Helfrick v. Dahlstrom Metallic Door Co.

• Decision Date: 12 May 1931
• Citation: 256 N.Y. 199,176 N.E. 141
• Parties: HELFRICK v. DAHLSTROM METALLIC DOOR CO. et al.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

256 N.Y. 199

176 N.E. 141

HELFRICK

v.DAHLSTROM METALLIC DOOR CO. et al.

Court of Appeals of New York.

May 12, 1931.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Paul Helfrick, claimant, against the Dahlstrom Metallic Door Company, employer, and the Jamestown Mutual Insurance Company, insurer. From an order of the Appellate Division, Third Department (231 App. Div. 775, 245 N. Y. S. 802), affirming an award of the State Industrial Commission for compensation to the claimant, the employer and the insurer appeal. By an amendment to the order (232 App. Div. 710,246 N. Y. S. 918), the Appellate Division overruled the constitutional question raised by the employer, and denied leave to appeal, and stated that affirmance was upon the law.

Order of the Appellate Division affirmed.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third department.

Robert H. Jackson, of Jamestown, for appellant.

John J. Bennett, Jr., Atty. Gen. (E. C. Aiken, Asst. Atty. Gen., of counsel), for respondent State Industrial Board.

CRANE, J.

On March 23, 1929, Paul Helfrick, of Jamestown, N. Y., was employed as a blacksmith by Dahlstrom Metallic Door Company, of the same place. While engaged in the regular course of his employment on that day, he accidentally injured his fingers, for which the State Industrial Board has made him an award of $395.41. The employer and the insurance carrier challenge the award on the ground that the procedure under our State Workmen's Compensation Law (Consol. Laws, c. 67) has or will deprive the employer of his property without due process of law, in that the board has been made the final arbiter of the facts without any review upon the weight of evidence in a court of law.

The Labor Law of the state (Consol. Laws, c. 31), by section 12, provides for an Industrial Board consisting of five members, at least one of whom shall be an attorney and counselor at law duly admitted to practice in the state. The members are appointed by the Governor by and with the advice of the Senate; the term of office being six years. Each member is obliged to take the constitutional oath of office.

The Workmen's Compensation Law, by section 20, gives to this board full power and authority to determine all questions in relation to the payment of claims presented to it for compensation. The board shall make or cause to be made such investigation as it deems necessary, and upon application of either party shall order a hearing, and within thirty days after a claim is submitted shall make an award and file the same in the office of the department. This section further provides as follows: ‘The decision of the board shall be final as to all questions of fact, and, except as provided in section twenty-three, as to all questions of law.’

Section 23 provides for an appeal to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court within thirty days after the award or decision is made. The board may also of its own motion certify to such Appellate Division questions of law involved in its decision. The board shall be deemed a party to every such appeal, and the Attorney General, without extra compensation, shall represent it. From the decision of the Appellate Division an appeal lies to this court where the decision has not been unanimous in the Appellate Division, or the consent of that court or of this court has been obtained. Such appeals are subject to the law and practice applicable to appeals in civil actions.

In Pine v. State Industrial Commission, 107 Okl. 40 [opinion withdrawn; for corrected opinion, see 108 Okl. 185, 235 P. 617], and Public Service Gas Co. v. Board of Public Utility Com'rs, 84 N. J. Law, 463, 87 A. 651, L. R. A. 1918A, 421, similar statutory provision, making a decision of a commission final as to the facts, was interpreted to mean final as a termination which ended the proceedings, and therefore did not attempt to take from the courts a constitutional power to review the facts. Although by article 6, § 1, of our State Constitution, the Supreme Court is continued with general jurisdiction in law and equity, subject to such appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals as now is or may be prescribed by law, the same Constitution, subsequent to Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 201 N. Y. 271, 94 N. E. 431, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 162, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 156, was amended by article 1, section 19, to read as follows: ‘Nothing contained in this Constitution shall be construed to limit the power of the Legislature to enact laws for the protection of the lives, health, or safety of employees; or for the payment, either by employers, or by employers and employees or otherwise, * * * of compensation for injuries to employees or for death of employees resulting from such injuries without regard to fault as a cause thereof, * * * for the adjustment, determination and settlement, with or without trial by jury, of issues which may arise under such legislation. * * *’

This court in 1916 decided in Matter of Heitz v. Ruppert, 218 N. Y. 148, 112 N. E. 750, L. R. A. 1917A, 344, that the decision of the commission or the State Industrial Board was final on all questions of fact, and such has been the practice in this state ever since that time. The decision by the Board does not take from the courts any of the powers invested in them by the State Constitution as was the instance in the Oklahoma and New Jersey cases above cited. Such limitation of review upon appeal is not illegal under our state form of government.

What, however, is the effect of the Federal Constitution under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Our Workmen's Compensation Law was before the United States Supreme Court in New York Central R. R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188, 194, 207, 37 S. Ct. 247, 254, 61 L. Ed. 667, L. R. A. 1917D, 1, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 629, and the opinion of Mr. Justice Pitney refers to the effect of the decision on the facts by the commission or board. He there stated: ‘No question is made but that the procedural provisions of the act are amply adequate to afford the notice and opportunity to be heard required by the 14th Amendment.’ True, the court's attention was addressed to the law as a whole and not particularly to this question of the finality of the board's decision on a question of fact. A similar statute was reviewed in Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219, 37 S. Ct. 260, 61 L. Ed. 685, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 642.

The procedure under our statute appears to comply with all the requirements of due process. A claim is presented to the State Industrial Board and an opportunity is afforded for a hearing of all parties interested-the employee, the employer, the insurance carrier, and any and every witness whom the parties desire to call. The hearing is conducted much like a trial, with more liberality as to rules of evidence than is permitted in the ordinary case in court. When the decision is made, an appeal lies by either party to the Appellate Division. That court must determine whether or not on the review of the facts there be any evidence to sustain the award. The Industrial Board or the Commission cannot make an award without evidence to support it, and this question is always open in the courts on appeal both to the Appellate Division and finally to this court. Only where there is a conflict in evidence, or the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence, is the decision of the board or commission of this conflict conclusive. This procedure meets all the requisites of due process as recently declared in Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U. S. 362, 369, 50 S. Ct. 299, 302, 74 L. Ed. 904, 68 A. L. R. 434, where Mr. Justice Stone, writing for the court, said: ‘The due process clause does not guarantee to the citizen of a state any particular form or method of state procedure. Under it he may neither claim a right to trial by jury nor a right of appeal. Its requirements are satisfied if he has reasonable notice and reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present his claim or defense; due regard being had to the nature of the proceeding and the character of the rights which may be affected by it. * * * Nor does the equal...