Henderson v. Gandy
Decision Date | 01 December 2005 |
Docket Number | No. S05G0674.,S05G0674. |
Citation | 280 Ga. 95,623 S.E.2d 465 |
Parties | HENDERSON et al. v. GANDY et al. |
Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Andrew R. Kirschner, Kirschner & Venker, P.C., Atlanta, Michael Wayne McElroy, Peachtree, for Appellant.
Simuel F. Doster Jr., Ashley Parker Nichols, Weinberg, Wheeler, Hudgins, Gunn & Dial, Paul E. Weathington, Robert T. Strang III, Allen & Weathington, Atlanta, for Appellee.
We granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals in Henderson v. Gandy, 270 Ga.App. 827, 608 S.E.2d 248 (2004), to consider whether Georgia's Fair Business Practices Act of 1975, OCGA § 10-1-390, et seq. ("FBPA"), the statutory scheme which protects consumers from unfair or deceptive trade practices, applies to a physician in connection with the provision of medical services. Under the circumstances of this case, we hold that plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the FBPA, and we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, but for different reasons.
Appellant Claire M. Henderson's husband, Dr. Herbert Henderson, was admitted by appellee Dr. Winston Gandy, Jr., to Saint Joseph's Hospital for emergency cardiac by-pass surgery. During Dr. Henderson's post-operative convalescence at Saint Joseph's Hospital, he developed a sacral decubitus ulcer (pressure bed sore), which later became necrotic and ultimately resulted in his death several months later.1 Ms. Henderson filed a medical malpractice action, both individually and as the representative of her husband's estate, naming Dr. Gandy, his professional corporation, Atlanta Cardiology Group, P.C. (collectively "Dr. Gandy"), and Saint Joseph's Hospital of Atlanta as defendants.
It was revealed during discovery that when Dr. Gandy identified the pressure ulcer, he ordered that the patient be treated by hospital nurses who specialize in wound ostomy care. It was also disclosed that these nurses noted in the patient's record that their continuing treatment of Dr. Henderson "was conducted pursuant to Dr. Gandy's verbal or telephone orders," when in fact, "Dr. Gandy did not verbally order the specific treatment noted after his initial consultation with the [nurses]," Henderson, supra at 828(2), 608 S.E.2d 248. Discovery also revealed that it was the policy of Atlanta Cardiology to allow the ostomy nurses to use their discretion in managing the wound treatment of Atlanta Cardiology's patients.
As a result of these discoveries, Henderson sought to amend her complaint to add claims for fraud, abandonment of care, and violation of the FBPA. Dr. Gandy and Atlanta Cardiology Group, P.C. sought and were granted partial summary judgment with regard to the FBPA claim.2 The trial court determined that Ms. Henderson failed to demonstrate that the conduct of defendants allegedly giving rise to the FBPA claim "occurred within the public consumer marketplace."
The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the nurses' actions, although pursuant to the group's policy, did not fall within the stream of commerce required to maintain a FBPA action. Henderson, supra. We agree with the Court of Appeals that Ms. Henderson's FBPA count does not allege a sufficient cause of action; however, we decide the issue for other reasons which follow. See National Tax Funding v. Harpagon Co., 277 Ga. 41, 586 S.E.2d 235 (2003) ( ).
A private party who suffers injury or damages as a result of "[u]nfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of consumer transactions and consumer acts or practices in trade or commerce," may bring an action under the FBPA. OCGA § 10-1-393(a). "Trade" and "commerce" are defined as "the advertising, distribution, sale, lease, or offering for distribution, sale, or lease of any goods, services, or any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal, or mixed, or any other article, commodity, or thing of value wherever situate and shall include any trade or commerce directly or indirectly affecting the people of the state." OCGA § 10-1-392(a)(9). Thus, a claim under the FBPA requires proof not only of deceptive misconduct but also of conduct which affects the public interest. (Emphasis deleted.) Zeeman v. Black, 156 Ga.App. 82, 273 S.E.2d 910 (1980).
This Court has not had occasion to consider whether Georgia's FBPA applies to the medical professional. Other jurisdictions, however, which have addressed this issue in the context of their various consumer protection acts have widely held that "although entrepreneurial or commercial aspects of the practice of medicine are covered as `trade or commerce' under that state's consumer protection act, violations predicated on negligence or malpractice, whether medical or legal, are not covered because those claims address only competence." Haynes v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, 243 Conn. 17, 35, 699 A.2d 964 (1997), adopting rule set forth in Quimby v. Fine, 45 Wash.App. 175, 180, 724 P.2d 403 (1986). The Michigan Court of Appeals applied a similar analysis, holding that Nelson v. Ho, 222 Mich.App. 74, 83, 564 N.W.2d 482 (1997). "Only when physicians are engaging in the entrepreneurial, commercial, or business aspect of the practice of medicine are they engaged in `trade or commerce' within the purview of the [act]." Id. at 84, 564 N.W.2d 482. See also Darviris v. Petros, 442 Mass. 274, 278, 812 N.E.2d 1188 (2004) ( ); Simmons v. Stephenson, 84 S.W.3d 926, 928 (Ky.Ct.App.2002) ( ); Dorn v. McTigue, 121 FSupp2d 17, 19 (D.D.C.2000) (in order for the consumer protection statute to apply in the physician-patient context, the claimant must demonstrate a nexus between the claim and the entrepreneurial aspect of the medical practice); Karlin v. IVF Am., 93 N.Y.2d 282, 293, 690 N.Y.S.2d 495, 712 N.E.2d 662 (1999) ( ); Gadson v. Newman, 807 F.Supp. 1412, 1416 (C.D.Ill.1992) ( ).
We find the foregoing authority persuasive and we conclude that their reasoning is equally applicable to claims under the Georgia FBPA. Therefore, we adopt the rationale of the Haynes court, which held that Haynes, 699 A.2d at 973.3
Our ruling is further buttressed by our Legislature's stated intent that the FBPA "be interpreted and construed consistently with interpretations given by the Federal Trade Commission in the federal court...
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