Hegwine v. Longview Fibre Co., Inc.

• Decision Date: 29 November 2007
• Docket Number: No. 78728-O.,78728-O.
• Citation: 172 P.3d 688
• Parties: Stacy L. HEGWINE, Respondent, v. LONGVIEW FIBRE COMPANY, INC., a Washington corporation, Petitioner.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

172 P.3d 688

Stacy L. HEGWINE, Respondent, v. LONGVIEW FIBRE COMPANY, INC., a Washington corporation, Petitioner.

No. 78728-O.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Argued May 10, 2007.

Decided November 29, 2007.

Nancy Williams, Kathryn C. Loring, Perkins Coie LLP, Seattle, WA, William L. Dowell, Attorney at Law, Longview, WA, for Petitioner.

Mark Stanley Brumbaugh, Walstead Mertsching PS, Longview, WA, for Respondent.

Kathleen Phair Barnard, Schwerin Campbell Barnard & Iglitzin LLP, Sarah A. Dunne, ACLU, Seattle, WA, Amicus Curiae on behalf of American Civil Liberties.

Sara Lyle Ainsworth, Northwest Women's Law Center, Seattle, WA, Amicus Curiae on behalf of Northwest Women's Law Center.

Michael Craig Subit, Frank Freed Subit & Thomas LLP, Jeffrey Lowell Needle, Seattle, WA, Amicus Curiae on behalf of Washington Employment Lawyers Assoc.

J.M. JOHNSON, J.

¶ 1 An employer who refuses to hire a job applicant because of her pregnancy is liable for sex discrimination under chapter 49.60 RCW (Washington Law Against Discrimination or WLAD), absent demonstration of a business necessity or proof of a bona fide occupational qualification.¹ Determining whether such sex discrimination has occurred involves application of the plain language of the WLAD and its related interpretive regulations.² These laws do not call for an accommodation analysis like that applicable to disability related employment discrimination claims; hence, no such analysis is applicable, or appropriate, in evaluating a pregnancy related employment discrimination claim. The trial court erred in applying such an accommodation analysis in the present case. The Court of Appeals correctly identified this error and, applying the proper analysis, held that petitioner Longview Fibre Company (Fibre) committed unlawful sex discrimination in refusing to hire respondent Stacy Hegwine. We affirm. Specifically, we hold that Fibre violated RCW 49.60.180(1), by refusing to hire Hegwine because of her pregnancy, and RCW 49.60.180(4), by inquiring as to Hegwine's pregnancy as part a preemployment medical examination.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2 In late 2000, Hegwine applied for a clerk/order checker position in Fibre's customer service department. The advertisement for the job stated that the company desired an applicant with related experience or education, computer abilities, and demonstrated communication skills. Ex. 1, App. A. The ad mentioned no lifting or other physical requirement. Hegwine interviewed for the position with Fibre employees Carlene Cox and Ron Samples on February 16, 2001. Fibre had no documented job description for the position at that time. During the interview, Samples told Hegwine that the position had a 25 pound lifting requirement.

¶ 3 Cox called Hegwine and offered her the position on February 21, 2001, contingent upon Hegwine's successful completion of a physical exam. Hegwine accepted the offer and was given a start date of March 1, 2001. Two days later, Hegwine completed her physical at the office of Dr. Ostrander Fibre's medical director. As part of the exam, Hegwine was required to complete a medical history form that inquired as to her pregnancy status. Ex. 18. Hegwine truthfully disclosed that she was pregnant. Id. In response, Dr. Ostrander gave Hegwine a medical release form and told her that she must have it completed by her personal physician as a condition of her employment. Ex. 8. Hegwine took this form to her physician, Dr. Herron, who completed it without being aware of any physical requirements related to Hegwine's prospective position at Fibre. Dr. Herron indicated on the form that Hegwine could lift between 20 to 30 pounds and could pull or push up to 40 pounds.³ Ex. 1, App. D.

¶ 4 Hegwine reported for employment and orientation on March 1, 2001. After watching a series of videos and receiving documents outlining Fibre's employment policies, Hegwine met with Cox. During this meeting, Hegwine again disclosed her pregnancy. Following this disclosure, Hegwine was escorted to another employee's office, while Cox contacted Dr. Ostrander about Hegwine's physical exam. After Dr. Ostrander indicated that he had not received the medical release form back from Hegwine's physician, Cox told Hegwine that she had to leave the premises. That same day, Cox obtained the completed release form directly from Dr. Herron. Cox then contacted Hegwine and informed her that Dr. Herron had released her to lift only 20 pounds and that Fibre would be in touch.

