Heinrichs v. Dunn
| Decision Date | 21 July 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:13-CV-00929 |
| Parties | R. STEPHEN HEINRICHS, Plaintiff, v. GEORGE DUNN, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
Magistrate Elizabeth P. Deavers
OPINION & ORDERI. INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court on Defendants George Dunn, Charles House, Bob Garretson, Fred Nielsen, Jeannie Macaluso, Joe Johnson, Bob Campbell, Vic Skirmants, Jim Liberty, Felix Macaluso, Karen Campbell, Mary Skamser, and Gordon Maltby's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 12). For the reasons set forth herein, Defendants' Motion is GRANTED.
II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff R. Stephen Heinrichs, a member of 356 Registry, Inc. ("Registry"), is an individual who does not reside in Ohio. Defendants George Dunn, Charles House, Bob Garretson, Fred Nielsen, Jeannie Macaluso, Joe Johnson, Bob Campbell, Vic Skirmants, Jim Liberty, Felix Macaluso, Karen Campbell, Mary Skamser, and Gordon Maltby (collectively, "Defendants"), are individuals who are former or current elected officers or trustees of the Registry, an Ohio corporation. None of the Defendants resides in Ohio.
Plaintiff has been an Active member of the Registry for over twenty years. (Complaint, Doc. 1, ¶ 12). At all times relevant to this Complaint, Plaintiff has met the prequisites to be an Active member of the Registry (Id., ¶ 13), including paying his dues (Id., ¶ 12), not resigning hismembership (Id., ¶ 14) and not committing infractions of the Registry's rules or acting contrary to the Registry's general objectives or interests (Id., ¶¶ 16-19). Thus, Plaintiff is entitled to the privileges and benefits of the membership (Id., ¶ 15), namely, access to and the ability to use the Registry's online membership posting forum (Id., ¶ 22). Further, in the past, the Registry published financial information approximately six months after the end of the tax year for its membership's review. (Id., ¶ 25).
In mid-2012, Plaintiff noticed that the 2011 financial information had yet to be published. (Id., ¶ 26). In response, Plaintiff began a discussion thread on the Registry's public forum, noting the missing information and requesting that Defendants make it available. (Id., ¶ 28). Plaintiff also inquired about the Registry's financial performance for the 2012 fiscal year (Id., ¶ 31) and posted his findings regarding the Registry's 2011 tax returns in a further attempt to pressure Defendants to make the 2011 financial information available. (Id., ¶ 32). Plaintiff continued to post on the online forum when Defendants did not provide the requested information. (Id., ¶ ¶ 33-34).
In August 2012, Defendants blocked Plaintiffs access to the online discussion forum, preventing him from making new postings and deleting some of his previous postings. (Id., ¶¶ 35-36). Around this same time, approximately between August 2012 and October 2012, Defendants communicated by interstate mail or electronic mail, allegedly devising a plan to defraud Plaintiff out of his membership rights and to avoid producing the 2011 financial information. (Id., ¶ 39). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that on August 3, 2012, Defendants exchanged such communications, scheming to invite Plaintiff and other members to an open member meeting, with the secret intention of attacking and ridiculing Plaintiff and terminating Plaintiff's membership status. (Id., ¶ 40).
On August 13, 2012, Defendant George Dunn, through counsel, sent Plaintiff a letter on behalf of the Registry's trustees and officers, inviting him to attend the alleged "schemed" meeting on September 23, 2012, explaining that the meeting's purpose was to allow members to review the Registry's financial information. (Id., ¶ 43-44). Plaintiff did not attend the meeting, but continued requesting that Defendants disclose the financial information. (Id., ¶ 46).
On October 1, 2012, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the Registry with the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas in Ohio. (Id., ¶ 50). Two days later, on October 3, 2012, Defendants suspended Plaintiff's membership because of Plaintiff's lawsuit against the Registry. (Id., ¶ 51-55). Up to August 2013, Plaintiff had continuously demanded access to his membership benefits. (Id., ¶¶ 62-63). Plaintiff, a world renowned Porsche historian, author, collector, restoration expert, and international event coordinator, believes access to the online forum is important to his financial success, because he relies on the online community for book sales and marketing. (Id., ¶ 67-77).
