Hedgeman v. Austal, U.S.A., L.L.C.

Decision Date24 May 2011
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 08–00155–KD–N.
PartiesSidney HEDGEMAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. AUSTAL, U.S.A., L.L.C., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Alexander Nicholas Gerogiannis, Ann C. Robertson, Rocco Calamusa, Jr., Jacob Andrew Kiser, Wiggins, Childs, Quinn, and Pantazis, LLC, Candis A. McGowan, Birmingham, AL, Henry Brewster, Henry Brewster, LLC, Mobile, AL, for Plaintiffs.

Anne Laurie McClurkin, Archibald T. Reeves, IV, Edward S. Sledge, III, Thomas M. O'Hara, McDowell Knight Roedder & Sledge, L.L.C., John Wesley Bell, Mobile, AL, for Defendant.

ORDER

KRISTI K. DuBOSE, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Docs. 277, 279), Plaintiff's Opposition (Doc. 321, 322), and Defendants' Reply (Doc. 352).

I. Factual Background

On March 20, 2008, multiple Plaintiffs initiated this action against Austal for legal and equitable relief to redress unlawful discrimination and harassment on the basis of race.1 (Doc. 1). Plaintiff Sidney Hedgeman (Hedgeman) asserts claims for hostile work environment and discrimination (promotion) based on race, in violation of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. (Doc. 37 at 64–69).2

A. Austal

Defendant Austal USA (Austal) is an Australian shipbuilding company dedicated to the design and construction of customized aluminum commercial and military vessels, located in Mobile, Alabama. (Doc. 279 at 2; Doc. 283–48 at 2–3 (Austal's 3/7/07 EEOC Position Statement)). The Operations Division has four (4) major Departments (Aluminum (divided into Fabrication and Components), Electrical, Engineering, and Fit Out (divided into HVAC, Insulation and Fit Out)). (Doc. 283–48 at 3–4).

B. Hedgeman's Employment

Sidney Hedgeman applied on December 12, 2005 and began working for Austal on January 3, 2006, as a HVAC helper in the HVAC Department, at the rate of $11/hour. (Doc. 279–2 (Dep. Hedgeman II at 72, 110); Doc. 279–3; Doc. 295 at 16 (Exhibit 105–Sealed); Doc. 279–1 at 2; Doc. 322–1 at 68–72). Handwritten notes on his employment application include “Roland said get him in,” Lance Leincool,” and “GC said that he a good man I work with him.” (Doc. 322–1 at 68). At that time, Hedgeman had worked in sheet metal for 13 years and in welding; attended a State business/technical school for welding; was employed as a machine operator ($8/hour); and had prior experience with welding and sheet metal since 1997. ( Id. at 69). During his first term of employment (approximately 20 months), Hedgeman does not recall whether he received an hourly employee orientation booklet, but believes he probably received [s]ome of it.” (Doc. 279–2 (Dep. Hedgeman II at 51–53)). Hedgeman did review and sign an orientation checklist—after completing orientation. (Doc. 322–1 (Dep. Hedgeman I at 48)). Hedgeman learned about how to report discrimination or harassment violations at Austal, based on his prior work experience. ( Id. (Dep. Hedgeman I at 58)). Hedgeman received four (4) pay raises dated February 3, 2006 (from $11/hour to $13/hour); May 22, 2006 (from $13/hour to $14.50/hour); July 18, 2006 (from $14.50/hour to $15.50/hour); and April 24, 2007 (from $15.50/hour to $16/hour). (Doc. 295 at 16 (Exhibit 105–Sealed); Doc. 279–2 (Dep. Hedgeman II at 74); Doc. 279–4). On August 17, 2007, Hedgeman took a leave of absence due to a medical illness. (Doc. 279–2 (Dep. Hedgeman II at 59–60)).

