Heins v. Ledis

Decision Date18 April 1996
Citation664 N.E.2d 10,422 Mass. 477
PartiesCheryl L. HEINS v. Alan E. LEDIS.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

COMPLAINT for divorce filed in the Worcester Division of the Probate and Family Court Department on February 17, 1993.

The case was heard by Arline S. Rotman, J.

The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review.

Wendy Sibbison, Greenfield, for defendant.

Raymond A. Desautels, III, Oxford, for plaintiff.

Before LIACOS, C.J., and WILKINS, ABRAMS, O'CONNOR and GREANEY, JJ.

LIACOS, Chief Justice.

Cheryl Heins (wife) filed a complaint for divorce against Alan Ledis (husband) in February, 1993. After trial, a judge in the Probate and Family Court Department, on September 13, 1994, made a division of the parties' marital property and ordered the husband to pay alimony to the wife in the amount of $300 weekly "until the death of either party or six years, whichever occurs first." The husband appeals. The judge denied the husband's motion for a stay of the order pending appeal. A single justice of the Appeals Court subsequently denied the husband's appeal from the denial of the motion. We allowed the husband's application for direct appellate review. On appeal, the husband challenges the alimony award, claiming the judge (1) unlawfully awarded alimony to the wife where she supported herself during the marriage and is on a voluntary leave of absence from her job, (2) improperly used alimony to reimburse the wife for her investment in the husband's veterinary business, and (3) violated the equitable purpose of G.L. c. 208, § 34 (1994 ed.), and constitutional principles of equal protection by basing the alimony award on the husband's, but not the wife's, potential earnings. We hold that the judge erred in using an award of alimony to reimburse the wife for her lost investment in the husband's business, and did not explain adequately a reason for the alimony award independent of the improper reimbursement. 1 We reverse the award and remand the case to the Probate Court.

The judge found the following facts. The parties were married on April 5, 1987; this was the second marriage for both. The husband has one child from a previous marriage. This child was thirteen years old at the time of the divorce. The wife's two children from her previous marriage were adults at the time of the divorce, although one resided with the parties during the marriage. No children were born of this marriage.

The wife has a masters degree in teaching and taught at a high school for twenty-two years. At the time of the marriage her net worth was $99,300. Her salary for the last year she worked was $41,158.21 plus sixty per cent of her health and dental insurance. The husband has a graduate degree in Veterinary Medicine. During the marriage he worked three part-time jobs, earning various amounts between $44,610 and $60,183 during the years 1987 through 1992. His net worth at the time of the marriage was $10,350, and his financial statement listed his weekly income at the time of the divorce as $541. The parties maintained separate bank accounts. During the marriage the husband earned more than the wife. The judge found that the wife devoted all of her money to the support of the marital enterprise while the husband did not. The parties resided in the home the wife owned prior to the marriage and the husband contributed $300 monthly toward the $2,000 monthly carrying costs.

The parties' goal was to open a veterinary clinic. The wife sold her home and applied the net proceeds ($85,000) toward the purchase of another house in 1992. In this house, the parties opened and operated their veterinary clinic. The wife additionally spent money and time renovating and equipping the clinic. The husband contributed approximately $22,000 toward the purchase and renovation of this real estate. The clinic was located on the first floor of the house, the second floor was the marital home, and the third floor was a rental apartment. The only kitchen facilities were located in the clinic area.

After the clinic opened in the spring of 1992, the parties' marriage began to deteriorate. In the fall of 1992, the husband became romantically involved with a woman who had volunteered her time working at the clinic, and moved in with her in December, 1992. The wife, who had one-half of a lung removed due to cancer and suffers from allergies and a low immune system, fell into a major depression. She requested and received an unpaid leave of absence from her teaching job, which leave continued through the 1994-1995 school year. At the time of trial, the wife was taking antidepressant medication and her depression was described as "partially remitted." She continues to exhibit depressive symptoms and sees her psychotherapist intermittently.

