Ouachita R.R. v. Circuit Ct of Union County

• Decision Date: 07 April 2005
• Docket Number: No. 04-734.,04-734.
• Parties: OUACHITA RAILROAD, INC., Petitioner, v. CIRCUIT COURT OF UNION COUNTY, Arkansas, Second Division, Respondent.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

206 S.W.3d 811

OUACHITA RAILROAD, INC., Petitioner, v. CIRCUIT COURT OF UNION COUNTY, Arkansas, Second Division, Respondent.

No. 04-734.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

April 7, 2005.

Shackleford, Phillips, Wineland & Ratcliff P.A., by: Teresa Wineland and Casey Castleberry, El Dorado, for petitioner.

John D. Lightfoot, P.L.L.C., by: John D. Lightfoot, El Dorado, for respondent.

ROBERT L. BROWN, Justice.

The petitioner, Ouachita Railroad, Inc., petitions this court for a writ of prohibition against the respondent, the Circuit Court of Union County, Second Division. Ouachita Railroad seeks the writ on the basis that the circuit court is wholly without jurisdiction to entertain a counterclaim against it for abandonment and adverse possession in its suit for ejectment against Donna and Steve Harbour (the Harbours). It asserts that the Harbours' counterclaim is within the exclusive jurisdiction of a federal board, the Surface Transportation Board (STB). The Harbours counterpetition for a writ of prohibition on grounds that Ouachita Railroad's ejectment action also falls within the sole jurisdiction of the STB. We grant Ouachita Railroad's petition for writ of prohibition and deny the Harbours' counterpetition.

On February 24, 1999, Ouachita Railroad filed it complaint for ejectment against the Harbours in circuit court. In its complaint, the railroad stated that it had obtained a parcel of land through a series of deeds from Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad Co., and that it had been paying, and was continuing to pay, property taxes on the land. The property at issue, as identified in the complaint, consists of a strip of land that is approximately fifty feet wide and runs from Main Street in El Dorado to a point approximately five-hundred feet north of Main Street. The complaint alleged that the Harbours had wrongfully taken possession of the land and had removed the railroad's tracks from the land, thereby damaging Ouachita Railroad by depriving it of its opportunity to use the property. The complaint prayed for the Harbours to be ejected and for damages, as well as for a writ of possession.

The Harbours answered Ouachita Railroad's complaint and counterclaimed, asserting adverse possession and abandonment against the railroad. They claimed that the railroad's right-of-way had been lawfully abandoned without any substantial possession by it or its predecessors in title for a period of more than twenty years. In addition, they claimed that title should be quieted in them due to their open, notorious, and continuous possession of the tract.

Ouachita Railroad answered the counterclaim and denied the allegations. It further asserted that the counterclaim failed to set forth facts upon which relief could be granted. The railroad also alleged that the circuit court had no jurisdiction to hear the Harbours' equitable quiet-title claim for abandonment and adverse possession, and that, therefore, the claim should be dismissed or transferred to the chancery court.¹

Ouachita Railroad then moved for summary judgment. It its motion, it asserted that the STB had exclusive jurisdiction over the abandonment or discontinuation of the use of the right-of-way, and that the STB's authority to regulate the matter preempted all state law relating to it.² It claimed that because there was no genuine issue as to any material fact, it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

On March 30, 2001, the chancery court issued a letter opinion in the matter. In it, the court stated that the authorities cited by Ouachita Railroad supported the railroad's preemption argument and that "it is the conclusion of this Court that whether this property has been abandoned by plaintiff must be resolved by the Surface Transportation Board." The court then ruled that because the filing fee for any petition before the STB was $14,500, it would be inequitable to require the Harbours to spend more than the value of the land at issue to find out whether the land had been abandoned by the railroad. The court concluded:

. . . Therefore, it is the conclusion of this Court that the Motion for Summary Judgment by plaintiff should be denied but a finding by this Court made that the exclusive source of determining whether the land has been abandoned is the Surface Transportation Board. An Order should be entered requesting that governmental agency to address the abandonment issue and that the filing fee be waived.

