Worman v. Entzel

• Decision Date: 26 March 2020
• Docket Number: No. 19-2048,19-2048
• Citation: 953 F.3d 1004
• Parties: John WORMAN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Frederick ENTZEL, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

953 F.3d 1004

John WORMAN, Petitioner-Appellant,

v.Frederick ENTZEL, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 19-2048

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued February 27, 2020

Decided March 26, 2020

Rockne Cole, Attorney, COLE LAW FIRM, PC, Iowa City, IA, for Petitioner - Appellant.

Katherine Virginia Boyle, Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Urbana, IL, Greggory R. Walters, Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Peoria, IL, for Respondent - Appellee.

Before Brennan, Scudder, and St. Eve, Circuit Judges.

Scudder, Circuit Judge.

John Worman reacted to losing his job and a business opportunity by mailing a pipe bomb to his former supervisor. Federal charges ensued, and a jury convicted Worman on all counts, leading to a sentence of 44 years’ imprisonment. Worman was unsuccessful in challenging his sentence on direct appeal and in a motion to vacate his sentence. The Supreme Court then decided Dean v. United States , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 1170, 197 L.Ed.2d 490 (2017), which Worman was right to recognize as calling into question the length of his sentence. But Congress has limited prisoners to one pursuit of habeas corpus relief, subject to very narrow exceptions. So Worman’s challenge became finding a viable path to file a second request for habeas relief, and he ultimately invoked 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The district court concluded that, even though Dean provided Worman a surefire basis for a meaningful sentencing reduction (from 44 to 30 years), he did not meet the exacting and narrow requirements for being able to use § 2241 to pursue a new sentence. We agree and affirm, with today’s decision exemplifying the stark reality that the limitations on habeas corpus relief can have very real and lasting consequences for prisoners laboring to navigate its complexities.

I

John Worman used to work at Winnebago Industries, an Iowa company that manufactures and sells recreational vehicles. His supervisor, Paulette Torkelson, repeatedly noted his poor performance and in time the company terminated him. Worman then started his own company and landed a contract to provide parts to Winnebago, but the agreement fell through. Worman blamed Torkelson for the misfortune and sought revenge by mailing her a pipe bomb. The U.S. Postal Service intercepted the package, and a criminal investigation commenced in short order.

A federal grand jury sitting in the Northern District of Iowa charged Worman with mailing an explosive device ( 18 U.S.C. § 1716 ), possessing an unregistered destructive device ( 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(d), 5845(f) ), transporting an explosive device ( 18 U.S.C. § 844(d) ), and possessing and using a destructive device in furtherance of a crime of violence ( 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), (B)(ii) ). Worman’s mailing of a pipe bomb constituted the predicate crime of violence for purposes of the § 924(c) charge. See, e.g. , United States v. Strickland , 261 F.3d 1271, 1274 (11th Cir. 2001) (concluding that the offense of transporting an explosive, 18 U.S.C. § 844(d), constitutes a predicate offense under § 924(c) ); United States v. Collins , 109 F.3d 1413, 1419 (9th Cir. 1997) (reaching same conclusion for crime of mailing a destructive device, 18 U.S.C. § 1716 ).

On the alleged facts—and owing to the gravity of Worman’s conduct—the § 924(c) charge brought with it a mandatory minimum sentence of 30 years’ imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii). Congress further required that the 30-year mandatory sentence be served consecutive to (as opposed to concurrently with) any other sentence imposed on any other count of conviction. See id . § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii) ; see also U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(a) (explaining consecutive and concurrent sentences).

Worman proceeded to trial in the Northern District of Iowa, and the jury convicted him on all counts. The district court then sentenced Worman to 361 months’ imprisonment—360 months (30 years) for the § 924(c) offense and one month for each, to run concurrently, of the other offenses of conviction. The latter sentence—the one month for mailing and possessing and transporting a pipe bomb—was 167 months below the low end of the advisory guidelines range of 168 to 201 months for those predicate offenses. The sentencing judge explained that a total sentence of 361 months was sufficient, especially given that Worman would not be released until he was 84. The sentencing court likewise pointed to Worman’s lack of any prior criminal history in justifying the 167-month downward variance.

