Hedges v. Lysek
| Decision Date | 14 December 1955 |
| Citation | 84 So.2d 28 |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
| Parties | Lloyd F. HEDGES, Appellant, v. Francis E. LYSEK and Lucille P. Lysek, his wife; John B. Matthews and KathrynI. Matthews, his wife; Mayer C. Kohn and Dora Kohn, his wife; W. F. Dingus andF. I. Grey, trading and doing business as Grey & Dingus, Appellees. |
Marshall & Rives, Clearwater, for appellant.
W. H. Brewton, Dade City, H. H. Baskin and H. H. Baskin, Jr., Clearwater, for appellees.
Appellant Hedges, who was plaintiff below, seeks reversal of a summary decree in favor of appellee, Kohn, in a declaratory judgment proceeding in which plaintiff also sought reformation of a deed and other incidental relief.
On May 24, 1951, Lysek and wife agreed to sell to Hamil the following described property, to-wit:
'All that part of the NW 1/4 of the NW 1/4 of Section 34, Township 24 South, Range 16 East, Pasco County, Florida: less the North 410 feet thereof, lying West of U. S. 19 Highway'
For brevity we shall hereafter refer to this property as 'Black Acre'.
On August 11, 1951, Lysek and wife agreed to sell to Matthews a tract of land which included the NW 1/4 of the NW 1/4 of Section 34, Township 24 South, Range 16 East, lying East of U. S. Highway No. 19, and Tracts 29 and 30 () in the same Section. For brevity we shall refer to this tract as 'White Acre'.
Neither agreement was recorded. On August 16, 1951, Matthews conveyed White Acre to Kohn by warranty deed and on August 18, 1951, Lysek conveyed White Acre to Matthews by warranty deed. The last two deeds were recorded respectively on September 18, 1951, and August 20, 1951.
On March 31, 1952, Hamil agreed to sell Black Acre to Hedges and on April 28, 1952, Hamil reconveyed Black Acre to Lysek by quitclaim deed, who thereupon immediately conveyed the same tract by warranty deed to Hedges.
The problem presented to us arose out of the apparent location of U. S. Highway 19 as superimposed on an old plat of the area. Prior to the original agreement to sell to Hamil, Lysek had started construction of a small house on the West side of U. S. No. 19 upon what he thought was a part of Black Acre. He then thought that White Acre was entirely on the East side of the road. Actually, a small triangular portion of White Acre lying in a part of so-called Tracts 29 and 30 was West of the highway, and it was in this small triangle that the house was actually built.
Until appellant Hedges bought Black Acre, thinking that the house was located thereon, and, shortly after his purchase, had a survey made which revealed the error, every party to this cause sold and bought the respective parcels with reference to the location of the road as reflected by the old map above mentioned. Lysek thought he was selling the house to Hamil and later to the plaintiff Hedges on the West side of the road, and they thought they were buying it when they bought Black Acre. Lysek thought he was selling unimproved acreage to Matthews and both Matthews and his grantees, Kohn and wife, thought they were buying unimproved acreage East of the road and actually so intended.
Appellee, Kohn, relied on the same inaccurate map that all of the others relied upon and although the map does not reflect the location of Highway U. S. No. 19 correctly, the parties also dealt on the basis of the road as constructed on the ground as being the East and West boundaries of the property which they intended to purchase and which they thought they had purchased. No one had any idea that the small house was on a part of the land actually conveyed to Kohn, obviously through error, until appellant Hedges had the survey made on May 16, 1952, subsequent to his purchase. Kohn himself testified by deposition that he did not realize that the house was on the description conveyed to him until after he had a survey made in September, 1952, about thirteen months after he bought the land, all of which he assumed to be on the East side of the highway. Kohn bargained for and paid for vacant land according to the map supposedly entirely East of the road. Hedges bargained for and paid for land with a house on it entirely West of the road.
There is not the slightest doubt indicated by this record that the small house was constructed on the triangular portion of White Acre completely through mistake and the original mistake thereafter permeated all of the transactions with all of the parties. The original grantor Lysek and the realtor, who handled every one of the transaction, unequivocally sustained by affidavit the position of the appellant that the problem before us was conceived in a bona fide mistake and nurtured into fruition by the continuity of the mistake that was preserved in all of the dealings.
The obvious mistake is thoroughly supported by the deposition of appellee Kohn himself who admits the error and merely in effect relies on the proposition that he has a warranty deed covering the description that happens to include a house which he, in truth and in fact, did not bargain for and did not pay for. The facts before us present as almost perfect case of mistake which is one of the historic incentives for the application of equitable doctrines. We mention at this point that when appellant Hedges was negotiating with Hamil for the purchase of Black Acre he learned through an abstract examination that the fee title to Black Acre remained in the original grantor Lysek. It was because of this fact that at that time Hamil reconveyed Black Acre by quitclaim deed to Lysek who thereupon conveyed it to Hedges by warranty deed.
In the quitclaim deed Hamil specifically stated that it was the purpose of the deed to convey back to Kysek 'all right, title and interest of the grantor under and by virtue of' the unrecorded agreement which Lysek had executed in favor of Hamil.
The chain of events should be briefly reviewed. When Hamil executed the quitclaim deed to Lysek intending to reconvey to him the land on which the small house was located, in fact Lysek had previously conveyed White Acre to Matthews and the latter had conveyed it to Kohn, both by warranty deeds. Before the trial Court and in this Court Kohn contends that even though the record sustains the conclusion that...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Royal Palm Corporate Ctr. Ass'n, Ltd. v. PNC Bank, NA
...principles of right and justice in cases where the restrictive technicalities of the law prevented the giving of relief.” Hedges v. Lysek, 84 So.2d 28, 31 (Fla.1955). While section 45.031 contains a ready-made procedure for a court to adopt, the statute does not mandate that a court utilize......
-
International Harvester Cr. Corp. v. East Coast Truck
...in equity jurisprudence is the doctrine that equity will always move to prevent an injustice engendered by . . . mistake." Hedges v. Lysek, 84 So.2d 28, 31 (Fla.1955). Accord, Moore v. Garrison, 148 Fla. 653, 5 So.2d 259, 262 Harvester's placing East Coast on a C.O.D. basis after July 10, 1......
-
Browning v. Peyton
... ... with the broad principles of right and justice in cases where the restrictive technicalities of the law prevented the giving of relief." Hedges v. Lysek, 84 So.2d 28, 31 (Fla.1955). See also River Holding Co. v. Nickel, 62 So.2d 702, 703 (Fla.1952). Hence, the continuing role of equity is ... ...
-
Romano v. Olshen
...principles of right and justice in cases where the restrictive technicalities of the law prevented the giving of relief.” Hedges v. Lysek, 84 So.2d 28, 31 (Fla.1955). “Equity is a court of conscience; it demands fair dealing in all who seek relief, and requires decency, good faith, fairness......