Heiskell v. Ledgerwood

• Decision Date: 21 November 1921
• Citation: 234 S.W. 1001,144 Tenn. 666
• Parties: HEISKELL v. LEDGERWOOD ET AL.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

234 S.W. 1001

144 Tenn. 666

HEISKELL v. LEDGERWOOD ET AL.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

November 21, 1921

Certiorari to Court of Civil Appeals.

Petition by S. G. Heiskell against S. T. Ledgerwood and others for certiorari to review proceedings of the Democratic State Primary Election Board. Dismissal of the petition was affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals, and petitioner brings certiorari. Affirmed.

McKINNEY J.

In the primary of August 5, 1920, the four candidates for membership on the Democratic State Executive Committee from the Second Congressional District (two of whom were to be elected) received the following vote: S. T. Ledgerwood, 3,481; W. N Hickey, 2,112; S. G. Heiskell, 2,035; and John W. Staples 1,853.

On August the 25th, 1920, Mr. Heiskell filed with the Chairman of the Democratic State Primary Election Board a petition, in which he contested the right of Mr. Ledgerwood and Mr. Hickey to qualify as members of said committee for the following reasons, to wit:

"(1) That no nominating petitions containing the required number of signatures nor certified copies thereof as required by sections 20 and 21 of chapter 118 of the Public Acts of 1917, had been filed in Loudon county in behalf of said two candidates whose election he proposed to contest.

(2) That in certain counties proper ballots were not used.

(3) That nominating petitions were properly filed for S. G Heiskell and John W. Staples in all counties of said Congressional District, but that their names were not put on the ballots in certain counties as required by law.

(4) That up to the date of the filing of the petition no returns of said election had been filed with the county court clerk of Scott county as required by law."

Petitioner also asked that he be awarded a certificate of election as a member of said committee.

On the hearing, on motion of the contestees, Ledgerwood and Hickey, the State Primary Board dismissed said petition upon the ground that said contest had not been commenced within the time provided by the Primary Election Law, chapter 118, Acts of 1917. Thereupon this suit was instituted by Mr. Heiskell by petition filed in the circuit court of Knox county, in which Mr. Ledgerwood, Mr. Hickey, and Mr. Staples were made defendants. The prayer of the petition was as follows:

"In consideration of the premises petitioner prays that the proceedings of the Democratic State Primary Election Board be transferred and removed to this honorable court, to the end that the same may be reviewed, corrected, annulled and reversed, and that the rights of your petitioner hereinbefore set forth may be heard and determined by the court and to this end that writ of certiorari issue requiring that all the records and proceedings of said board be transmitted by the chairman and secretary of the Democratic State Primary Election Board of Commissioners, who are the custodians thereof, to this court, and that process issue to the defendants herein named requiring them to appear and make defense to this petition, and that this honorable court proceed to hear and determine the matters in controversy and deal with the same according to law.

Answer under oath by the defendant is expressly waived. This is the first application that petitioner has ever made for a writ of certiorari in this cause."

Motions to dismiss said petition were filed by the defendants Ledgerwood and Hickey. It is unnecessary to state the grounds thereof. Said motions to dismiss were sustained by the circuit judge, and the petition was dismissed.

On appeal the judgment of the circuit court was affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals. The case is before us on petition for certiorari.

We are of the opinion that we are without jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter here involved. In other words, that the action of the State Primary Election Board is final and conclusive, and is not subject to review by the courts.

Section 29 of the Primary Election Law (Laws 1917, c. 118) is as follows:

"Be it further enacted, if any contest shall be instituted as a result of the holding of any primary under this act, a candidate or candidates so desiring to contest shall give notice thereof in writing to the chairman of the State Primary Election Board holding said primary election within five (5) days after the said County Primary Election Boards have met and canvassed the returns. Said notice of contest shall likewise be served upon all candidates adversely interested within a like period. In the said notice of contest grounds thereof shall be fully stated, so as to enable the contestants adversely interested to prepare their defense thereto. After the filing of such notice of contest the same shall be considered and passed upon by the said State Primary Election Board, which shall hear and determine such contests and make such disposition thereof as fairness and justice shall require."

The act makes no provision for a review of the action of the State Primary Board by the courts, and the decisions uniformly hold that the finding of the State Primary Board is conclusive.

In 9 R. C. L. p. 1088, it is said:

"Ordinarily the primary election laws provide for the manner in which contests shall be determined, and when this is the case the finding of the statutory authority is conclusive on the party organization within the state."

In 20 C.J. 119, it is stated:

"However, statutes relating to primary elections frequently confer the right of contest, and prescribe the procedure to be adopted in the exercise thereof; and the mode of contest so prescribed is exclusive, and is not governed by the general provisions of the Codes of Procedure."

And on page 120 the author says:

"Jurisdiction of primary election contests is conferred sometimes on party authorities or committees, and sometimes on officers or official boards. In this case the decision of the party or official tribunal is final and conclusive, and, unless authorized by statute, the courts have no power to review it, provided the tribunal has not acted in excess of its jurisdiction."

In Democratic Executive Committee, etc., v. Dougherty, 134 Ky. 402, 120 S.W. 343, it appears that there was a contest over the nomination of circuit court clerk, and it was insisted by the petitioner that the executive committee dismissed the petition without a hearing on the merits. The court said:

"Section 1563 of the Kentucky Statutes of 1909, concerning contests in primary elections, in so far as pertinent thereto, is as

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