On April 12, 2001, the court entered its order in which it agreed "that the issue of whether the Plaintiff has abandoned the property in question in this lawsuit is an issue which must be resolved by the Surface Transportation Board." The court stayed the matter and referred the abandonment issue to the STB for resolution. It further directed counsel for the Harbours to file the necessary request with the STB to bring the abandonment issue before it and directed counsel to request the STB to waive all filing fees in the matter because the matter was being referred by a state governmental entity in accord with 49 C.F.R. § 1002.2(e)(1). The court retained jurisdiction to address the state law claims after the STB made its final determination on whether Ouachita Railroad had abandoned the property.

On April 25, 2002, Ouachita Railroad filed a renewed and supplemental motion for summary judgment, in which it claimed that the Harbours made the request as directed by the court, but that the STB denied the Harbours' request to waive the filing fee. The railroad moved that since the court had already determined that the STB had exclusive jurisdiction over the Harbours' counterclaim, it was appropriate for the court now to grant its motion for summary judgment.

On May 9, 2003, the circuit court issued a letter opinion.³ In this opinion, the circuit court wrote that a hearing had been held on the railroad's renewed and supplemental motion for summary judgment. The court found:

It is the conclusion of this Court that, although the issue of abandonment is not within the jurisdiction of this Court, the equitable defenses raised by defendants regarding the action in ejectment are within the jurisdiction of this Court. Therefore, the motion for summary judgment by plaintiff should be denied.

A decree memorializing the circuit court's letter opinion was entered subsequently.

On June 30, 2004, Ouachita Railroad petitioned this court for a writ of prohibition on grounds that the circuit court was wholly without subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the Harbours' counterclaim of abandonment or adverse possession. The Harbours responded that the circuit court had "maintained that certain equitable and affirmative defenses remained available as pertains to possession and usage of any such right-of-way."

Ouachita Railroad first contends that it is entitled to a writ of prohibition against the circuit court, because the STB has exclusive jurisdiction over the Harbours' counterclaim of abandonment and adverse possession. It contends that 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b) grants the STB exclusive jurisdiction over the abandonment and discontinuance of all rail lines where Ouachita Railroad has record title. It claims that the STB's jurisdiction preempts any state court jurisdiction to adjudicate an action involving the cessation of services on a rail line, and it submits that under the ICC Termination Act of 1995, the STB's determination of abandonment is plenary, pervasive. and exclusive of state law, preempting all state laws relating to the subject matter. It further asserts that state law claims can only be brought after an STB-authorized abandonment, and as such, the circuit court is precluded by federal law from hearing or deciding the Harbours' abandonment claim. Finally, it maintains that the Harbours' quiet-title action is likewise preempted, because any determination by the circuit court that the Harbours had acquired title by adverse possession would effectively equate to a permanent and total cessation of railroad service over the right-of-way, and, again, only the STB has the authority to discontinue rail service.

The Harbours first respond that the petition for writ of prohibition is moot in that the circuit court has acknowledged the STB's exclusive jurisdiction over abandonment, and any appellate-court finding in that regard would have no practical legal effect upon the existing legal controversy. The Harbours further urge that there are proper appellate remedies remaining available to the railroad after a full adjudication of the issues on the merits, and, accordingly, prohibition should not be substituted for the normal remedy of appeal. Finally, the Harbours urge that their counterpetition for a writ of prohibition should be granted regarding Ouachita Railroad's ejectment complaint. They contend that should the STB have exclusive jurisdiction over their claims, then the circuit court should likewise be barred from reviewing or considering those issues set forth in the railroad's complaint.

This court has previously set forth the requirements for obtaining a writ of prohibition:

A writ of prohibition is an extraordinary writ. McGlothlin v. Kemp, 314 Ark. 495, 863 S.W.2d 313 (1993). We have stated that it is only appropriate when the lower court is wholly without jurisdiction. Id. Jurisdiction is the power or authority of the court to act. Mark Twain Life Ins. Corp. v. Cory, 283 Ark. 55, 670 S.W.2d 809 (1984). The jurisdiction of the circuit court to hear civil cases absent a provision for exclusive jurisdiction of a particular matter in another venue is well settled. Commission of Judicial Discipline and Disability v. Digby, 303 Ark. 24, 792 S.W.2d 594 (1990). We have consistently denied writs of prohibition where the lower court acted within its jurisdiction. See, e.g., Arkansas Highway Comm'n v. Munson, 295 Ark. 447, 749 S.W.2d 317 (1988) (chancery court has power to enjoin the enforcement of a void order); Commission of Judicial Discipline...