Hegel v. McMahon

• Decision Date: 20 August 1998
• Docket Number: 65218-0,No. 201,Nos. 65105-1,201,s. 65105-1
• Citation: 960 P.2d 424,136 Wn.2d 122
• Parties: Christine HEGEL, as parent and natural guardian for Dale Hegel, Jr., a minor child; and Karna and Donald Hegel, Sr., wife and husband; Dean Hegel and Mary Hegel, husband and wife; and Donald Hegel, Jr., Petitioners, v. Brett M. McMAHON; and Michael McMahon and Jane Doe McMahon, husband and wife, and the marital community composed thereof, Respondents. Barton P. MARZOLF, Sr., individually, and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Jeremy A. Marzolf, Petitioner, v. Bonnie Rae STONE, individually, and John Doe Stone, her husband, and the marital community composed thereof; Snohomish School District, a municipal corporation; Snohomish County, a municipal corporation; John Does 1-3, Respondents.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 122

136 Wn.2d 122

960 P.2d 424

Christine HEGEL, as parent and natural guardian for Dale

Hegel, Jr., a minor child; and Karna and Donald Hegel, Sr., wife and husband; Dean Hegel and Mary Hegel, husband and wife; and Donald Hegel, Jr., Petitioners, v. Brett M. McMAHON; and Michael McMahon and Jane Doe McMahon,

husband and wife, and the marital community

composed thereof, Respondents.

Barton P. MARZOLF, Sr., individually, and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Jeremy A. Marzolf, Petitioner, v. Bonnie Rae STONE, individually, and John Doe Stone, her

husband, and the marital community composed thereof;

Snohomish School District No. 201, a municipal corporation;

Snohomish County, a municipal corporation; John Does 1-3,

Respondents.

Nos. 65105-1, 65218-0.

Supreme Court of Washington En Banc.

Argued March 10, 1998.

Decided Aug. 20, 1998.

De Funis & Balint, David Balint, Marco De Funis, Seattle, for Petitioner Marzolf

Crary & Clark, John R. Clark, Spokane, for Petitioner Hegel.

Rettig, Osborne, Forgette, O'Donnell, Iller & Adamson, Cheryl Adamson, Kennewick, for Respondent McMahon.

Jim Krider, Snohomish County Prosecutor, Alfred Gehri, Deputy Snohomish County Prosecutor, Everett, Tim Dore, Bellevue, Peery, Hiscock, Pierson, Kingman & Peabody, John C. Gibson, Max Peabody, Seattle, for Respondents Snohomish County and Stone.

DURHAM, Chief Justice.

Plaintiffs in these consolidated cases seek to recover for emotional trauma they experienced after witnessing the suffering of an injured family member at the scene of an accident. Their claims below were dismissed because the Plaintiffs were not present when the accidents occurred. We reverse and hold that Plaintiffs may recover for emotional distress caused by observing an injured relative at the scene of an accident shortly after its occurrence and before there is substantial change in the relative's condition or location.

FACTS

Hegel v. McMahon

Dale Hegel ran out of gas and pulled over to the side of a road. As he poured gasoline into his tank, a passing car struck him and knocked him into a ditch. Dale Hegel's son and parents were driving along the same road and came upon the scene after the accident. They discovered him lying in the ditch, severely injured and bleeding from his nose, ears, and mouth. A few minutes later, Dale Hegel's brother and sister-in-law also came upon the scene and observed him in the ditch.

Dale Hegel suffered severe and permanent head injuries. He and his wife have settled all claims against the driver. The Hegel family members who came upon the accident scene sued the driver on their own behalf for negligent infliction of emotional distress. They alleged that the sight of Dale Hegel's injured body in the ditch put them in a state of fear and panic and that they continue to suffer from anxiety and shock.

The Defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting

that they owed no duty to the Hegels and that the Hegels' interrogatory answers did not allege sufficient objective symptoms of mental distress. The Hegels sought to amend their interrogatory answers to include physical ailments caused by their emotional distress, but the trial court refused to consider the amended answers because they contradicted the Hegels' previous answers and were unsupported by medical evidence. The court then dismissed the case on the grounds that the Hegels failed to show sufficient objective symptoms of emotional distress. The Court of Appeals affirmed the summary judgment, but did not examine the sufficiency of the symptoms. Instead, the court ruled that a plaintiff must actually witness the injury causing accident in order to state a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Hegel v. McMahon, 85 Wash.App. 106, 112, 931 P.2d 181 (1997). The plaintiffs petitioned for discretionary review in this court.

Marzolf v. Stone

Nineteen-year-old Jeremy Marzolf was killed when his motorcycle collided with a school bus. Jeremy's father, Barton Marzolf, happened upon the scene within 10 minutes of the collision, before emergency crews arrived. He saw his son on the ground, still conscious, but "his leg was cut off, and he was about split in half." Br. of Pet'r at 2. Jeremy died soon afterward.

