Hector v. Barnhart

• Decision Date: 01 March 2004
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A.H-03-0513.,CIV.A.H-03-0513.
• Parties: Melvin L. HECTOR, Plaintiff, v. Jo Anne B. BARNHART, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

337 F.Supp.2d 905

Melvin L. HECTOR, Plaintiff, v. Jo Anne B. BARNHART, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant.

No. CIV.A.H-03-0513.

United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Houston Division.

March 1, 2004.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Victor N. Makris, Attorney at Law, Bellaire, TX, for Melvin Hector, Plaintiff.

Marguerite Esposito Lokey, Special Asst U.S. Attorney, Dallas, TX, for Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

HOYT, District Judge.

On February 10, 2004, Magistrate Judge Calvin Botley issued a Memorandum and Recommendation [Doc.# 14] on Plaintiff Melvin L. Hector's ("Hector") and Defendant Jo Anne B. Barnhart's, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("the Commissioner") cross-motions for summary judgment.

This Court has reviewed the Memorandum and Recommendation, noting that no objections have been filed, and the cross-motions for summary judgment filed by the parties. It is, therefore.

ORDERED that the Memorandum and Recommendation is ADOPTED as this Court's Memorandum and Order. It is further

ORDERED that Hector's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. # 9] is DENIED. It is further

ORDERED that the Commissioner's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. # 11] is GRANTED. It is finally

ORDERED that this matter is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION

BOTLEY, United States Magistrate Judge.

Pending before the Court are Plaintiff Melvin L. Hector's ("Hector") and Defendant Jo Anne B. Barnhart's ("the Commissioner") cross-motions for summary judgment. Hector appeals the determination of an Administrative Law Judge ("the ALJ") that he is not entitled to receive Title XVI supplemental security income ("SSI") benefits. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). Having reviewed the pending motions, the submissions of the parties, the pleadings, the administrative record, and the applicable law, this Court recommends that the Commissioner's motion (Docket Entry No.11) be granted, Hector's motion (Docket Entry No. 9) be denied, and that the Commissioner's decision denying Hector benefits be affirmed.

I. Background

On August 25, 2000, Hector filed an application for SSI benefits with the Social Security Administration ("SSA"), claiming that he has been disabled and unable to work since December 1, 1996. (R. 112-115).¹ Hector alleges a variety of disabling conditions, including leg, back and neck pain, and arthritis in his hands. (R. 112).

After being denied benefits initially and on reconsideration, Hector requested an administrative hearing before an ALJ to review the decision. (R. 82). A hearing was held on August 7, 2002, in Bellaire, Texas, at which time the ALJ heard testimony from Hector, Stephen M. Goldstein, M.D. ("Dr. Goldstein"), a medical expert who specializes in internal medicine and neurology, Ashok I. Khushalani, M.D. ("Dr. Khushalani"), a medical expert who specializes in psychiatry, and Thomas King ("King"), a vocational expert ("VE"). (R. 23-68). In a decision dated, October 17, 2002, the ALJ denied Hector's application for benefits. (R. 9-18). In her decision, the ALJ found that Hector had the following severe medically determinable impairments: sarcoidosis;² degenerative disc disease³ of the cervical and lumbar spine; affective⁴ and anxiety-related mental disorders;⁵ and hypertension.⁶ (R. 17). The ALJ determined, however, that Hector's impairments did not meet or medically equal one of the listed impairments in Appendix I, Subpart P, Regulation No. 4. (R. 17). The ALJ concluded that, although Hector could not perform his past relevant work as a service station attendant, he could perform light work (i.e., marker, store checker, and sorter), with certain limitations, and that these jobs exist in significant numbers in the national economy. (R. 17-18).

On October 22, 2002, Hector appealed the ALJ's decision to the Appeals Council of the SSA's Office of Hearings and Appeals. (R. 6-8). The Appeals Council, on January 23, 2003, declined to review the ALJ's determination. (R. 4-5). This rendered the ALJ's opinion the final decision of the Commissioner. See Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 107, 120 S.Ct. 2080, 147 L.Ed.2d 80 (2000). Hector filed the instant action on February 10, 2003, contesting the Commissioner's denial of his claim for benefits.