As sensible as it may sound, the sentence reflected a legal error. The reason is because, at the time of Worman’s sentencing, the Eighth Circuit prohibited district judges from considering a mandatory consecutive sentence (like Worman’s 30-year § 924(c) sentence) when granting a downward variance on another count. See United States v. Hatcher , 501 F.3d 931, 934 (8th Cir. 2007) (ordering resentencing because district court impermissibly considered the severity of a firearm sentence with a mandatory and consecutive minimum when imposing a reduced sentence on other counts). On appeal, therefore, the Eighth Circuit followed its precedent, vacated Worman’s sentence, and ordered resentencing. See United States v. Worman , 622 F.3d 969, 978 (8th Cir. 2010). The Supreme Court declined Worman’s request to review the case.

On remand the district court adhered to the Eighth Circuit’s direction and resentenced Worman to 528 months’ (44 years’) imprisonment—168 months (14 years) for the pipe-bomb offenses and 360 mandatory and consecutive months (30 years) for the § 924(c) offense. In doing so, the district judge made plain that this outcome—which added 14 years to the original sentence—worked an injustice for Worman.

In 2016, Worman turned to pursuing post-conviction relief, filing a pro se motion for a new sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. He sought relief based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States , ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015), which invalidated the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). The motion had no merit, though, because Johnson ’s holding did not extend to any aspect of Worman’s conviction under § 924(c). Worman did not pursue an appeal.

Two years later the Supreme Court decided Dean v. United States , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 1170, 197 L.Ed.2d 490 (2017). Dean overruled the Eighth Circuit’s case law prohibiting sentencing courts from considering § 924(c) ’s mandatory minimum when determining the appropriate sentence for the other counts of conviction. See id . at 1176–78. By extension, then, Dean established that the district court committed no legal error in initially sentencing Worman to 361 months.

Worman recognized the importance of Dean and turned his attention to securing a sentencing reduction through a second pursuit of habeas relief. In doing so, though, he had to overcome a substantial procedural obstacle—he had already filed a motion to vacate his sentence, the one seeking relief based on Johnson . Even though it went nowhere, Worman’s first filing had consequences: subject to narrow exceptions, Congress has limited federal inmates to one motion for habeas relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). To file a second § 2255 motion, inmates like Worman must receive express authorization from a circuit court and that requires showing the claim in question relies on either newly discovered evidence showing that a reasonable jury could not have found the inmate guilty of the offense of conviction or a new rule of constitutional law previously unavailable that applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. See id . § 2255(h)(1), (2). These requirements are demanding. See, e.g. , Suggs v. United States , 705 F.3d 279, 281 (7th Cir. 2013) (explaining that the statute "sharply restrict[s] a second or successive motion to narrow circumstances").

Worman realized this firsthand when the circuit court denied his request to file a second § 2255 motion. He went ahead anyway and filed the motion, but the district court denied it as untimely. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f) (establishing a one-year limitation period absent certain circumstances). What Worman tried next provides the basis for this appeal.

Recognizing that any further motions under § 2255 were a dead end, Worman turned to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a provision embodying and authorizing what is often referred to as traditional habeas relief. Worman filed his § 2241 petition in the Northern District of Iowa, but that court rightly transferred the matter to the Central District of Illinois, the district in which Worman is now incarcerated. See Chazen v. Marske , 938 F.3d 851, 856 (7th Cir. 2019) (explaining that whereas § 2255 motions must proceed in the jurisdiction of conviction, a § 2241 petition can be brought only in the district of incarceration).

The district court dismissed the petition, concluding that, even though the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Dean provided Worman a strong challenge to his 44-year sentence, he could not satisfy the exacting requirements for pursuing relief under § 2241. Worman now appeals.

II

A

Worman’s appeal implicates an area of law riddled with complexity—the savings clause of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) and the narrow and limited instances under which a prisoner can pursue relief under § 2241. Other cases have required us to spill substantial ink traversing this complexity. See, e.g. , Chazen , 938 F.3d at 856. Perhaps a future appeal will require, or provide an opportunity for, our full court to sort out confusion in our case law in this area. See id. at 864, 866 (Barrett, J., concurring) (explaining that our case law contains differing interpretations of key limiting language in § 2255(e) and has been interpreted in ways that may undermine the limits Congress has imposed on second and successive pursuits of habeas relief in § 2255(h) ). Worman’s appeal can be resolved on much narrower grounds, however.

Section 2255(h) limits second and successive...