Helland v. King County Civil Service Commission
| Decision Date | 02 January 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 43252,43252 |
| Citation | 529 P.2d 1058,84 Wn.2d 858 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | Sergeant George HELLAND and Sergeant Leonard Randall, Petitioners, v. KING COUNTY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Respondent. |
Carroll, Rindal, Caplinger & Kennedy, James E. Kennedy, Seattle, for petitioners.
Christopher T. Bayley, Pros. Atty., Michael L. Cohen, Seattle, for respondent.
The plaintiffs (petitioners), Sergeant George Helland and Sergeant Leonard Randall, seek a review of a decision of the Court of Appeals, Division One, which reversed the Superior Court for King County and thereby reinstated a decision for the defendant (respondent), King County Civil Service Commission (hereinafter referred to as the Commission). The Commission had refused to give the plaintiffs credit for two questions on a test designed to determine their eligibility for promotion to the rank of lieutenant.
The plaintiffs are sergeants with the King County Public Safety Department. In order to be eligible for promotion to the position of lieutenant, the plaintiffs were required to take the lieutenant's promotional examination, conducted by the Commission, which consisted of four parts: (1) an oral examination; (2) a consideration of seniority; (3) a department performance review; and (4) a written objective examination. To qualify for promotion, a candidate must receive a passing score on each of the four parts. All candidates who become eligible are ranked according to total scoring achievement on the entire examination. The commission had employed a national testing service, McCann & Associates (hereinafter referred to as McCann), to prepare the written portion of the examination.
The written portion was given on April 15, 1972, to a total of 18 candidates, including the plaintiffs. McCann recommended 69 as a passing score; the plaintiffs received a score of 68. The plaintiffs had previously passed the other three sections of the examination.
In accordance with King County Civil Service Commission rule 9.5, the plaintiffs, and other candidates feeling aggrieved, filed for a hearing at which time they could contest the validity of certain questions. At the initial hearing four questions were challenged, and the Commission sustained the applicants' objections to two of these, neither of which are the subject of this review. The Commission held that all candidates, including the plaintiffs, were to receive credit for these questions. In response to this ruling, the plaintiffs requested and were granted a hearing specifically limited to the two remaining questions, section 2, No. 26, and section 3, No. 13. Questions No. 26 provided as follows:
A police officer or patrol at public beach observes a mature girl about 20 years of age wearing a very brief bikini bathing suit. Assume that in this jurisdiction the only law that applies is a statute passed in 1910 which requires that all females in bathing costumes must be covered from the knee to the base of the neck to the elbow. Which one of the following choices best indicates whether or not the above situation is a 'crime' according to most modern police authorities and also states the best reason therefor:
A. It is a 'crime' because it violates an existing statute.
B. It is not a 'crime' because the statute is obsolete and not usually enforced.
C. It is a 'crime' because the exposure may incite others to more serious crime.
D. It is a 'crime' because the offensiveness to public opinion justifies the use of the obsolete statute.
E. It is not a 'crime' because public opinion would not support the police in taking enforcement action.
The plaintiffs marked 'A' as the correct answer, whereas the Commission would accept only 'B' as being correct. (Since the plaintiffs alleged error only as to this question in their petition for review, the discussion will be limited to the issues it raises.)
On August 16, 1972, the Commission convened to hear argument from both the plaintiffs and the chief examiner. Again, the Commission upheld the validity of its 'key' answers to the questions.
The plaintiffs thereafter sought and were granted a Superior Court review of the Commission's determination. At the conclusion of the hearing, without entering formal findings of fact or conclusions of law, the trial court considered the proceeding as if it were a writ of certiorari, and entered a final order holding that the questions under consideration were arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law in light of the answers deemed by the Commission to be correct. In conclusion, the court held that the plaintiffs should receive credit for their answers to said questions solely for the purpose of having passed said written examination but for no other purpose. In accordance with this decision, both plaintiffs were placed on the eligible list. One of the plaintiffs was third from the top and received a promotional appointment to the rank of lieutenant, served out his probationary period, and is awaiting the outcome of this review to see whether he will be afforded permanent status. Since the other plaintiff did not receive an appointment, and since the promotion period has expired, the issues raised by this case are moot as to him.
The Commission then appealed to the Court of Appeals, Division One, which reversed on the grounds that there was room for varying opinions as to the best answer to the questions under consideration, and therefore the Commission, in holding that the 'key' answers were correct and in refusing to accept the plaintiffs' answers, did not constitute arbitrary and capricious conduct.
The plaintiffs then petitioned this Court to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, which we granted. The case now comes before us for review upon the plaintiffs' petition.
The plaintiffs' threshold argument is that the trial court, when reviewing challenges raised in regard to a civil service examination, as in this instance, may go beyond the examination, taken as a whole, and review the validity of individual questions in light of their accompanying answers. We agree.
In reviewing the actions of administrative agencies, this Court has consistently followed the rule established in Reiger v. Seattle, 57 Wash.2d 651, 359 P.2d 151 (1961), wherein we stated on page 653, 359 P.2d on page 152:
(T)he judiciary will only review the actions of an administrative agency to determine if its Conclusions may be said to be, As a matter of law, arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.
(Italics ours.) The Commission contends that this scope of review is limited to determining whether the examination, taken as a whole, is competitive and fair. They argue that the action of the trial court, by considering individual questions, was paramount to usurping the discretionary function reserved to the agency. This argument misconstrues the action taken by the trial court, for it did not attempt to act in a supervisory capacity nor did it substitute its beliefs for that of the Commission. The trial court merely complied with the general rule as stated above. This is clear when one considers that the nature of the Conclusions made by an agency vary depending upon the particular function being carried out within the ambit of their authority. In this case we are dealing with the testing of candidates seeking promotion. King County Civil Service rule 9.5, as it relates to promotional examinations, provides that
protests relating to any subject as being unfair, ambiguous or answering either way, or the Correctness of the proposed 'key' answers, must be filed, in writing, within five days after examination is held.
(Italics ours.) Additionally, rule 9.5.1 establishes a procedure by which the Commission will review protests on specific questions raised by the examination candidates. Therefore, the decisions or conclusions which the court is authorized to review, under the rule enunciated in the Reiger case, necessarily covers the individual questions considered by the Commission during its statutorily sanctioned review proceeding. Since the plaintiffs complied with the King County Civil Service rules, as stated above, thereby preserving their right to review, we hold that the trial court was within its jurisdictional confines when it reviewed the validity of specific questions and their accompanying 'key' answers.
The plaintiffs next contend that the Commission erred in accepting only McCann's 'key' answer to question ...
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