On September 19, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendants, alleging five counts: (1) mail and wire fraud; (2) civil RICO conspiracy; (3) declaratory judgment; (4) breach of fiduciary duties; and (5) intentional interference with a business relationship (Doc. 1). Pursuant to Rules 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6), Defendants filed a motion for dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction or, in the alternative, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Doc. 12).
III. MOTIONS
The Defendants seek dismissal of the Plaintiff's Complaint on two alternative grounds: (1) lack of personal jurisdiction over the Defendants; and (2) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Court will address each ground independently, herein.
Defendants seek dismissal of the claims against them for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). "Because personal jurisdiction is a threshold determination linked to any subsequent order issued by the court," The Kroger Co. v. Malease Foods Corp., 437 F.3d 506, 510 (6th Cir. 2006), the Court turns to Defendant's Rule 12(b)(2) argument first. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is GRANTED.
The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating personal jurisdiction. CompuServe Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1262-63 (6th Cir. 1996). In the face of a supported motion to dismiss, the plaintiff may not rest on his pleadings, but must, by affidavit or otherwise, set forth specific evidence supporting jurisdiction. Theunissen v. Matthews, 935 F.2d 1454, 1458 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing Weller v. Cromwell Oil Co., 504 F.2d 927, 930 (6th Cir. 1974). When the Court considers a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) without an evidentiary hearing on the issue of personal jurisdiction, however, the plaintiff "'need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction.'" Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 871 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 282 F.3d 883, 887 (6th Cir. 2002)) (internal citation omitted). The plaintiff can make this prima facie showing by "'establishing with reasonable particularity sufficient contacts between [the Defendants] and the forum state to support jurisdiction.'" Neogen, 282 F.3d at 887 (quoting Provident Nat'l Bank v. California Savings & Loan Ass'n, 819 F.2d 434, 437 (3d Cir. 1987)).
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss, the Court is to construe the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Bird, 289 F.3d at 871. Significantly, the Court isnot to weigh any assertions of the party seeking dismissal which contradict those offered by the plaintiff. CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1262 (citing Theunissen, 935 F.2d at 1459). That way, a defendant cannot defeat personal jurisdiction simply by filing an affidavit that denies all jurisdictional facts. Id. (citing Theunissen, 935 F.2d at 1459).
Personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant "arises from certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Air Prods.& Controls, Inc. v. Safetech Int'l, Inc., 503 F.3d 544, 549 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945)) (internal quotations omitted). When a federal court's subject matter jurisdiction derives from the existence of a federal question, "personal jurisdiction over a defendant exists 'if the defendant is amenable to service of process under the [forum] state's long-arm statute and if the exercise of personal jurisdiction would not deny the defendant [ ] due process.'" Bird, 289 F.3d at 871 (quoting Michigan Coalition of Radioactive Material Users, Inc. v. Griepentrog, 954 F.2d 1174, 1176 (6th Cir. 1992)).
Here, Plaintiff argues that this Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants because each Defendant "has purposefully availed himself or herself of the privilege of acting within the State of Ohio, conducting acts or omissions directed to and into the State of Ohio, and voluntarily submitting to the personal jurisdiction of courts within the State of Ohio." (Complaint, Doc. 1, ¶ 6). Defendants, however, assert that they lack any real systematic and continuous contacts with Ohio and therefore have not purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of acting in Ohio. (Doc. 19 at 1).
In evaluating Defendant's 12(b)(2) motion, the Court assesses whether Plaintiff has made the requisite prima facie statutory and constitutional showing with respect to Defendants.
Ohio's long-arm statute provides nine bases for specific jurisdiction. Ohio Rev. Code § 2307.382(A)(1-9); Dayton Superior Corp. v. Yan, 288 F.R.D. 151, 160 (S.D. Ohio 2012). In relevant part, the statute states, "[a] Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from the person's...(3) [c]ausing tortious injury by an act or omission in this state; (4) [c]ausing tortious injury in this state by an act or omission outside this state if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this state;..." Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §...
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