Hedayatzadeh v. City of Del Mar

• Decision Date: 22 January 2020
• Docket Number: D074690
• Citation: 257 Cal.Rptr.3d 718,44 Cal.App.5th 555
• Parties: Farid HEDAYATZADEH, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. The CITY OF DEL MAR, Defendant and Respondent.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

44 Cal.App.5th 555

257 Cal.Rptr.3d 718

Farid HEDAYATZADEH, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.The CITY OF DEL MAR, Defendant and Respondent.

D074690

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

Filed January 22, 2020

Khashayar Law Group and Daryoosh Khashayar, Vista, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Devaney Pate Morris & Cameron and William C. Pate, San Diego, for Defendant and Respondent.

IRION, J.

Farid Hedayatzadeh (Hedayatzadeh) appeals following the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of the City of Del Mar (the City) in his lawsuit arising out of the death of his 19-year-old son, who was struck by a train on an oceanfront bluff in Del Mar on property owned by North County Transit District (NCTD). Specifically, Hedayatzadeh contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on his single cause of action alleging a dangerous condition of public property based primarily on the City’s failure to erect any barriers to prevent pedestrians from accessing NCTD’s train tracks. We conclude that the trial court properly granted summary judgment, and we accordingly affirm the judgment.

I.FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On the night of September 24, 2016, 19-year-old Javad Hedayatzadeh drove to Del Mar with two friends.¹ They parked at the end of 13th Street, a City street which terminates at an ocean bluff.

A railroad right-of-way owned by NCTD runs along the top of the ocean bluff, perpendicular to the end of 13th Street. As stated in a land surveyor’s declaration submitted by the City, NCTD’s right-of-way is 100 feet wide near 13th Street.² Although the record is not clear about where the City property ends and the NCTD right-of-way begins, the parties agree that a sloped dirt embankment begins after the end of 13th Street and leads down to the area where the train tracks are located. A guardrail on City property prevents automobiles from continuing past the end of 13th Street to reach NCTD’s right-of-way, but pedestrians are able to walk around the guardrail to access NCTD’s right-of-way and the train tracks. It is common knowledge, and undisputed by the parties, that members of the public frequently walk around the guardrail and access NCTD’s right-of-way to walk next to the train tracks on the ocean bluff.³ It is also undisputed that, throughout the years, multiple train-related injuries, fatalities and near misses have occurred on the tracks that run along the bluff through the City.

On the night at issue, Javad⁴ and his friends walked around the guardrail at the end of 13th Street, down an unimproved dirt embankment, and crossed the train tracks. The group then walked northbound on the west side of the tracks to a spot where they sat and smoked marijuana. They knew they were trespassing on NCTD property. At various points along the railroad right-of-way, NCTD has installed signs stating "No Trespassing," "Danger" and "Railroad Property."⁵

Javad noticed a freight train coming from the south and told his friends that he was going to use his phone to take a video "selfie" of himself next to the train. As Javad was near the train tracks taking the selfie, he was struck by the train and killed.

The location where Javad was struck by the train is more than 50 feet from the City’s property to the east and more than 40 feet from the City’s property to the west. The City does not perform any maintenance of the NCTD right-of-way and has no authority to correct any defects on the NCTD property.

After filing an unsuccessful claim under the Government Claims Act ( Gov. Code, § 905 ),⁶ Javad’s father, Hedayatzadeh, filed this lawsuit against the City, NCTD, and BNSF Railway Company, which allegedly operated the freight train. As relevant here, the operative first amended complaint alleged a single cause of action against the City for dangerous condition of public property.⁷ As alleged in the first amended complaint, "The property adjacent to the railroad tracks and right[-]of[-]way were ... owned, maintained, managed and controlled by [the City] ... and by virtue of the proximity of the adjacent property to the railroad tracks and its use to access recreational areas open to the public by the public, the property adjacent to the railroad right[-]of[-]way was in [a] dangerous condition as it exposed the using public to a substantial risk of injury when the property was used in a reasonably foreseeable manner."

The City filed a motion for summary judgment based on several independent grounds: (1) as matter of law, the City’s own property was not in a dangerous condition; (2) the alleged dangerous condition of the City’s property was not a proximate cause of Javad’s death; (3) to the extent the cause of action was based on failure to warn, the City had no duty to warn of an obvious danger, and section 830.8 precludes liability for failure to provide a warning sign;⁸ and (4) recovery is barred by the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk.

After considering the evidence and argument presented by the parties, the trial court granted summary judgment, basing its ruling on the first ground identified by the City. As the trial court explained, "The Court finds that Plaintiff has not met his burden of showing a triable issue of material fact that the City created, enhanced, or intensified a danger to the public.... Plaintiff’s evidence, which formed the basis for the Court’s tentative ruling, demonstrates that the City was aware of pedestrians illegally accessing the railroad right-of-way from the City’s property at 13th Street in order [to] reach the adjacent coastal bluffs. This fact does not show that a condition of the City’s property increased or enhanced the risk of injury which arises from the occasional passing of trains. Plaintiff has not submitted evidence demonstrating that a feature of 13th Street encouraged users to trespass onto the right-of-way. Moreover, it is undisputed that a legal railroad crossing was available just a few blocks away at 15th Street."⁹

Hedayatzadeh appeals from the judgment.

II.DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standards Applicable to Review of a Summary Judgment

Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c) provides that summary judgment is to be granted when there is no triable issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A defendant "moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact." ( Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841, 24 P.3d 493 ( Aguilar ).) A defendant may meet this burden either by showing that one or more elements of a cause of action cannot be established or by showing that there is a complete defense. ( Ibid. )

If the defendant’s prima facie case is met, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show the existence of a triable issue of material fact with respect to that cause of action or defense. ( Aguilar, supra , 25 Cal.4th at p. 849, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841, 24 P.3d 493 ; Silva v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 256, 261, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 382.) "[T]o meet that burden, the plaintiff ‘may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings ... but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to that cause of action ....’ " ( Merrill v. Navegar, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 465, 476-477, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 370, 28 P.3d 116.) Ultimately, the moving party "bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." ( Aguilar , at p. 850, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841, 24 P.3d 493.)

We review a summary judgment ruling de novo to determine whether there is a triable issue as to any material fact and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ( Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London v. Superior Court (2001) 24 Cal.4th 945, 972, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 672, 16 P.3d 94.) " ‘Since defendant[ ] obtained summary judgment in [its] favor, "we review the record de novo to determine whether [it has] conclusively negated a necessary element of the plaintiff’s case or demonstrated that under no hypothesis is there a material issue of fact that requires the process of trial." ’ " ( Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 767, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 617, 23 P.3d 1143.)

B. The Law Governing Liability for a Dangerous Condition of Public Property

The only cause of action pled against the City alleged a dangerous condition of public property, which is a basis for liability set forth in the Government Claims Act and governed by specific statutory standards.

" ‘[A] public entity is not liable for injuries except as provided by statute (§ 815) and ... section 835 sets out the exclusive conditions under which a public entity is liable for injuries caused by a dangerous condition of public property. "[T]he intent of the [Government Claims Act] is not to expand the rights of plaintiffs in suits against governmental entities, but to confine potential governmental liability to rigidly delineated circumstances:

immunity is waived only if the various requirements of the act are satisfied." ’ " ( Metcalf v. County of San Joaquin (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1121, 1129, 72 Cal.Rptr.3d 382, 176 P.3d 654.)

Section 835 sets forth the following requirements for liability based on a dangerous condition of public property:

"Except as provided by statute, a public entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and that either:

"(a) A negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition; or

"(b)

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