Barton Marzolf filed suit for wrongful death and negligent infliction of emotional distress against Snohomish County, the school district, and the driver of the bus. The Defendants moved to dismiss the emotional distress claim on the grounds that Mr. Marzolf was not at the scene when the accident occurred. Initially, the trial court denied the motion, but when the Court of Appeals issued its decision in Hegel, the County moved for reconsideration. After considering Hegel, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss. Marzolf petitioned this court for review and the two cases were consolidated.

ANALYSIS

Bystander negligent infliction of emotional distress

claims involve emotional trauma resulting from one person's observation or discovery of another's negligently inflicted physical injury. Washington restricts the class of bystander negligent infliction of emotional distress plaintiffs to those who were present at the scene of the accident, Gain v. Carroll Mill Co., 114 Wash.2d 254, 260, 787 P.2d 553 (1990), and requires that plaintiffs demonstrate objective symptoms of their emotional injury. Hunsley v. Giard, 87 Wash.2d 424, 436, 553 P.2d 1096 (1976). The parties ask us to decide whether plaintiffs must actually be at the scene at the time of the accident, and what is necessary to sufficiently allege objective symptoms of their distress.

I.

Washington first recognized a bystander negligent infliction of emotional distress cause of action in Hunsley. In that case, the defendant negligently drove her car into the plaintiff's home. The plaintiff was not injured, but after the accident she experienced heart trouble which was later diagnosed as having resulted from severe mental stress. Hunsley, 87 Wash.2d at 425, 553 P.2d 1096. The court allowed the claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, dispensing with the previous limiting requirement that the plaintiff be within the zone of danger. Instead, the court evaluated the claim based on the general tort principles of duty and foreseeability. If the specific harm alleged by the plaintiff was foreseeable to the defendant, he had a duty to avoid it and could be held liable. Hunsley, 87 Wash.2d at 434-35, 553 P.2d 1096.

More than 10 years after Hunsley first allowed a claim for bystander negligent infliction of emotional distress, the Court of Appeals reasoned that a liability scheme that was limited by foreseeability alone was contrary to public policy. Cunningham v. Lockard, 48 Wash.App. 38, 736 P.2d 305 (1987). The plaintiffs in Cunningham were the minor children of a mother who was struck by a car. The children neither witnessed the accident, nor came upon the scene shortly after its occurrence. The Court of Appeals held as a matter of law that the children could not recover for This court revisited the issue in Gain v. Carroll Mill Co., 114 Wash.2d 254, 787 P.2d 553 (1990). In Gain, we recognized that Hunsley 's foreseeability approach might allow for an overly expansive allocation of fault, and acknowledged the need for an outer limit to liability. In Gain, the plaintiff learned of his son's death when he viewed television news coverage of the fatal accident. The plaintiff sued the driver of the car that caused the accident. The court held that a plaintiff who viewed an accident on television may not bring a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The court reasoned that such emotional injury is unforeseeable as a matter of law where the family member was not present at the scene of the accident. Gain, 114 Wash.2d at 255, 787 P.2d 553.

                emotional distress.  The Court of Appeals explained that Hunsley 's foreseeability approach did not set an adequate limit to the scope of a defendant's legal liability.  "[T]he decision subjects defendants to potentially unlimited liability to virtually anyone who suffers physical manifestations of emotional distress ... Because of this virtually unlimited liability, a boundary establishing the class of persons who can sue must be drawn."  Cunningham, 48 Wash.App. at 44, 736 P.2d 305.   Thus, Cunningham held that negligent infliction of emotional distress claims should be limited to claimants who were present at the time the victim was imperiled by the defendant's negligence
                

We agree with the Court in Cunningham, that unless a reasonable limit on the scope of defendants' liability is imposed, defendants would be subject to potentially unlimited liability to virtually anyone who suffers mental distress caused by the despair anyone suffers upon hearing of the death or injury of a loved one. As one court stated:

" 'It would surely be an unreasonable burden on all human activity if a defendant who has endangered one person were to be compelled to pay for the lacerated feelings of every other person disturbed by reason of it....' "

Gain, 114 Wash.2d at 260, 787 P.2d 553 (quoting Budavari v. Barry, 176

Cal.App.3d 849, 855, 222 Cal.Rptr. 446 (1986) (quoting Scherr v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 168 Cal.App.3d 908, 214 Cal.Rptr. 393 (1985))). ¹

Although Gain recognized that specific limitations must be placed on the foreseeability standard, the court did not embrace Cunningham 's rule that a claimant must be present at the time of the accident. Instead, the court balanced the interest in compensating the injured party against the view that a negligent act should have some end to its legal consequences. The court held that mental suffering by a relative "who is not present at the scene of the injury-causing event is unforeseeable as a matter of law." The court later concluded that plaintiffs must be "physically present at the scene of the accident or arrive shortly thereafter. Mental distress where the plaintiffs are not present at...