Hedrick v. County Court of Raleigh County

• Decision Date: 10 February 1970
• Docket Number: No. 12889,12889
• Citation: 172 S.E.2d 312,153 W.Va. 660
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: Betty HEDRICK, Ethel Keyser, Margarette Polk, Ernest H. Radford and Helen Hope Snuffer, as Citizens, Residents and Taxpayers of Raleigh County, West Virginia v. The COUNTY COURT OF RALEIGH COUNTY, West Virginia, a Corporation, WalterJanes, its President, Minor L. Scott and Charles T. Burdiss, CommissionersThereof, and Fred T. Stacy, Clerk of Said County Court, and the Board ofEducation of RaleighCounty, West Virginia, a Corporation, J. A. Blackburn, its President, George B.Chambers, A. Mac Carpenter, Warren G. Jarrell and Virgil C. Cook, Members ofSaid Board.

Page 312

172 S.E.2d 312

153 W.Va. 660

Betty HEDRICK, Ethel Keyser, Margarette Polk, Ernest H.

Radford and Helen Hope Snuffer, as Citizens,

Residents and Taxpayers of Raleigh

County, West Virginia v. The COUNTY COURT OF RALEIGH COUNTY, West Virginia, a

Corporation, WalterJanes, its President, Minor L. Scott and

Charles T. Burdiss, CommissionersThereof, and Fred T. Stacy,

Clerk of Said County Court, and the Board ofEducation of

RaleighCounty, West Virginia, a Corporation, J. A.

Blackburn, its President, George B.Chambers, A. Mac

Carpenter, Warren G. Jarrell and Virgil C. Cook, Members ofSaid Board.

No. 12889.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Argued Jan, 14, 1970.

Decided Feb. 10, 1970.

Syllabus by the Court

1. 'Whether a special act or a general law is proper, is generally a question for legislative determination; and the court will not hold a special act void, as contravening sec. 39, Art. VI. of the State Constitution, unless it clearly appears that a general law would have accomplished the legislatuve purpose as well.' Point 8 Syllabus, Woodall v. Darst, 71 W.Va. 350 (77 S.E. 264, 80 S.E. 367).

2. Chapter 161, Acts of the Legislature, Regular Session, 1969, which provides for the creation, operation and maintenance of the Raleigh County Public Library, is not violative of the provisions of Section 39 of Article VI of the Constitution of West Virginia, the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States or Code, 1931, 11--8--26, as amended.

James M. Henderson, Beckley, fo relators.

Thomas Canterbury, Pros. Atty., Beckley, for respondents.

CALHOUN, Judge.

In this mandamus proceeding instituted in this Court pursuant to its original jurisdiction, Betty Hedrick, Ethel Keyser, Margarette Polk, Ernest H. Radford and Helen Hope Snuffer, citizens, residents and taxpayers of Raleigh County, as petitioners, against The County Court of Raleigh County and the individual commissioners thereof and against The Board of Education of Raleigh County and the individual members of that body, as respondents, the petitioners seek to require the county court and the board of education each to appoint two members of the board of directors of the Raleigh County Public Library pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 161, Acts of the Legislature, Regular Session, 1969, which hereafter in this opinion may be referred to merely as the act or as the statute.

The case was submitted for decision upon the mandamus petition; upon an answer and a demurrer to the petition; and upon briefs and oral argument of counsel.

No material issue of fact is presented for decision. The primary defense asserted in behalf of the respondents is that the statute in question violates the provisions of Section 39 of Article VI of the Constitution of West Virginia, the most pertinent portion of which is as follows: '* * * and in no case shall a special act be passed, where a general law would be proper, and can be made applicable to the case, * * *.' The constitutional provision was quoted in its entirety in Kanawha County Public Library v. County Court of Kanawha County, 143 W.Va. 385, 388--389, 102 S.E.2d 712, 715.

The statute in question, the constitutionality of which is challenged in this case, resulted from a bill which was introduced in the legislature by Delegates Sparacino and McManus of Raleigh County, enacted February 28, 1969, and made effective ninety days from the date of its passage. By its provisions, it created a public library to be known as the Raleigh County Public Library to be supported by the county court and the county board of education as 'a joint endeavor of the two governing authorities' in a manner thereafter prescribed in the statute.

The statute further provides for the creation of a board of directors, a corporation, consisting of five members, two of whom are to be appointed by the county court, two by the court board of education and the fifth by the City of Beckley, a municipality which is the county seat of Raleigh County. From the briefs and oral argument, it appears that the City of Beckley appointed a member of the board of directors pursuant to the provisions of the statute and hence the city is not a party to the mandamus proceeding.

