Height v. State

• Decision Date: 04 May 1961
• Docket Number: No. 241,241
• Citation: 170 A.2d 212,225 Md. 251
• Parties: James HEIGHT v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 251

225 Md. 251

170 A.2d 212

James HEIGHT v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 241.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

May 4, 1961.

Elsbeth Levy, Baltimore, for appellant.

James O'C. Gentry, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Thomas B. Finan, Atty. Gen., on the brief), for appellee.

Before HENDERSON, HAMMOND, PRESCOTT, HORNEY and MARBURY, JJ.

PRESCOTT, Judge.

Just a few days prior to June 1, 1954, the petitioner was sentenced to six months' confinement in the Maryland House of Correction by a Trial Magistrate of Calvert County; and, as a result thereof, he was incarcerated in said institution as of June 1, 1954. After serving some five months, he was duly released, but, failing to display any peculiar or outstanding qualifications for high rank in the 'Blue Ribbon Army,' he was arrested for, and convicted of, being drunk and disorderly on five occasions during a twelve-month period. His last conviction was in the Circuit Court after the State had requested a jury trial, and he received a six months'$ sentence as an habitual offender. At the same time, he was referred to the Patuxent Institution for examination. The staff of that Institution recommended that he be committed thereto. After hearing pursuant to the Code (1957), Article 31B (sometimes hereinafter referred to as the Act), he was found to be a defective delinquent, his aforementioned sentence was suspended, and he was returned to the Institution under indeterminate sentence, where he has since abided. The Circuit Court denied the appellant's petition for relief under the Post Conviction Procedure Act, Code 1957, art. 27, § 645A et seq., and we granted leave to appeal.

The briefs on both sides have been prepared with care, ability and thoroughness, which is most commendable, as well as helpful and gratifying to the Court.

Three sections of the Code (1957), Article 31B, are here involved. In pertinent part they are as follows ' § 6. Requests for examination.

'(a) For whom requests may be made.--A request may be made that a person be examined for possible defective delinquency if he has been convicted and sentenced in a court of this State for a crime or offense coming under one or more of the following categories: * * * (5) two or more convictions for any offenses or crimes punishable by imprisonment, in a criminal court of this State.

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'Application

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' § 15. Not to affect magistrate courts.

'Nothing in this article shall be construed to extend to or affect any case in the court of a magistrate or justice of the peace, or any person involved in such case, unless by reason of a request for a jury trial or for other cause the case shall be heard and adjudicated in a regular criminal court.

' § 16. ¹ Article construed prospectively.

'Nothing in this article shall be construed to extend to or to affect any person who on June 1, 1954, is held as an inmate or prisoner of any penal institution operated and supervised by the Department of Correction in this State, unless after that time he is convicted and sentenced in a court of this State for a crime or offense listed in § 6 above; and it is specifically provided that one such offense or crime committed after June 1, 1954, if followed by conviction and sentence, shall be sufficient to bring the said person within the application of this article. * * * Nothing in this article shall be construed to bring any person within the application of this article by reason of any crime or offense committed prior to June 1, 1954, unless it is under the foregoing provisions of this section.'

The appellant contends that his confinement on June 1, 1954, was the result of a 'case in the court of a magistrate,' that he was 'a person involved in such case,' in his said case there was no 'request for a jury,' and it was not 'heard and adjudicated in a regular criminal court.' Consequently, he argues, that since the State makes no claim that he has had two convictions under the terms of Section 6(a)(5), he is clearly exempted from the provisions of Article 31B by Section 15. The State, on the other hand, says that Section 15 is only intended to be an exception to the Act, and the object of the exemption granted by said section is 'meant to apply to the current disposition of a case by a magistrate,' i. e., that no trial magistrate or justice of the peace should have a right to refer a person to the Patuxent Institution for examination. The State further contends that the appellant's present confinement is legal, because he was a 'person who on June 1, 1954 [was] held as an inmate or prisoner of [a] penal institution operated * * * by the Department of Correction' and, thereafter, he was convicted of, and sentenced for, one offense within the category named in Section 6(a)(5), which brought him directly and specifically within the provisions of Section 16.

The question is not entirely free of difficulty. It is obvious that if Section 16 controls under the circumstances of this case, as we have stated them above, a literal reading of said section supports the State's contentions. It is, also, apparent that if Section 15 prevails and it be given a grammatical construction, the appellant's claim of exemption from the provisions of the Act is well founded, because his conviction prior to June 1, 1954, was the result of a 'case in the court of a magistrate,' and he was a 'person involved in such case.' From the above, it is readily seen that the provisions of both Sections 15 and 16 cannot be applied to the facts and circumstances of this case, if both are afforded strictly verbal constructions.

It has been stated so frequently by this Court, and others, that the 'primary,' the 'fundamental,' and the 'cardinal' rule in the construction of statutes is to effectuate the real and actual intention of the legislature, that it no longer requires the citation of authorities to support the proposition. ² In determining the legislative intention of an enactment, the Court considers its language in its natural and ordinary signification, and, if there be no obscrity or ambiguity on the face of it, there is no occasion for construction, and the Court will give to the language used, its apparent meaning, Pressman v. Barnes, 209 Md. 544, 121 A.2d 816; however, when the words of a statute are of doubtful meaning, the Court, in determining legislative intent, will consider not only their usual and literal meanings, but their meaning and effect considered in the light of the setting, the objectives and purposes of the enactment, and the consequences that may result from one meaning rather than another, Tyrie v. Baltimore County, 215 Md. 135, 137 A.2d 156, with the real legislative intent prevailing over literal intent. Wright v. State, 189 Md. 218, 224, 55 A.2d 849; McKeon v. State, 211 Md. 437, 443, 127 A.2d 635. And all parts and sections of Article 31B must be read and considered together in arriving at the true intention of the legislature, as they form part of a general system. State v. Petrushansky, supra.

Applying the above principles of law to the facts in the instant case, we think that Section 15 is controlling. In enacting the Defective Delinquent Act, the legislature embarked upon the adoption of relatively new, experimental and somewhat unusual legislation, with few, if any, close parallels, either procedurally or substantively, to the laws of other jurisdictions. Legislative Council Research Report No. 29. The underlying purpose of the Act was to protect society from the dangers of persons whose actions evidence a propensity toward criminal activity, with the statutory emphasis being on confinement and treatment, rather than on punishment or deterrence. Eggleston v. State, 209 Md. 504, 121 A.2d 698. Section 9(b) provides that when a defendant is found to be a defective delinquent, he shall be 'committed or returned to the institution for confinement * * * for an indeterminate period without either...