Prior to trial, the wife underwent a court-ordered psychiatric evaluation to determine her ability to return to work. The psychiatrist concluded that she does not presently have a mental disability that would preclude her from returning to work. Following the separation she travelled the country in her motor van. She planned to borrow money from her father to spend three years skiing, travelling, doing art work, and possibly writing a book. She had anticipated that the veterinary clinic would eventually provide the couple with sufficient funds that she could discontinue teaching, a career she never wanted but entered "because of money concerns."

Following trial, the judge entered a judgment of divorce nisi for the wife on grounds of the husband's cruel and abusive treatment toward the wife, and made the following orders. The wife was to transfer all her right, title, and interest in the marital home to the husband in consideration of $17,500, subject to the mortgage which the husband was to assume. The wife was further to release all rights she may have had in the veterinary equipment in exchange for $15,000, which the husband was to pay by a promissory note with interest, the principal due in three years. Each party was to retain his or her own personal property and debts, and to maintain his or her own health insurance. The husband was ordered to pay the wife $2,500 toward her counsel fees, and to pay the wife alimony until the death of either party or six years, whichever occurred first.

The court's power to award alimony and make an equitable division of property is wholly statutory. See Gottsegen v. Gottsegen, 397 Mass. 617, 621, 492 N.E.2d 1133 (1986); Inker, Alimony and Assignment of Property: The New Statutory Scheme in Massachusetts, 10 Suffolk U.L.Rev. 1, 7 (1975). The concept of alimony is historically based in the early common law obligation of a man to support his wife. According to early common law property concepts, a married couple was an indivisible unit with legal title to all property being vested in the husband. Because the marriage bond was inseparable, the modern notion of "divorce" did not exist and the obligation of a husband to support his wife remained intact following a separation of the spouses. Id. at 12 & n. 50. Following the onset of married women's property acts and the recognition of true divorce, alimony was seen as an alternative to leaving many women destitute. Gottsegen v. Gottsegen, supra at 622-623, 492 N.E.2d 1133. The 1974 amendment to G.L. c. 208 gave courts the ability to award alimony to either a husband or wife, and to award either spouse's property to the other. St.1974, c. 565, approved July 19, 1974. Bianco v. Bianco, 371 Mass. 420, 422, 358 N.E.2d 243 (1976). Allowing a court to divide the property was seen as a mechanism for recognizing the nonmonetary contribution of a spouse, usually the wife, to a marriage without the inherent limitation of alimony that it be only for "the amount necessary to support the wife in the manner of living to which she has been accustomed." Inker, supra at 8. Chapter 565 abolished the notion that a wife's obligation is to provide the services of a homemaker and a husband's obligation is to provide economic support for the family. Id. Instead, the Legislature adopted the gender-neutral principle that marriage is a partnership, and that spouses have a mutual obligation to support the children of the marriage as well as the other spouse. See Saraceno v. Saraceno, 369 Mass. 967, 341 N.E.2d 261 (1976) (c. 565 eliminates possible gender discrimination in alimony statute).

A judge has broad discretion when awarding alimony and dividing marital assets pursuant to G.L. c. 208, § 34 (1994 ed.). 2 Drapek v. Drapek, 399 Mass. 240, 243, 503 N.E.2d 946 (1987). Rice v. Rice, 372 Mass. 398, 400, 361 N.E.2d 1305 (1977). Bianco v. Bianco, supra. The judge must consider fourteen mandatory factors set out in the third sentence of § 34, namely "the length of the marriage, the conduct of the parties during the marriage, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties, and the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income." In addition, the judge may, in his or her discretion, consider "the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of their respective estates and the contribution of each of the parties as a homemaker to the family unit." G.L. c. 208, § 34. Bowring v. Reid, 399 Mass. 265, 267, 503 N.E.2d 966 (1987). Drapek v. Drapek, supra. The judge must make express findings indicating that he or she weighed each of the required factors and did not consider any irrelevant factors. Pare v. Pare, 409 Mass. 292, 296, 565 N.E.2d 1195 (1991). Bowring v. Reid, supra. Rice v. Rice, supra at 402-403, 361 N.E.2d 1305. Additionally, the reasoning for the judge's conclusions must be apparent in his or her findings and rulings. Pare v. Pare, supra. Savides v. Savides, 400 Mass. 250, 252, 508...

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