¶ 5 Hegwine immediately contacted Dr. Herron and requested that he raise her lifting restriction to 40 pounds based on information she received from an employee at Dr. Ostrander's office as to what the actual lifting requirement was for the clerk/order checker position. Dr. Herron obliged and faxed a new form to Fibre. Ex. 1, App. E. Apparently confused by the disparity between the two releases, Dr. Ostrander contacted Dr. Herron and, based on their conversation, completed a third form. This form indicated that Hegwine could lift 20 pounds frequently and 40 pounds "occasionally to infrequently." Ex. 1, App. F.

¶ 6 After the receipt of this third form, Fibre's equal employment opportunity coordinator, Margaret Rhoades, was directed to conduct a relevant analysis of the clerk/order checker position. Rhoades analyzed the position generally and also specifically addressed whether Hegwine could perform its essential functions given her lifting restrictions. Rhoades determined that a clerk/order checker must occasionally lift boxes weighing up to 60 pounds. In her final report, Rhoades indicated that because of Hegwine's 40 pound lifting restriction, Hegwine could not meet the requirements of the clerk/order checker position. Bob Arkell, Fibre's senior vice president of industrial relations and general counsel, made the final decision to rescind Hegwine's offer. He testified that his decision was based on Hegwine's lifting restriction. On March 16, 2001, Cox called Hegwine and informed her that Fibre was "withdrawing [its] offer of employment" because her "availability" did not permit her "to perform the job." Ex. 11.

¶ 7 Hegwine sued Fibre alleging, among other things, that Fibre's actions constituted unlawful sex discrimination in violation of RCW 49.60.180. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted a judgment in favor of Fibre. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 19-20 (Judgment). The trial court grounded its decision in the law of disability discrimination, as argued by Fibre, as opposed to sex discrimination, as argued by Hegwine. CP at 14-18 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law). The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court applied the wrong legal analysis and holding that, under the proper sex discrimination analysis, Hegwine prevailed. Hegwine v. Longview Fibre Co., 132 Wash.App. 546, 550, 132 P.3d 789 (2006). The Court of Appeals remanded to the trial court solely for determination of damages. Id. at 568, 132 P.3d 789. The court also awarded Hegwine attorney fees. Id. Fibre then successfully petitioned this court for review. Hegwine v. Longview Fibre Co., 159 Wash.2d 1001, 153 P.3d 195 (2007).

Analysis

I. Proper Analysis of Pregnancy Related Employment Discrimination Claims

A. Standard of Review

¶ 8 The proper legal analysis for pregnancy related employment discrimination claims under the WLAD is a question of law, which we review de novo. Dep't of Labor & Indus. v. Granger, 159 Wash.2d 752, 757, 153 P.3d 839 (2007).

B. Claims of employment discrimination because of pregnancy are to be analyzed as matters of sex discrimination and are not subject to an accommodation analysis like that utilized in the disability context

¶ 9 The trial court analyzed Hegwine's claim under a disability discrimination framework. In particular, the trial court focused its analysis on whether the 60 pound lifting requirement was an essential function of the clerk/order checker position, which Hegwine's "disability" prevented her from performing, thus relieving Fibre of any obligation to accommodate her. CP at 17-18 (Conclusions of Law). The Court of Appeals determined that this legal analysis was incorrect. Hegwine, 132 Wash.App. at 562-63, 132 P.3d 789.

¶ 10 Fibre now concedes that pregnancy is not a disability under Washington law but argues that the Court of Appeals erred in rejecting the application of an accommodation analysis analogous to that applicable to disability related employment discrimination claims. Hegwine counters that Fibre's position is inconsistent with the regulations enacted by the Washington State Human Rights Commission (WHRC or Commission), which specifically address employment discrimination because of pregnancy. We agree with Hegwine and affirm the Court of Appeals. Specifically, we hold that under the plain language of the WLAD and its interpretative regulations, pregnancy related employment discrimination claims are matters of sex discrimination. Such claims are not subject to an accommodation analysis similar to that used in the disability context.

¶ 11 While the plain language of RCW 49.60.180(1) prohibits job discrimination "because of ... sex ..." and does not specifically mention pregnancy, the WHRC has enacted several interpretive regulations that clarify discrimination because of pregnancy is sex discrimination. For instance, WAC 162-30-020 provides key definitions and sets forth a number of specific prohibitions on employers in regard to their conduct involving pregnant applicants and employees. Likewise, WAC 162-12-140 focuses on preemployment inquiries and, specifically, prohibits any such inquiries related to pregnancy. See WAC 162-12-140(3)(n). It is appropriate to look to these regulations in interpreting and applying RCW 49.60.180 because the WHRC is statutorily charged with interpreting and enforcing the WLAD. See Marquis v. City of Spokane, 130 Wash.2d 97, 111, 922 P.2d 43 (1996); RCW 49.60.010, .120. Moreover, so...