Heinsma v. City of Vancouver

• Citation: 29 P.3d 709,144 Wash.2d 556
• Decision Date: 23 August 2001
• Docket Number: No. 70895-9.,70895-9.
• Parties: Roni HEINSMA, Appellant, v. CITY OF VANCOUVER, Respondent.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Washington

29 P.3d 709

144 Wash.2d 556

Roni HEINSMA, Appellant, v. CITY OF VANCOUVER, Respondent.

No. 70895-9.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Argued May 31, 2001.

Decided August 23, 2001.

Jerry Franklin King, Vancouver, Luce, Lombino & Riggio, William Louis Cameron, Tacoma, Amicus Curiae on Behalf of Washington State Association.

Karolyn Ann Hicks, Seattle, Jennifer C. Pizer, Los Angeles, CA, Aaron Hugh Caplan, Seattle, Amicus Curiae on Behalf of American Civil Liberties Union.

Darren Clayton Walker, Vancouver, Northstar Legal Center, Jordan W. Lorence, Fairfax, VA, Jonathan P. Gundlach, Chicago, IL, for Appellant.

Debra Quinn, Asst. Vancouver City Attorney, Vancouver, for Respondent.

OWENS, J.

In this appeal, we must determine whether the City of Vancouver exceeded authority under article XI, section 11 of the state constitution by extending insurance benefits to the domestic partners of city employees. The appellant, Roni Heinsma (Heinsma), argues that the city abused its discretion under RCW 41.04.180 by expanding the definition of "dependents" to include domestic partners. However, the trial court concluded that the benefits program was constitutional and that the regulation of employee benefits was a matter of local concern. We agree and affirm the decision of the trial court.

FACTS

In May 1998, the City of Vancouver began offering benefits to its city employees' domestic partners and the domestic partners' children. Under this program, domestic partners of city employees may qualify to receive health insurance benefits, and city employees may use their sick leave to care for their domestic partners or for their domestic partners' children.

To qualify as a domestic partner for purposes of Vancouver's benefits program, the employees and their partners must file an affidavit proclaiming that their relationship exists.¹ Since the program was implemented, at least 29 partnerships have been registered, and all of the domestic partners have been approved to receive benefits. In addition, 13 children have also been approved to receive benefits. During 1998, the city spent at least $20,000 of its tax funds to cover the costs of extending benefits to domestic partners and their children.

Heinsma is a taxpayer and resident of the City of Vancouver. Heinsma filed an action requesting that the trial court grant declaratory judgment against the city based on the alleged unconstitutionality of the benefits program. At trial, both parties moved for summary judgment, and the trial court awarded summary judgment to the City of Vancouver, concluding that the extension of benefits to domestic partners was a matter of local rather than statewide concern. Heinsma sought review in the Court of Appeals; however, this court accepted review of this case by way of certification from the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE

Whether the City of Vancouver's Domestic Partner Benefits Program violates article XI, section 11 of the state constitution by impermissibly expanding the definition of "dependents" as contained in RCW 41.04.180 to include domestic partners.

ANALYSIS

Under article XI, section 10 of the state constitution, first class cities, like Vancouver, may adopt city charters, which allow cities to exercise broad legislative powers. In addition, the legislature has delegated police powers to charter cities so that the cities "may make and enforce within [their] limits all such local police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with general laws."² CONST. art. XI, § 11. Thus, a first class city may, without sanction from the legislature, legislate regarding any local subject matter. City of Spokane v. Portch, 92 Wash.2d 342, 345-46, 596 P.2d 1044 (1979). However, this power ends when the legislature adopts a law concerning a particular interest, unless the legislature has left room for concurrent jurisdiction. Lenci v. City of Seattle, 63 Wash.2d 664, 669, 388 P.2d 926 (1964). When the state's interest is paramount or joint with the city's interest, the city may not enact ordinances affecting the interest unless it has delegated authority. Massie v. Brown, 84 Wash.2d 490, 492, 527 P.2d 476 (1974).

Heinsma asserts that the city exceeded its authority under RCW 41.04.180 by extending insurance benefits to the domestic partners of its employees. Under RCW 41.04.180, the legislature authorized cities to provide medical insurance benefits to their employees and the employees' dependents. Heinsma asserts that domestic partners are not dependents within the meaning of the statute and that the city's recognition of domestic partnership is ultra vires because the legislature has a paramount interest in defining and regulating familial relationships.

