Helena-West Helena Sch. v. Circuit Court
Decision Date | 25 January 2007 |
Docket Number | No. 06-1284.,06-1284. |
Citation | 247 S.W.3d 823 |
Parties | HELENA-WEST HELENA SCHOOL DISTRICT # 2 OF PHILLIPS COUNTY, Arkansas; Rudolph Howard, Interim Superintendent in his personal and his official capacity; and Lisa Baker in her Individual and official capacity as principal of the West Side Elementary School of the Helena-West Helena School District, Petitioner, v. THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PHILLIPS COUNTY, Arkansas, Respondent. |
Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Rieves, Rubens & Mayton, by Kent J. Rubens, West Memphis, AR, for petitioners.
Petitioners are the Helena-West Helena School District, the District's Interim Superintendent, Rudolph Howard, and Lisa Baker, Principal of West Side Elementary School. They are seeking either a writ of prohibition or, alternatively, certiorari, to prevent the Respondent, the Circuit Court of Phillips County, Arkansas, from further exercising jurisdiction in the instant matter. In support of their petition, they assert that the trial court acted wholly without jurisdiction when it entered a temporary restraining order in this case, because the parties seeking that restraining order failed to first exhaust their administrative remedies. As Petitioners are seeking a writ of prohibition or certiorari, our jurisdiction is pursuant to Ark. Sup.Ct. R. 1-2(a)(3). We deny the petition.
The facts underlying this case indicate that Jimmy and Coretta Brown filed a complaint in the Phillips County Circuit Court on October 24, 2006, alleging that their two minor children, J.B., age nine, and Y.B., age eleven, both students at West Side Elementary, had been verbally abused and attacked by the school's principal, Ms. Baker, on or about October 18, 2006, in a confrontation that resulted in the children being escorted from the building and placed under arrest by the West Helena Police Department.1 The complaint further alleged that the Browns were subsequently notified that their two children had been expelled from the Helena-West Helena School District for the remainder of the year. Plaintiffs averred that the expulsion would cause irreparable harm to their minor children and further that they would be denied due process, as they alleged that there was no school board within the Helena-West Helena School District. The Browns requested the trial court to intervene and issue a temporary restraining order enjoining the Petitioners from expelling their children.
On October 31, 2006, the trial court entered an order granting the request for the temporary restraining order, prohibiting any further action related to their expulsion. In addition, the order required that the children be immediately transferred and placed into appropriate classes at Beechcrest Elementary School.
This court issued a stay of the trial court's October 31 order, pending review of Petitioners' request for extraordinary relief. On December 7, 2006, this court ordered the parties to this matter to submit simultaneous briefs by December 21, 2006. Petitioners are the only party to have submitted a timely brief.2 We now consider the merits of the instant petition.
As their first point on appeal, Petitioners contend that a writ of prohibition is warranted in this matter, as the Browns failed to exhaust their administrative remedies before seeking redress in circuit court. Specifically, Petitioners contend that no final action has been taken in the matter, as only a recommendation of suspension has been made, and that the Browns failed to avail themselves of the opportunity of two separate hearings before the school board. Thus, according to the Petitioners, the trial court was without jurisdiction to hear the Browns' complaint. Petitioners further point out that the school district, pursuant to Ark.Code Ann. § 6-18-507 (Repl.1999), has the right to expel a student, and that a trial court's right to review the ultimate decision of expulsion is on an abuse-of-discretion standard, not on a de novo basis, as would be the case here if the Browns were allowed to proceed.
In their initial response to this petition, the Browns argued that extraordinary relief was not warranted, as Petitioners have another adequate remedy available at law, namely an appeal of the trial court's order granting the temporary restraining order. The Browns are correct. Because an order granting a temporary restraining order is immediately appealable, Petitioners should have filed an appeal from the trial court's order, as opposed to seeking a writ of prohibition or certiorari.
It is well settled that a writ of prohibition is an extraordinary writ that is only appropriate when the lower court is wholly without jurisdiction. Jordan v. Circuit Court of Lee County, 366 Ark. 326, 235 S.W.3d 487 (2006); Ouachita R.R., Inc. v. Circuit Court of Union County, 361 Ark. 333, 206 S.W.3d 811 (2005); Patterson v. Isom, 338 Ark. 234, 992 S.W.2d 792 (1999). Jurisdiction is the power of the court to hear and determine the subject matter in controversy between the parties. Ulmer v. Circuit Court of Polk County, 366 Ark. 212, 234 S.W.3d 290 (2006); Conner v. Simes, 355 Ark. 422, 139 S.W.3d 476 (2003). In Conner, we thoroughly explained our standard of review for a writ of prohibition and stated:
The writ is appropriate only when there is no other remedy, such as an appeal, available. Prohibition is a proper remedy when the jurisdiction of the trial court depends upon a legal rather than a factual question. This court confines its review to the pleadings in the case. Moreover, prohibition is never issued to prohibit a trial court from erroneously exercising its jurisdiction.