In order to provide for the support, maintenance and operation of the public library by the board of directors, the county court and the board of education, respectively, are authorized and directed by the statute, upon the written request of the board of directors, to levy certain property taxes as specified in the statute. Section 4 of the statute provides: 'The title to all property, both real and personal, now devoted to public library purposes by the board of education of the county of Raleigh in connection with the operation by it of a public library in the city of Beckley and the county of Raleigh, shall, on July first, one thousand nine hundred sixty-nine, vest in the board of directors of the Raleigh county public library hereby created.'

The answer to the mandamus petition states 'that the citizens of Raleigh County are enjoying the facilities of the very sizeable and stable library operated by a Library Board appointed under the general statute relating to the operation of libraries,' and that the respondent county court and the respondent county board of education declined to act upon the requests for appointment of members of the board of directors 'because of the illegality of said Act, and the fact that Raleigh County had a legally appointed and acting Library Board.'

It is not questioned that a demurrer is a proper means by which to test the sufficiency of a pleading in a proceeding in mandamus. Wilson v. County Court of Logan County, 150 W.Va. 544, pt. 1 syl., 148 S.E.2d 353. Apparently it is conceded that, if the statute is valid, mandamus is a proper means by which to obtain the relief sought in this case. State ex rel. Allstate Insurance Company v. Union Public Service District, 151 W.Va. 207, pt. 1 syl., 151 S.E.2d 102.

The brief of counsel for the respondents asserts that the statute in question is in violation of Code, 1931, 11--8--26, as amended, which, generally speaking, provides that a local fiscal body shall not expend money or incur obligations to be paid from levies available for a subsequent fiscal year. This contention is not urged vigorously and we believe it is without substantial merit. See Edwards v. Hylbert, 146 W.Va. 1, 18--19, 118 S.E.2d 347, 356--357.

The demurrer to the mandamus petition asserts that the statute in question authorizes the City of Beckley to appoint one member of the board of directors; that the city is not required by the statute to contribute municipal funds to the support of the public library; that the result is that citizens of the City of Beckley 'will have a larger voice in the operation of the library than the other citizens of Raleigh County'; and that the statute is in this respect violative of the portion of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States which provides that no state shall deny to 'any person' within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. We are of the opinion that this contention has not been urged confidently by counsel for the respondents, either by brief or by oral argument, and that it lacks substantial merit. Citizens owning property within the city are required to pay property taxes levied both by the county court and by the county board of education, as well as by the municipality. Four of the five members of the board of directors are appointed on a countywide basis. The statute requires that the facilities of the library shall be available to members of the general public, irrespective of any place of residence within the county. We are of the opinion that the statute does not deny equal protection to any citizen of the county within the meaning of provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Counsel for the parties, by brief and oral argument, agree that the paramount question presented to the Court for decision is whether the statute is a special act of such a character as to be violative of the constitutional provision previously referred to in this opinion. We do not want to be understood as not having given careful consideration to other questions presented for decision by the answer and the demurrer. We believe we are warranted in the conclusion that none of such other contentions can be regarded as determinative of the case presented for decision. Therefore, we now proceed to a consideration of the question whether the statute is a 'special act' of such a character as to be in that respect unconstitutional.

In support of the constitutionality of the statute involved in this case, counsel for the petitioner confidently relies on this Court's unanimous decision in Kanawha County Pbulic Library v. County Court of Kanawha County, 143 W.Va. 385, 102 S.E.2d 712, in which it was held that a legislative act providing for the creation and operation of the Kanawha County Public Library was not a special act or a special law in violation of the constitutional provision in question. In that case (143 W.Va. 385, 390, 102 S.E.2d 712, 716), the Court stated: 'That this legislation is local in its nature cannot be challenged. Its provisions are applicable to one institution, a public library located in the City of Charleston, Kanawha County. That alone is not sufficient to make it invalid. This Court cannot concern itself with the wisdom of this legislation, but only with the question of whether the Legislature had the authority under the Constitution of this State to pass such an act.' In the same case (143 W.Va. 385, 391, 102 S.E.2d 712, 716), the Court stated: 'Certainly it could not be seriously contended that a general law would be proper to attain the results sought by the Legislature in requiring the respondent, the Board of Education and the City of Charleston to make certain contributions for the support of a public...