Helton v. Steak N Shake, Inc.
| Decision Date | 08 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | 20-14549 |
| Parties | MARGARET HELTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STEAK N SHAKE, INC., ABC CORPORATIONS (1-3), JOHN/JANE DOES (1-3), Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
DO NOT PUBLISH
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cv-02181-WMR Before Newsom, Branch, and Brasher, Circuit Judges.
Margaret Helton appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Steak N' Shake, Inc., the corporate owner of a fast-food restaurant in Sandy Springs, Georgia, on her premises liability "slip and fall" tort suit. Helton raises two principal issues. First, Helton claims that the district court erred by concluding that, because of visible "wet floor" signs, she had equal knowledge of the water hazard. Second, Helton argues that the district court failed to credit her rebuttal evidence establishing material disputes of fact as to whether she exercised reasonable care for her safety. But unfortunately for Helton the restaurant recorded her on video, which, in turn, reveals no reason that she was unable to see the "wet floor" signs. Hence, after review and with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm.
On March 5, 2018, Helton went to the Steak N' Shake to enjoy a late lunch with her family. Shortly before her arrival, a Steak N' Shake employee mopped the floor on the side of the restaurant opposite from where Helton eventually sat, placing and leaving a wet floor sign near the restaurant's drink machine. When she concluded, she did not remove the wet floor sign. Approximately an hour and a half later, another employee proceeded to mop the main dining area, and placed two new wet floor signs on the opposite side of the dining room from where Helton was seated.
Prior to Helton's fall, multiple customers and employees traversed the area between the signs without issue. Helton followed in their footsteps less than a minute after the last of these patrons crossed. In the process, she walked past the bright yellow wet floor sign next to the drink machine, and, a few seconds later, tumbled to the ground.
After she fell, Helton heard a person she believed to be an employee shout "[g]et this water up" or "get a mop." She also claims that when she stood up, her clothes were soaked. However, the manager recalls her clothes being bone dry.
On May 14, 2019, Helton filed a negligence claim against Steak N' Shake in Georgia state court, contending that Steak N' Shake's employees negligently mopped the floor-or, alternatively, that the restaurant negligently failed to maintain a leaky soda machine-which, in turn, led to her fall. Steak N' Shake subsequently removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, where the case proceeded to discovery. After discovery closed, Steak N' Shake moved for summary judgment. In addition to contesting both the existence and its knowledge of the hazard, Steak N' Shake contended that Helton failed to exercise reasonable caution despite being put on notice of the hazard by the wet floor sign.
Recognizing disputes of material fact regarding the existence of a hazard, and whether Steak N' Shake had constructive or actual knowledge of the hazard, the district court turned to Helton's knowledge of the hazard and the degree of care she exercised.
The district court found that "it is reasonable to expect water to be on the floor of a restaurant and to take caution, especially when a wet floor sign is placed nearby." It continued, explaining that the video evidence shows Helton walk right by the sign before her fall, and establishes that it was well within her line of sight. Consequently, the district court also dismissed her argument that an angled booth, not captured in the video's frame, obstructed her view. Accordingly, the district court held that Helton had actual knowledge and nevertheless failed to exercise reasonable care for her safety. Helton timely appealed.
We review de novo a district court's grant of summary judgment, taking as true the non-moving party's factual pleadings and drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor. Burton v. Tampa Housing Auth., 271 F.3d 1274, 1276-77 (11th Cir. 2001). However, where video evidence plainly contradicts some or all of those facts, we need not credit them. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).
Helton argues that the district court erred by determining that she had "equal or superior knowledge of the hazard," and that the evidence instead established that she had constructive knowledge, at most. She therefore claims that, because Steak N' Shake had actual knowledge of the hazard, the district court erred by granting summary judgment.
Georgia's test for premises liability distills Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc. v. Brown, 679 S.E.2d 25, 27-28 (Ga. 2009).
But "[t]he mere occurrence of an unfortunate event" on an owner's premises, such as Helton's fall, does not necessarily permit an invitee to recover against him. Shortnacy v. N. Atlanta Internal Med., P.C., 556 S.E.2d 209, 213 (Ga.Ct.App. 2001). Because, relative to his customers, the owner is better positioned to discover, remediate, or warn invitees about potential hazards, "the fundamental basis for an owner or occupier's liability [is] that party's superior knowledge of the hazard encountered by the plaintiff." Cherokee Main St., LLC v. Ragan, 813 S.E.2d 397, 399 (Ga.Ct.App. 2018) (quotation omitted).[1] Accordingly:
to survive a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff must come forward with evidence that, viewed in the most favorable light, would enable a rational trier of fact to find that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the hazard. At that point, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to produce evidence that the plaintiff's injury was caused by [her] own voluntary negligence (intentional disregard of a known risk) or causal negligence (failure to exercise ordinary care for one's personal safety). If the defendant succeeds in doing so, the burden of production shifts back to the plaintiff to come forward with evidence that creates a genuine dispute of fact on the question of voluntary or causal negligence by the plaintiff or tends to show that any such negligence resulted from the defendant's own actions or conditions under the defendant's control.
Of course, "[a]s a general proposition, issues of negligence, contributory negligence and lack of ordinary care for one's own safety are not susceptible of summary adjudication . . . ." Robinson v. Kroger, 493 S.E.2d 403, 408 (Ga. 1997) (quotation omitted). But "where the evidence is plain, palpable and undisputable," a "court can conclude as a matter of law that the facts do or do not show negligence on the part of the defendant or the plaintiff." Id. (internal citations and alterations omitted).
To that end, as a matter of law, "the fact that the plaintiff merely failed to look will not relieve her from the responsibility for her misadventure." D'Elia v. Phillips Edison & Co., Ltd., 839 S.E.2d 721, 724 (Ga.Ct.App. 2020) (citation omitted). Though Georgia does not require an invitee to fix her gaze on the floor in front of her, see Robinson, 493 S.E.2d at 409, it does not permit that invitee to blind herself to the premises owner's efforts to warn her of avoidable hazards either.
Rather, an invitee must "exercise ordinary care for her own safety . . . and must make use of all her senses in a reasonable measure amounting to ordinary care in discovering and avoiding those things that might cause hurt to her." Crebs v. Bass Pro Outdoor World, 860 S.E.2d 802, 805 (Ga.Ct.App. 2021) (quotation omitted). "Cases in which it is plain and palpable that knowledge was or should have been possessed by a person of ordinary intelligence and powers of observation will not be changed to a case involving disputed issues of material fact simply because the party claims he did not use his intelligence or powers of observation." See Scott v. Forest Acres Fu l Gospel Church, 834 S.E.2d 286, 290 (Ga.Ct.App. 2019) (quotation omitted).
Applying Georgia's law to the case at bar, we find no dispute of material fact precluding a grant of summary judgment in favor of Steak N' Shake. Rather, the only real question in this case is whether Helton can create a material dispute of fact as to her equal knowledge of the hazard when the video evidence clearly contradicts her position. According to the Supreme Court, she cannot. See Scott, 550 U.S. at 380 ().
First, we agree with the district court that Helton carried her burden to show that Steak N' Shake had actual knowledge of the water hazard. After all, the restaurant's employees twice mopped the floor and placed the caution signs at issue in this dispute.
Thus the burden shifted to Steak N' Shake "to produce evidence that the plaintiff's injury was caused by [her] own voluntary negligence ...
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