Heirs of Neil G. Ellis v. Estate of Virgie Mae Ellis, 99-00897
| Decision Date | 11 April 2001 |
| Docket Number | 99-00897 |
| Parties | HEIRS OF NEIL G. ELLIS v. THE ESTATE OF VIRGIE MAE ELLISIN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Probate Court for Rutherford County, David Loughry, Judge
This is a will case. The wife, as the husband's conservator, sold the couple's real and personal property and deposited the proceeds into a joint checking account and into investments in the wife's name only. The husband died, and the wife died less than one hundred twenty hours later. Both of their wills devised all of their property to each other. The wife's will was admitted to probate. The husband's heirs moved the trial court to apply provisions of Tennessee's Uniform Simultaneous Death Act to equally divide the proceeds of the couple's jointly held property between the husband and wife's separate estates. The trial court denied the motion, holding that the Act did not apply and that sole ownership of the proceeds from couple's real property, which was held as tenants by the entirety, vested in the wife upon the husband's death. The husband's heirs appealed. We affirm, finding that sole ownership of the proceeds from the couple's jointly held real and personal property vested in the wife upon the husband's death. We also find that the husband and wife's devises of any individually owned personal property would both lapse and the property, or its proceeds, would remain in each spouse's separate estate. We remand the case to the trial court to determine whether any of the personal property was owned individually, whether any such property was sold, and if so, the value of the property.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Probate Court is Affirmed and Remanded.
Holly Kirby Lillard, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which W. Frank Crawford, P.J., W.S., and David R. Farmer, J., joined.
Laurie Y. Young, Murfreesboro, Tennessee, for the appellants, Heirs of Neil G. Ellis.
William W. Burton, Murfreesboro, Tennessee, for the appellee, Estate of Virgie Mae Ellis.
Virgie Mae Ellis ("Wife") and Neil Ellis ("Husband") were married in 1944. The couple had no children during their marriage. In April 1998, Wife filed a petition in the trial court to establish herself as Husband's conservator, due to his advanced age and deteriorating physical and mental condition. In the petition, Wife listed Husband's assets as follows:
A.A 64+ acre farm, house with 3 bedroom, 2 bath,
living/dining room and den, separate garage/
workshop and barn $160,000.00
Furniture and personal possessions13,998.00
B.Farm machinery & tools25,000.00
C.Fishing boat/motor 250.00
D.EE Savings bond10,000.00
E.Suntrust joint checking account 200.00
F.Burial insurance - Single premium deferred annuity 7,726.00
G.Cemetery plot 650.00
H.1985 Ford Pickup (both names) 2,850.00
I.1991 Plymouth Acclaim (both names) 2,400.00
Total $223,074.00
The October 1978 deed for the farmhouse and surrounding real estate states that the property was transferred to both Husband and Wife.
On April 23, 1998, the trial court entered an order appointing Wife as conservator for Husband. The order permitted Wife, with the trial court's approval, to sell the parties' farmhouse and surrounding real estate, as well as the parties' personal property, and to deposit the proceeds from the sales into an interest-bearing account. The order required Wife to use the proceeds from the sale of all of the parties' property to pay for Husband's monthly nursing home costs.
On February 11, 1999, Husband died. Wife died three days later, on February 14, 1999, less than one hundred twenty hours after Husband's death. Both deaths were of natural causes. Husband and Wife had identical wills, each devising and bequeathing all of their property to the other. The wills did not name a contingent beneficiary. The wills did not include either a provision on the couple's simultaneous death or a provision requiring devisees to survive a given period of time in order to take under the will.
In March 1999, Wife's brother, Hall Irby ("Irby"), submitted to the trial court a report on Husband's conservatorship. In the report, Irby stated that he had been appointed Wife's attorney-in-fact in January 1998. From that time until Wife's death, Irby maintained Husband and Wife's financial records, changed the couple's investments at Wife's direction, and made assisted living arrangements for Wife. The first action taken pursuant to the conservatorship was the redemption of Husband's savings bond. Irby reported that the bond was redeemed for $7,132.00 and the proceeds deposited into Husband and Wife's joint checking account in order to pay Husband's health care costs. When it became apparent that the couple's health would prevent them from ever returning to live at the farmhouse, Irby arranged a sale of the farmhouse and the surrounding real estate, as well as an auction of most of their personal property. The farmhouse and surrounding real estate sold for a net price of $280,726.43.1 An auction of the personal property resulted in net proceeds of $63,287.95. Proceeds from the sales were deposited into the couple's joint checking accounts, and were also invested into several certificates of deposit and an investment account. The certificates of deposit and the investment account were in Wife's name only. Dividends and interest from the certificates of deposit and the investment account were reinvested into the particular investment.