On the other hand, the City of Vancouver asserts that it had discretion to define the term "dependents" because the legislature did not define the term in the statute. In addition, the city argues that the distribution of employee benefits is a local interest and that it has broad power to regulate those benefits so long as the regulations do not conflict with RCW 41.04.180. Finally, the city asserts that it has not created a new marital status because its recognition of domestic partnership is limited to its employee benefits program and because its recognition did not affect the legislature's ability to regulate familial relationships on a statewide basis.

Municipal ordinances are presumed to be valid, and grants of municipal power are to be liberally construed. City of Bothell v. Gutschmidt, 78 Wash.App. 654, 659-60, 898 P.2d 864 (1995). Similarly, the person challenging an ordinance bears the burden of proving that the ordinance is unconstitutional. Id. at 660, 898 P.2d 864. Nevertheless, an ordinance will be found to be invalid (1) if a general statute preempts city regulation of the subject or (2) if the ordinance directly conflicts with a statute. Brown v. City of Yakima, 116 Wash.2d 556, 559, 807 P.2d 353 (1991).

A. Preemption

A city is preempted from enacting ordinances if the legislature has expressly or by implication stated its intention to preempt the field. Brown, 116 Wash.2d at 560, 807 P.2d 353. When the legislature has expressly stated its intent to preempt the field, a city may not enact any ordinances affecting the given field. See id. However, if the legislature is silent regarding its intent, the court must consider both "the purposes of the statute and ... the facts and circumstances upon which the statute was intended to operate" in order to determine the intent of the legislature. Id.

Under RCW 41.04.180, the City of Vancouver has authority to provide medical benefits to its employees and their dependents. Since the legislature did not define the term "dependents," we conclude that the legislature delegated authority to the city to determine who should be eligible for benefits. See Arlington County v. White, 259 Va. 708, 711-12, 528 S.E.2d 706 (2000)

(holding that the county necessarily had the power to determine who qualified as a dependent when the state legislature failed to define the term "dependent" in a similar statute); see also Hite v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 2, 112 Wash.2d 456, 458-59, 772 P.2d 481 (1989) (noting that "[a] municipal corporation's powers are limited to those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to powers expressly granted by statute"). We recognize that the city has a strong interest in retaining qualified employees and that the regulation of employee benefits has traditionally been treated as a local interest. See State ex rel. Beck v. Carter, 2 Wash.App. 974, 979-81, 471 P.2d 127 (1970) (noting that municipalities have the authority to regulate employee compensation); Ayers v. City of Tacoma, 6 Wash.2d 545, 554, 108 P.2d 348 (1940) (holding that cities have the authority to implement employee pension programs); see also Schaefer v. City & County of Denver, 973 P.2d 717, 719 (Colo.Ct.App.1998) (explaining that "the authority to define the scope of employee compensation, including benefits, is of particular importance to a local government because of its impact on a city's ability `to both hire and retain qualified individuals'") (quoting Colo. Springs Fire Fighters Ass'n v. Colo. Springs, 784 P.2d 766, 773 (Colo.1989)); Crawford v. City of Chicago, 304 Ill.App.3d 818, 827, 237 Ill.Dec. 668, 710 N.E.2d 91 (concluding that the power to extend benefits to city employees is essentially a local concern and that cities must be able to offer good employment benefits in order to be able to hire and retain qualified individuals), appeal denied, 185 Ill.2d 621, 242 Ill.Dec. 135, 720 N.E.2d 1090 (1999). We also recognize that the State of Washington provided for home rule charters in order to allow cities to operate economically and efficiently. See City of Seattle v. Auto Sheet Metal Workers Local 387, 27 Wash.App. 669, 683-84, 620 P.2d 119 (1980),

overruled on other grounds by City of Pasco v. Pub. Employment Relations Comm'n, 119 Wash.2d 504, 833 P.2d 381 (1992). For all these reasons, we conclude that the legislature did not intend to preempt the City of Vancouver from providing a reasonable definition of "dependent."

In addition, Heinsma argues that the city's recognition of domestic partnership is preempted because the legislature has a paramount interest in defining and regulating familial relationships. The legislature has enacted several different laws defining and regulating marriage in Title 26 RCW; however, we conclude that the city's recognition of domestic partnership in no way affects the state's ability to regulate familial relationships.³ For example, the city enables domestic partners of its employees to receive insurance benefits, but the domestic partners do not thereby become eligible to receive any other legal benefits that the state has extended to married couples.⁴ Similarly, the city's recognition of domestic partnership is limited to its employee benefits program. As the trial court noted,...