II. Analysis

A. Statutory Bases for Benefits

SSI benefits are authorized by Title XVI of the Act and are funded by general tax revenues. See SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, SOCIAL SECURITY HANDBOOK, § 2100 (14th ed.2001). The SSI Program is a general public assistance measure providing an additional resource to the aged, blind, and disabled to assure that their income does not fall below the poverty line. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.110. Eligibility for SSI is based upon proof of indigence and disability. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382(a), 1382c(a)(3)(A)-(C). A claimant applying to the SSI program cannot receive payment for any period of disability predating the month in which he applies for benefits, no matter how long he has actually been disabled. See Brown v. Apfel, 192 F.3d 492, 495 n. 1 (5th Cir.1999); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.335. The applicable regulation provides:

When you file an application in the month that you meet all the other requirements for eligibility, the earliest month for which we can pay you benefits is the month following the month you filed the application. If you file an application after the month you first meet all the other requirements for eligibility, we cannot pay you for the month in which your application is filed or any months before that month.

20 C.F.R. § 416.335. Thus, the month following an application, here, August 1998, fixes the earliest date from which benefits can be paid. Eligibility for SSI payments, however, is not dependent on insured status. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a).

Social Security disability insurance benefits are authorized by Title II of the Act and are funded by Social Security taxes. See also SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, SOCIAL SECURITY HANDBOOK, § 2100. The disability insurance program provides income to individuals who are forced into involuntary, premature retirement, provided they are both insured and disabled, regardless of indigence. A claimant for disability insurance can collect benefits for up to twelve months of disability prior to the filing of an application. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.131, 404.315; see also Perkins v. Chater, 107 F.3d 1290, 1295 (7th Cir.1997).

While these are separate and distinct programs, applicants seeking benefits under either statutory provision must prove "disability" within the meaning of the Act, which defines disability in virtually identical language for both programs. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d), 1382c(a)(3), 1382c(a)(3)(G); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505(a), 416.905(a). Under both provisions, disability is defined as the inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(3)(A). Moreover, the law and regulations governing the determination of disability are the same for both disability insurance benefits and SSI. See Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 236 (5th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1120, 115 S.Ct. 1984, 131 L.Ed.2d 871 (1995).

B. Standard of Review

1. Summary Judgment

The court may grant summary judgment under FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) when the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. The burden of proof, however, rests with the movant to show that there is no evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. If a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, then a motion for summary judgment cannot be granted because there exists a genuine issue of fact. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

An issue of fact is "material" only if its resolution could affect the outcome of the case. See Duplantis v. Shell Offshore, Inc., 948 F.2d 187, 189 (5th Cir.1991). When deciding whether to grant a motion for summary judgment, the court shall draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and deny the motion if there is some evidence to support the nonmoving party's position. See McAllister v. Resolution Trust Corp., 201 F.3d 570, 574 (5th Cir.2000). If there are no issues of material fact, the court shall review any questions of law de novo. See Merritt-Campbell, Inc. v. RxP Prods., Inc., 164 F.3d 957, 961 (5th Cir.1999). Once the movant properly supports the motion, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party, who must present specific and supported material facts, of significant probative value, to preclude summary judgment. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v. Compania Mexicana de Aviacion, S.A. de C.V., 199 F.3d 796, 798 (5th Cir.2000).

2. Administrative Determination

Judicial review of the Commissioner's denial of disability benefits is limited to whether the final decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole and whether the proper legal standards were applied to evaluate the evidence. See Masterson v. Barnhart, 309 F.3d 267, 272 (5th Cir.2002). "Substantial evidence" means that the evidence must be enough to allow a reasonable mind to support the Commissioner's decision; it must be more than a mere scintilla and less than a preponderance. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971); Masterson, 309 F.3d at 272; Brown, 192 F.3d at 496.

When applying the substantial evidence standard on review, the court "scrutinize[s] the...