355 Ark. at 425-26, 139 S.W.3d at 478 (citations omitted). In Ulmer, 366 Ark. at 215-16, 234 S.W.3d at 293-94, we further explained that "writs of prohibition are prerogative writs, extremely narrow in scope and operation; they are to be used with great caution and forbearance." Simply stated, writs of prohibition should issue only in cases of extreme necessity. Id.
Petitioners concede that they have sought a writ of prohibition even though our case law dictates that a writ of prohibition cannot be invoked to correct an order already entered, see Bates v. McNeil, 318 Ark. 764, 888 S.W.2d 642 (1994), but argue that a writ of certiorari is warranted for the reasons set forth in Conner, 355 Ark. 422, 139 S.W.3d 476. There, we reiterated the standards for determining the propriety of a writ of certiorari and stated as follows:
A writ of certiorari is extraordinary relief, and we will grant it only when there is a lack of jurisdiction, an act in excess of jurisdiction on the face of the record, or the proceedings are erroneous on the face of the record. In determining its application, we will not look beyond the face of the record to ascertain the actual merits of a controversy, or to control discretion, or to review a finding of fact, or to reverse a trial court's discretionary authority. A writ of certiorari lies only where it is apparent on the face of the record that there has been a plain, manifest, clear, and gross abuse of discretion, and there is no other adequate remedy.
Id. at 428, 139 S.W.3d at 479-80 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Thus, it appears from Petitioners' brief that they realize that they are not entitled to a writ of prohibition, as the trial court has already entered the order granting the temporary restraining order, but instead attempt to avail themselves of a writ of certiorari.
This court has explained that certiorari is available in the exercise of this court's superintending control over a tribunal that is proceeding illegally where no other adequate mode of review has been provided. Beverly Enters.-Ark., Inc. v. Circuit Court of Independence County, 367 Ark. 13, 238 S.W.3d 108 (2006); Lenser v. McGowan, 358 Ark. 423, 191 S.W.3d 506 (2004). As previously explained, it applies where the proceedings are erroneous on the face of the record and where it is apparent on the face of the record that there has been a plain, manifest, clear, and gross abuse of discretion. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs. v. Mainard, 358 Ark. 204, 188 S.W.3d 901 (2004). A manifest abuse of discretion is discretion exercised improvidently or thoughtlessly and without due consideration. Jones Rigging & Heavy Hauling, Inc. v. Parker, 347 Ark. 628, 66 S.W.3d 599 (2002).
While Petitioners' argument that the trial court was without jurisdiction to entertain the Browns' complaint because of their failure to exhaust their administrative remedies seems well taken, it is not enough to establish entitlement to extraordinary relief, either in the form of prohibition or certiorari. This court has repeatedly held that prohibition and certiorari will only lie in cases where there is no other adequate remedy available to a party. See Conner, 355 Ark. 422, 139 S.W.3d 476. It is axiomatic that where an appeal is available, another adequate remedy exists. Manila Sch. Dist. No. 15 v. Wagner, 357 Ark. 20, 159 S.W.3d 285 (2004).
In the present case, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order preventing the children from being expelled from school. Such an interlocutory order is specifically appealable under Ark. R.App. P.-Civ. 2(a)(6). See also AJ & K Operating Co., Inc. v. Smith, 355 Ark. 510, 140 S.W.3d 475 (2004) ( ); Three Sisters Petroleum, Inc. v. Langley, 348 Ark. 167, 72 S.W.3d 95 (2002) ( ). Because the relief requested by Petitioners is available through an appeal of the trial court's order, they are not entitled to extraordinary relief.
A similar result was reached by this court in Weaver v. Simes, 365 Ark. 289, 229 S.W.3d 15 (2006). There, pe...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Entergy Ark., Inc. v. Pope Cnty. Circuit Court
...Simply stated, writs of prohibition should issue only in cases of extreme necessity. Helena–W. Helena Sch. Dist. # 2 of Phillips Cnty. v. Cir. Ct. of Phillips Cnty., 368 Ark. 549, 247 S.W.3d 823 (2007). Generally, an employer who carries workers' compensation insurance is immune from liabil......
-
Cent. Flying Serv., Inc. v. Pulaski Cnty. Circuit Court
...Simply stated, writs of prohibition should issue only in cases of extreme necessity. Helena–W. Helena Sch. Dist. # 2 of Phillips Cnty. v. Cir. Ct. of Phillips Cnty., 368 Ark. 549, 247 S.W.3d 823 (2007).The sole question before us is whether the circuit court is wholly without jurisdiction o......
-
Griffen v. Ark. Jud. Disc. and Dis. Com'n
... ... No. 06-1392 ... Supreme Court of Arkansas ... January 25, 2007 ... [247 S.W.3d 817] ... action that first must be reviewed in circuit court. See Neal v. Hollingsworth, 338 Ark. 251, 992 S.W.2d ... ...
-
In re Administrative Order Number 4, (Ark. 4/9/2009)
...writ of certiorari. See Evans v. Blankenship, 374 Ark. 104, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2008); Helena-West Helena Sch. Dist. #2 of Phillips County v. Phillips County Circuit Court, 368 Ark. 549, 247 S.W.3d 823 (2007); Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. Herndon, 365 Ark. 180, 226 S.W.3d 776 (2006); Ark. Dep't o......