MARTA v. Funk, 206 Ga.App. 868, 870(2)(a), 426 S.E.2d 623 (1992), reversed on other grounds, 263 Ga. 385, 435 S.E.2d 196, supra. A showing of "uniqueness" is a prerequisite to a business owner's recovery of business losses as a separate element of just and adequate compensation. Department of Transp. v. Dixie Highway Bottle Shop, Inc., 245 Ga. 314, 265 S.E.2d 10 (1980). "Uniqueness" may also be relevant in determining the amount of just and adequate compensation to be paid the owner of the property for the taking thereof. "If the condemned real property is 'unique,' that 'uniqueness' is to be reflected in the owner's recovery of just and adequate compensation for the taking thereof." MARTA v. Funk, 263 Ga., supra at 386, 435 S.E.2d 196. However, "[w]hether or not the business property is unique has no bearing on the recoverability of relocation expenses." MARTA v. Funk, 206 Ga.App., supra at 871(2)(a), 426 S.E.2d 623.

Accordingly, the "costs to build out a new replacement facility" are never recoverable as relocation expenses and the recovery of such relocation expenses as are authorized is never dependent upon a showing of "uniqueness." It follows that there is no merit in Condemnors' contention that the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury that a finding of "uniqueness" is a prerequisite to an award of "relocation expenses,...