Hector v. Horrell
| Decision Date | 28 February 1913 |
| Citation | 154 S.W. 96,248 Mo. 166 |
| Parties | CYNTHIA G. HECTOR et al., Appellants, v. J. A. HORRELL |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Butler Circuit Court. -- Hon. Jesse C. Sheppard, Judge.
Affirmed.
Sam J Corbett and C. G. Shepard for appellants.
(1) The abbreviations in all of the descriptions are such as to make the whole transaction void for want of certainty. When we consider the descriptions where neither the township nor range is given, it certainly cannot be contended that the description is sufficient to locate any land whatever, or to pass title to defendant. Neither can it be said that said descriptions are in any way connected with the other descriptions given. They stand alone, separate and distinct and could as well be covered by a deed conveying land in another county as in the deed in question. Such vague indefinite and uncertain descriptions have ever been held insufficient where personal service was had, and surely it cannot be held good where defendants are brought into court by publication, as was done in the partition proceedings through which defendant holds the land in question. O'Day v. McDaniel, 181 Mo. 529; Martin v. Kitchen, 195 Mo. 477; Talty v. Schlatitz, 180 Mo. 231; State ex rel. v. Burrough, 174 Mo. 700; Winningham v. Trueblood, 149 Mo. 572; Low v. Ekey, 82 Mo. 286. (2) The evidence in this case discloses the fact that the lands herein mentioned were all wild, unimproved and unoccupied.
Oliver & Oliver for respondent.
The complaint is based upon the use of abbreviations in describing the subdivisions of a section, and the use of punctuation marks, and the failure to follow up the different sections by describing the township and range of each section, although there are several sections or subdivisions of different sections in the same township and range. This is the sum total of appellant's grievance. Respondent contends that the description in the deed is a good one, clearly describing the land, and is in accord with the almost universal usage of conveyances in transferring landed property. In each tract, and in each section, is stated: the subdivision of the section (by the use of well-understood abbreviations), and the number of each section, each township and range. This is a perfect description. R.S. 1909, secs. 11372, 11520; Sparks v. Clark, 57 Mo. 58.
This suit was brought in the circuit court of Pemiscot county, and involves practically the same questions that were involved in the cases of Hector v. Mann, 225 Mo. 228, 124 S.W. 1109, and Hector v. Warren, 225 Mo. 255, 124 S.W. 1119, which upon consultation will disclose the main facts of this case; since, however, they are not material to the question to be determined in this case, they will be omitted largely from the statement of this case.
The plaintiffs sought, by this suit, to recover from the defendant a large tract of land situate in Pemiscot county. A trial was had in the circuit court, which resulted in a judgment in favor of the defendant, and the plaintiffs duly appealed the cause to this court.
In regard to this case, counsel for appellant state that of the law as announced in the cases previously mentioned they have no complaint to make; and that "this case was tried on two theories, to-wit:
Counsel for appellants, in their brief, concede that this court in the cases previously mentioned, decided the first proposition mentioned against them, and that the appellants are not entitled to recover any of the lands which were properly described in the partition proceedings mentioned in said cases; but insist that some of the lands involved in this case were not described in said partition proceedings.
This concession, under the evidence, which is undisputed, reduces the case to two legal propositions for determination.
The land involved in this case was described in said partition proceedings, and the deed made in pursuance thereof, in the following language (omitting county and state):
320 acres, being the E. 2 of Sec. No. 13, Twp. No. 20, Range 13 East.
120 acres being W. 2 of NW. 4 and NE. 4 NW. 4 of Sec. No. 15.
40 acres being the NW. 4 of SE. 4 of Sec. No. 10.
160 acres being the S. 2 of NW. of the NE. 4 of NE. 4 and the SW. 4 of NE. 4 of Sec. No. 17, Twp. No. 20, Range 12 E.
80 acres being N. 2 of SE. 4.
40 acres being SW. 4 of NW. 4 and
160 acres being E. 2 of W. 4 of Sec. No. 18 Twp. No. 20, Range 14 East. [*]
I. Counsel for appellants state their position in the following language:
In brevity, their contention is, first, that the description of the entire land sued for was so vague and uncertain that it was in fact no description at all, and that the judgment in the partition suit and the deed made in pursuance thereof were and are absolute nullities; and, second, that even though that be not true, nevertheless, that was and is true as to all the tracts mentioned excepting the first, fifth and the two last tracts.
We will dispose of these two contentions in the order stated.
As to the first: There can be no doubt but what the law is, that, in order to sustain a judgment of a court affecting real estate, the description thereof must be sufficiently definite to enable the sheriff of the county in which it is located, to locate the land therefrom.
The real contention on this branch of the case is, that the abbreviations used in the description of the lands in the judgment and deed, as shown in the statement of the case were and are vague, uncertain and meaningless, and therefore constitute no description of the land whatever. For instance, it is insisted that...
To continue reading
Request your trial