On March 26, 1999, the trial court entered an order admitting Wife's will to probate. On August 3, 1999, Husband's heirs filed a notice of intervention, asserting that Wife's estate should be equally divided between Wife's heirs and Husband's heirs. In a subsequent brief, Husband's heirs argued that, because Husband and Wife died within one hundred twenty hours of one another, Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 31-3-1202 and 31-3-1043 should be applied to distribute their jointly-owned property equally to their separate estates. Wife's estate objected, arguing that all property held as tenants by the entirety passed to Wife upon Husband's death.
On September 15, 1999, after a hearing, the trial court issued an order denying the motion of Husband's heirs to equally divide the couple's jointly owned property between their separate estates. In the order, the trial court held that Tennessee Code Annotated § 31-3-120 does not apply to property owned as tenants by the entirety, and that Tennessee Code Annotated § 31-3-104 does not apply in this case.
On September 24, 1999, Husband's heirs filed a motion for a new trial. In the motion, Husband's heirs argued that the trial court erred in failing to apply Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 31-3-120 and 31-3-104 in this case. Husband's heirs again noted that Husband and Wife died within one hundred twenty hours of one another, arguing that this made their estates subject to the provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated § 31-3-120. Husband's heirs also contended that, because Husband and Wife died "simultaneously" as the term is defined in section 31-3-120, Tennessee Code Annotated § 31-3-104 should be applied to distribute half of Wife's estate to Husband's estate.
On October 7, 1999, the trial court issued an order denying the motion for a new trial. The trial court held that Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 31-3-102 and 31-3-104 do not apply in this case. It found that the proceeds from the sale of Husband and Wife's real property were deemed to be held as tenants by the entirety. From this order, and from the September 15, 1999 order, Husband's heirs now appeal.
On appeal, Husband's heirs argue that the trial court erred in failing to apply Tennessee Code Annotated § 31-3-120. They assert that proceeds from the sale of property owned as tenants by the entirety retains its character as tenants by the entirety. They contend that, because Wife failed to survive Husband by one hundred twenty hours, she is presumed under section 31-3-120 to have predeceased Husband. Thus, Husband's heirs claim, Husband's testamentary devise of the proceeds of the couple's property held as tenants by the entirety lapses, and the property passes to Husband's estate. Husband's heirs also argue that the trial court erred in failing to apply Tennessee Code Annotated § 31-3-104 in this case. They assert that section 31-3-104 should apply because failure to survive a joint tenant by one hundred twenty hours is equivalent to "simultaneous" death under Tennessee's version of the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act.
Wife's estate argues that neither of the statutes cited by Husband's heirs apply in this case. Wife's estate concedes that proceeds from the sale of property owned as tenants by the entirety retains that character. However, Wife's estate asserts that sole ownership of the proceeds from Husband and Wife's property held as tenants by the entirety vested in Wife upon Husband's death.
The issues presented in this case are questions of law. Consequently, the scope of review is de novo with no presumption of correctness in the trial court's decision. See State v. Levandowski, 955 S.W.2d 603, 604 (Tenn. 1997); Ridings v. Ralph M. Parsons Co., 914 S.W.2d 79, 80 (Tenn. 1996).
Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 31-3-120 and 31-3-104 were enacted as part of Tennessee's version of the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 31-3-101 through 31-3-120 (1984 and Supp. 2000). Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 31-3-120(b) and (c) provide:
(b) A devisee who fails to survive the testator by one hundred twenty (120) hours is deemed to have predeceased the testator, unless the will of the decedent contains language dealing explicitly with simultaneous deaths or deaths in a common disaster or requiring that the devisee survive by a stated period of time in order to take under the will.
(c) If it is not established by clear and convincing evidence that an individual who would otherwise be...
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