Heine v. Fla. Atl. Univ. Bd. of Trs.
| Decision Date | 26 April 2023 |
| Docket Number | 4D22-15 |
| Parties | AMANDA HEINE and JHAYLA STREADY, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Appellants, v. FLORIDA ATLANTIC UNIVERSITY BOARD OF TRUSTEES, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit Palm Beach County; Samantha Schosberg Feuer, Judge; L.T. Case No. 502021CA004008.
Adam A. Schwartzbaum, Adam M. Moskowitz, Howard M. Bushman, and Barbara C. Lewis of The Moskowitz Law Firm, Coral Gables, and Douglas F. Eaton of Eaton &Wolk, P.L., Miami, for appellants.
Holly Griffin Goodman and Jack J. Aiello of Gunster, Yoakley &Stewart, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellee.
Appellants Amanda Heine and Jhayla Stready ("Students") appeal the trial court's order granting Florida Atlantic University Board of Trustees' ("FAU") motion to dismiss their class action suit with prejudice. Students claim FAU breached a contract when the university failed to provide certain in-person services during the COVID-19 pandemic yet continued to collect fees and refused to provide refunds. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. Because of the nature of the dispute and the similar cases filed in other jurisdictions, we also certify a question of great public importance.
After the COVID-19 virus began infecting people nationwide Florida's Governor issued Executive Order 20-52 on March 9, 2020, declaring a Florida State of Emergency due to COVID-19. Two days later, the Florida Board of Governors issued an order to all state public universities, including FAU, directing them to immediately begin transitioning their faculty and students to remote instruction. Many colleges and universities throughout the country acted similarly to stop the spread of COVID-19 by moving classes online and halting various in-person activities and services. Initially, this response earned these institutions praise for acting in the best interests of their students and public health.[1] However, those directly and adversely affected by the shutdowns later closely scrutinized those decisions. As a result, college students across the country filed lawsuits seeking refunds of either tuition or fees for the in-person educational experience which they expected, but did not receive.
In exercising its constitutional authority to establish tuition and fees for students at these institutions,[2] the Florida Legislature has enacted several statutes requiring all state public universities to charge fees to students who register for courses. See § 1009.24(2), Fla. Stat. (2021) (); § 1009.24(4)(d), Fla. Stat. (2021) (). The Legislature has prescribed the fees which each state public university must charge to all students, except those exempted by law. § 1009.24, Fla. Stat. (2021); § 1001.706(4)(c), Fla. Stat. (2021) (). In addition to mandating state universities collect and retain certain fees, the Legislature has specified general purposes for their use. See, e.g., § 1009.24(9), Fla. Stat. (2021) (authorizing "separate activity and service, health, and athletics fees").
In June 2021, Students filed this suit against FAU after the COVID-19 shutdown, alleging one count of breach of contract and, in the alternative, one count of unjust enrichment. Students assert that an express, written contract was established with FAU when they signed up for classes and paid tuition and fees. In support of their position, Students attached to their complaint the billing statements which they had received after paying their tuition for the affected semesters. In the billing statements for the Spring 2020 semester, Students were charged for several services in addition to tuition, including fees for transportation access, health, and athletics. Students also attached a "Statement of Responsibility" to their complaint that they were required to sign when registering for classes. In the section of the Statement titled "Payment of Fees &Refunds," Students agreed to the following terms:
I understand that when I register for any course at Florida Atlantic University or request and/or receive any service from Florida Atlantic University I accept full responsibility to pay all tuition, fees and other associated costs assessed as a result of my registration and/or request/receipt of services. I further understand and agree that my registration and acceptance of these terms constitutes a promissory note agreement (i.e., a financial obligation in the form of an educational loan as defined by the U.S. Bankruptcy Code at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)) in which Florida Atlantic University is providing me educational services, deferring some or all of my payment obligation for those services. I promise to pay for all assessed tuition, fees and other associated costs by the published or assigned due date. I understand that distance learning courses may have additional cost associated with taking online proctored exams. Those costs could include: webcam (if your computer does not already have one), online proctoring fees, and/or remote testing center costs.
(emphasis added).
FAU moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing Students' claims were barred by the separation of powers doctrine as well as by sovereign immunity. Following a hearing on the motion, the trial court dismissed Students' complaint with prejudice, finding their claims were barred under both doctrines. On FAU's sovereign immunity defense, the trial court found the Statement of Responsibility and tuition billing statements did not constitute an express, written contract because they simply referenced "fees" in the aggregate without identifying any specific services provided in exchange for Students' payment. According to the lower court's ruling, Because the attachments to the operative complaint did not clearly and unequivocally show the existence of an express contract, the trial court found Students did not establish a cause of action with allegations sufficient to be deemed a waiver of sovereign immunity to allow recovery under either a breach of contract or unjust enrichment claim. This appeal followed.
An appellate court reviews a motion to dismiss using a de novo review. See Bell v. Indian River Mem'l Hosp., 778 So.2d 1030, 1032 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); see also Plancher v. UCF Athletics Ass'n, Inc., 175 So.3d 724, 725 n.3 (Fla. 2015) (). "When considering a motion to dismiss, trial courts are not permitted to 'go beyond the four corners of the complaint in considering the legal sufficiency of the allegations.'" PNC Bank, Nat'l Ass'n v. Inlet Vill. Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 204 So.3d 97, 99 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (quoting Barbado v. Green &Murphy, P.A., 758 So.2d 1173, 1174 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)). However, "[t]he issue of sovereign immunity may properly be considered on a motion to dismiss." Dist. Bd. of Trs. of Miami Dade Coll. v. Verdini, 339 So.3d 413, 417 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022) ().
Three opinions from other Florida appellate courts are relevant to the analysis of the legal viability of Students' claims Verdini, 339 So.3d at 413; University of South Florida Board of Trustees v. Moore, 347 So.3d 545 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022), reh'g denied, SC22-1398, 2023 WL 105592 (Fla. Jan. 5, 2023); and University of Florida Board of Trustees v. Rojas, 351 So.3d 1167 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022), appeal filed, SC23-126. We will discuss each of these in turn.
In Verdini, the trial court denied the state college's motion to dismiss by ruling the attachments to the complaint sufficiently contained express written terms and provided "the specific services [the college] was contractually obligated to provide in exchange for [the student's] payment of 'fees' to survive a motion to dismiss." Verdini, 339 So.3d at 417. The Third District reversed that order, finding the plaintiff's complaint did not establish an express contract for "on-campus or in-person services in exchange for the various fees listed in the complaint." Id. at 421.
The Third District noted the plaintiff's breach of contract claim was not based on the college's complete failure to provide services; it was instead premised on "an alleged failure to provide on-campus or in-person services." Id. at 418. The appellate court found nothing in the complaint expressly required the college to provide on-campus services in exchange for paying the student services, financial aid, capital improvement, and technology fees. Id. Further, the appellate court held the plaintiff had failed to identify anything that expressly prohibited the school from "providing remote services in exchange for these fees." Id. For that reason, the appellate court held the general allegations made in the complaint were "insufficient to overcome sovereign immunity as there is nothing evidencing an express, written contract." Id. at 419.
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