Hellems v. Werlich
| Decision Date | 30 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 19-cv-1013-NJR |
| Parties | ROMAN HELLEMS, # 15580-030, Petitioner, v. T.G. WERLICH, Warden, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois |
Petitioner Roman Hellems is an inmate in the Bureau of Prisons currently incarcerated at FCI-Greenville. He filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in September 2019. (Doc. 1). His Amended Petition (Doc. 4) is now before the Court. Hellems invokes Rehaif v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), as the basis for his collateral attack and request for immediate release. Respondent answered the Petition (Doc. 15), and Hellems replied (Doc. 18).
Hellems was convicted by a jury of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). (Doc. 15-2); United States v. Hellems, No. 15-cr-00141-JAJ (S.D. Iowa). He is serving a 120-month sentence imposed in May 2016. (Doc. 15, p. 5; Doc. 15-6).
In October 2015, Hellems was charged by indictment with possession of two firearms after having been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year. (Doc. 15-2). The indictment did not specifically allege that Hellems knew he was a convicted felon at the time he possessed the guns. Hellems represented himself at trial with the assistance of appointed standby counsel.1 Hellems declined to stipulate to the fact that he had a prior felony conviction, so the Government presented evidence that he had an Iowa state drug conviction, as well as a previous Iowa conviction for receipt/control of firearms by a felon, both of which were punishable by more than one year in prison. United States v. Hellems, 866 F.3d 856, 860-61 (8th Cir. 2017). The trial court redacted the actual sentences imposed on those offenses. (Doc. 15, p. 3; Doc. 15-5, pp. 5-8). The jury found Hellems guilty of possessing one of the firearms. (Doc. 15-3).
The Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR") showed that Hellems had served well over one year in prison for three of his prior felony offenses. (Doc. 17-1, pp. 9-11, 14, ¶¶ 34, 37, 46). For his state felon-in-possession conviction in 1993, Hellems's 5-year sentence was initially suspended and he was placed on probation, but he served over 3 years in prison after probation was revoked and another 2 years following revocation of his parole. (Doc. 17-1, p. 9, ¶ 34). He was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment for delivery/possession of cocaine base, serving nearly 3 years before his work release (concurrent with the 3 years above) and another 2 years after his parole was revoked (concurrent with the 2-year parole revocation term above). (Doc. 17-1, p. 10, ¶ 37). He served about 14 months of a 36-month sentence for a 2007 California domestic battery offense. (Doc. 17-1, p. 14, ¶ 46).
Hellems's 120-month federal sentence was affirmed on appeal in August 2017. United States v. Hellems, 866 F.3d 856 (8th Cir. 2017). He filed an unsuccessful motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and did not appeal the trial court's February 14, 2019 denial. Hellems v. United States, Noe. 18-cv-294-JAJ (N.D. Iowa).
Generally, petitions for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 may not be used to raise claims of legal error in conviction or sentencing, but are instead limited to challenges regarding the execution of a sentence. See Valona v. United States, 138 F.3d 693, 694 (7th Cir. 1998). Thus, aside from the direct appeal process, a prisoner who has been convicted in federal court is generally limited to challenging his conviction and sentence by bringing a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the court which sentenced him. A Section 2255 motion is ordinarily the "exclusive means for a federal prisoner to attack his conviction." Kramer v. Olson, 347 F.3d 214, 217 (7th Cir. 2003). A prisoner is also normally limited to only one challenge of his conviction and sentence under Section 2255. He or she may not file a "second or successive" Section 2255 motion unless a panel of the appropriate court of appeals certifies that such motion contains either (1) newly discovered evidence "sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense," or (2) "a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h).
Under very limited circumstances, however, it is possible for a prisoner to challenge his federal conviction or sentence under Section 2241. Specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) contains a "savings clause" which authorizes a federal prisoner to file a Section 2241 petition where the remedy under Section 2255 is "inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). See Hill v. Kerlinger, 695 F.3d 644, 648 (7th Cir. 2012) () (citing Taylor v. Gilkey, 314 F.3d 832, 835 (7th Cir. 2002); see also United States v. Prevatte, 300 F.3d 792, 798-99 (7th Cir. 2002). The Seventh Circuitconstrued the savings clause in In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir. 1998): "A procedure for postconviction relief can be fairly termed inadequate when it is so configured as to deny a convicted defendant any opportunity for judicial rectification of so fundamental a defect in his conviction as having been imprisoned for a nonexistent offense."2
Following Davenport and its progeny, the Seventh Circuit has enunciated a three-part test for determining whether Section 2255 is inadequate or ineffective, thus triggering the savings clause:
Worman v. Entzel, 953 F.3d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 2020) (emphasis in original) (citing Montana v. Cross, 829 F.3d 775, 783 (7th Cir. 2016); Beason v. Marske, 926 F.3d 932, 935 (7th Cir. 2019)). See also Chazen v. Marske, 938 F.3d 851, 856 (7th Cir. 2019); Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2013). Thus, Webster v. Daniels, 784 F.3d 1123, 1136 (7th Cir. 2015).
On June 21, 2019, United States Supreme Court held in Rehaif:
[I]n a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and § 924(a)(2), the Government must prove both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm. We express no view, however, about what precisely the Government must prove to establish a defendant's knowledge of status in respect to other § 922(g) provisions not at issue here.
Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2200 (2019) (). The opinion abrogated nationwide precedent in all eleven circuit courts of appeal which had held that knowledge was not an element that the prosecution must prove to obtain a conviction.
Hellems asserts in the Amended Petition that his "criminal liability remains, unresolved" in light of Rehaif. (Doc. 4, pp. 1-2). He insists that he is not seeking to vacate his conviction and sentence, but instead seeks a "settlement conference" with the United States Department of Justice and other federal officials to secure his immediate release, invoking several sections of the Code of Federal Regulations. (Doc. 4, pp. 2-3; Doc. 4-1, pp. 1-2); see 28 C.F.R. § 0.55(e) & § 0.55(i). He appears to argue that his indictment failed to state an offense because it did not include the element that he knew he "belonged to the relevant status, that barred him from possessing a firearm," thus his custody is unlawful. (Doc. 4, p. 2). Hellems also argues for the first time in his Reply that a defendant's knowledge of his felon status can only be proven with ATF Form 4473 or Form 6, and these "necessary" forms were "unlawfully withheld from the Grand Jury" in his case. (Doc. 18, p. 8).
Hellems's premise that his criminal liability is "unresolved" is flawed, however, the juryfound him to be criminally liable when it returned the guilty verdict, and this conviction still stands unless and until a court rules otherwise. The Rehaif decision itself did not undo Hellems's conviction or render his criminal liability "unresolved." Hellems invokes Section 2241 to challenge the basis of his custody, which amounts to a direct attack on his conviction despite his insistence that it is not. As such, the Court will evaluate his habeas claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and the savings clause of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e).
Respondent concedes that Hellems's Rehaif claim satisfies the first and second prongs of the savings clause test - Rehaif is a statutory interpretation case, and it sets forth a new substantive rule narrowing the scope of Section 922(g), which applies retroactively. (Doc. 15, pp. 17-18). Further, this new substantive rule was previously unavailable to Hellems, because it would have been futile to raise his claim in the...
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