Helm v. Professional Children's School

• Decision Date: 02 May 1980
• Citation: 103 Misc.2d 1053,431 N.Y.S.2d 246
• Parties: Suzanne HELM and Frank Helm, Individually, and as parents and guardians of Dean Helm, under the age of 14 years, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The PROFESSIONAL CHILDREN'S SCHOOL and Carol Tucker, Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Term

Page 246

431 N.Y.S.2d 246

103 Misc.2d 1053

Suzanne HELM and Frank Helm, Individually, and as parents and guardians of Dean Helm, under the age of 14 years, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The PROFESSIONAL CHILDREN'S SCHOOL and Carol Tucker, Defendants-Respondents.

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, First Department.

May 2, 1980.

Robert S. Markfield, New York City, for appellants.

Hale, Grant, Meyerson, O'Brien & McCormick, New York City (Vincent J. Maroney, New York City, of counsel), for Professional Children's School, respondent.

Before DUDLEY, P. J., and HUGHES and TIERNEY, JJ.

PER CURIAM:

Order entered March 12, 1979 (B. Cohen, J.) affirmed without costs.

As a matter of public policy, the courts should not entertain a cause of action in educational negligence or, as it is sometimes referred to, educational malpractice, against either public or private schools (cf. Donohue v. Copaigue Union Free School District, 64 A.D.2d 29, 407 N.Y.S.2d 874, aff'd 47 N.Y.2d 440, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375, 391 N.E.2d 1352; Hoffman v. Board of Education, 64 A.D.2d 369, 410 N.Y.S.2d 99, rev'd 49 N.Y.2d 121, 424 N.Y.S.2d 376, 400 N.E.2d 317 (1980)). The plaintiffs herein argue that both Donohue, supra, and Hoffman, supra, should be distinguished from the instant action because the defendants in the Donohue and Hoffman cases were public educational institutions, while the defendant in the case at bar is a private educational institution. However, as observed by Judge Wachtler in his concurring opinion in Donohue, supra, 47 N.Y.2d at page 445, 418 N.Y.S.2d at page 379, 391 N.E.2d at page 1356:

The practical problems raised by a cause of action sounding in educational malpractice are so formidable that . . . such a legal theory should not be cognizable in our courts. These problems, clearly articulated at the Appellate Division, include the practical impossibility of proving that the alleged malpractice of the teacher proximately caused the learning deficiency of the plaintiff student. Factors such as the student's attitude, motivation, temperament, past experience and home environment may all play an essential and immeasurable role in learning.

We find these considerations to be equally applicable to any attempt to assess the educational experience, whether in the context of public or private education.