On December 28, 2007, Hedgeman reapplied 3 for employment with Austal and began working on January 21, 2008 at the rate of $16/hour as a HVAC Helper and was upgraded to sheet metal mechanic in the HVAC Department. (Doc. 279–1 at 3; Doc. 279–2 (Dep. Hedgeman II at 72, 74, 76–77); Doc. 279–3; Doc. 322–1 (Dep. Hedgeman I at 71–73); Doc. 295 at 16 (Exhibit 105–Sealed); Doc. 279–4 at 6–7). Hedgeman received pay raises dated April 21, 2008 (from $16/hour to $17/hour, “90 day-good, motivated employee, will do anything asked of him. Deserves a raise[ ]); and on June 30, 2008 (from $17/hour to $17.51/hour, “cost of living adjustment ... for fiscal year 2009[ ]). (Doc. 279–4 at 6–7). On May 8, 2009, Hedgeman was laid off. (Doc. 279–2 (Dep. Hedgeman II at 90, 94)).4 During his second term of employment, Hedgeman received the hourly employee orientation booklet as indicated on the checklist he signed on January 21, 2008. (Doc. 279–2 (Dep. Hedgeman II at 77)).

II. Standard of Review

“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (Dec. 2010). The recently amended Rule 56(c) governs Procedures, and provides as follows:

(1) Supporting Factual Positions. A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:

(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or

(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.

(2) Objection That a Fact Is Not Supported by Admissible Evidence. A party may object that the material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence.

(3) Materials Not Cited. The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record.

(4) Affidavits or Declarations. An affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.

Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 56(c) (Dec. 2010).

Defendant, as the party seeking summary judgment, bears the “initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir.1991). (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). If the nonmoving party fails to make “a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof,” the moving party is entitled to summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. “In reviewing whether the nonmoving party has met its burden, the court must stop short of weighing the evidence and making credibility determinations of the truth of the matter. Instead, the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH–Siegen, 965 F.2d 994, 998–999 (11th Cir.1992), cert. den.,507 U.S. 911, 113 S.Ct. 1259, 122 L.Ed.2d 657 (1993) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

III. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies for “Discrete” Title VII Claims

Austal contends that Hedgeman's Title VII claim that he was denied promotions during his second term of employment (January 21, 2008May 8, 2009), fails due to his failure to exhaust the necessary administrative remedies. A plaintiff may not sue under Title VII unless he first exhausts administrative remedies by filing a timely charge of discrimination with the appropriate agency. See, e.g., Wilkerson v. Grinnell Corp., 270 F.3d 1314, 1317 (11th Cir.2001). A failure to file a timely charge with the EEOC results in a bar of the claims contained in the untimely charge.

Hedgeman signed his EEOC Charge for race discrimination on November 13, 2006 and it was “received” on November 20, 2006. (Doc. 279–6 at 1). In his EEOC Charge, Hedgeman described conduct occurring from the time he started at Austal, January 3, 2006, through the date he filed his charge, November 13, 2006. ( Id. at 2). The EEOC issued a Notice of Right to Sue letter on December 26, 2007. (Doc. 279–7). Two (2) days later, Hedgeman reapplied for employment with Austal and was rehired on January 9, 2008.

There is no evidence that Hedgeman amended the November 20, 2006 EEOC charge. There is no evidence that Hedgeman filed a new EEOC charge concerning the allegedly discriminatory conduct occurring between January 2008May 2009 (during his second term of employment). As such, Hedgeman's claims must be limited by the scope of the EEOC investigation which could reasonably have been expected to grow out of the charges of racial discrimination asserted on November 20, 2006.

Nevertheless, [t]he failure to specifically articulate a claim in an EEOC charge is not necessarily fatal[,] as a Title VII action may be based ‘upon any kind of discrimination like or related to the charges' allegations, limited only by the scope of the EEOC investigation that could reasonably be expected to grow out of the initial charges of discrimination.’ Lampkin v. United Parcel Service, 2008 WL 1925120, *3 (M.D.Ala. May 1, 2008). Thus, judicial claims may be permitted if they “amplify, clarify, or more clearly focus the allegations in the EEOC complaint,” but judicial claims that allege “new acts of discrimination are inappropriate.” Gregory v. Ga. Dep't of Human Res., 355 F.3d 1277, 1280 (11th Cir.2004) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Austal contends that Hedgeman's Title VII claims that he was denied promotions from January 2008May 2009, is barred. Hedgeman's EEOC charge complained of a failure to promote as of November 13, 2006. Even assuming that Hedgeman's failure to promote claim relating to his second term of employment are “like or related to the charge's allegations” for the 2006 alleged instances...

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