Henderson v. Gunther

• Citation: 931 P.2d 1150
• Decision Date: 13 January 1997
• Docket Number: No. 95SC543,95SC543
• Parties: , 21 Colorado Journal 103 Mary L. HENDERSON, Petitioner, v. Frank GUNTHER, former Director of the Colorado State Department of Corrections, in his individual capacity; William Price, Superintendent of The Arkansas Valley Correctional Facility, State Department of Corrections, in his individual capacity; and Ron Wager in his individual capacity, Respondents.
• Court: Supreme Court of Colorado

Page 1150

931 P.2d 1150

65 USLW 2494, 21 Colorado Journal 103

Mary L. HENDERSON, Petitioner, v. Frank GUNTHER, former Director of the Colorado State Department of Corrections, in his individual capacity William Price, Superintendent of The Arkansas Valley Correctional Facility, State Department of Corrections, in his individual capacity; and Ron Wager in his individual capacity, Respondents.

No. 95SC543.

Supreme Court of Colorado En Banc.

Jan. 13, 1997.

McDivitt Law Firm, P.C. Michael W. McDivitt, Colorado Springs, for Petitioner.

Gale A. Norton, Attorney General, Stephen ErkenBrack, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Richard Westfall, Solicitor General, Garth C. Lucero, Deputy Attorney General, Timothy R. Arnold, Deputy Attorney General, Gregg E. Kay, First Assistant Attorney General, Jack M. Wesoky, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Civil Litigation Section, Tort Litigation, Denver, for Respondents.

Justice KOURLIS delivered the Opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari to review the court of appeals decision in Henderson v. Romer, 910 P.2d 48 (Colo.App.1995), affirming the trial court's order dismissing Petitioner Mary L. Henderson's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) claims against Frank Gunther, William Price, and Captain Ron Wager. We conclude that Henderson has failed to state a cognizable § 1983 claim. Therefore, we affirm the court of appeals.

I.

Because the case was resolved on a motion to dismiss, we must view the allegations in Henderson's amended complaint in the light most favorable to her case. Dunlap v. Colorado Springs Cablevision, 829 P.2d 1286, 1291 (Colo.1992). In 1992, Henderson was employed as a housing technician at the Arkansas Valley Correctional Facility (the Facility) in Crowley County, Colorado. Pursuant to official policy, inmates were allowed to visit Henderson's office from 6:20 to 6:30 a.m. each morning to obtain aspirin and other personal items. Henderson was alone in her office during these visits and was prohibited from carrying a weapon.

On February 28, 1992, at approximately 6:30 a.m., William Sojka, an inmate, attacked Henderson in her office. Sojka took Henderson hostage with the broken shank of a mirror and locked her in an office. For approximately five and a half hours, Sojka beat Henderson, cut her on the neck, face and hands, and used an electrical cord to shock her repeatedly.

Wager, Henderson's supervisor at the Facility, and Price, superintendent of the Facility, informed the media of the hostage situation before notifying Henderson's family members. Henderson's husband, Randy Henderson, and her three children learned of the situation from news reports.

On May 21, 1993, Henderson, Randy, and the children (collectively, the Plaintiffs) filed a complaint against Roy Romer, governor of the State of Colorado, individually and in his official capacity; Aristedes Zavaras, director of the Colorado Department of Corrections, in his official capacity; Price, individually and in his official capacity; Wager, individually and in his official capacity; the State of Colorado; and the Department of Corrections (collectively, the Original Defendants).

In the complaint, Henderson alleged she was attacked and taken hostage as part of a concerted escape attempt by inmates at the Facility. Henderson further alleged that she had provided Wager with evidence of the planned escape at least a week before the attack, and that in compliance with official policy, she had filed a confirmatory memorandum. That memorandum was allegedly forwarded to Wager and Price. ¹ Henderson also alleged that Wager and Price knew that Sojka had a P-5 psychological rating, ² and therefore presented an unreasonable danger for the Facility and the housing unit in which Henderson worked.

Henderson further alleged that approximately four days prior to the attack, upon inquiry, Wager told her he had taken no action in response to the report of the planned escape. Henderson also learned that the day prior to the attack, an employee at the Facility had reported to Wager that an inmate had warned that employee not to come to work the following day. Despite the warnings of an impending escape, the Original Defendants took no action and Henderson was required to perform her job on the day of the attack without any additional protection.

The original complaint stated five claims for relief. The first three claims were brought under state tort law on behalf of Randy and the children. The fourth and fifth claims, brought on behalf of Henderson and her family members, respectively, sought damages pursuant to § 1983 for the willful, wanton, and reckless deprivation, under color of state law, of constitutional rights. In response to a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) motion filed on behalf of the Original Defendants, the trial court dismissed the state tort law claims, but permitted Henderson and her family leave to amend the complaint to specify the elements they would rely upon to establish jurisdiction under § 1983.

On September 9, 1993, the Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint asserting three § 1983 claims against Romer, Gunther, ³ Price, and Wager individually (collectively, the Amended Complaint Defendants). ⁴ In the first claim, Henderson asserted that Romer, Gunther, and Price acted with reckless disregard and deliberate indifference as to the effect their budgetary decisions and allocations of resources would have on Henderson's physical safety. In addition, Henderson alleged in the first claim that through their actions and omissions under the color of law, ⁵ the Amended Complaint Defendants deprived Henderson of her constitutional right to be free from injury and her right not to be placed in a situation of known danger through their wilful, wanton, reckless, intentional, and deliberately indifferent behavior.

In the second claim, Randy and the children alleged that the Amended Complaint Defendants' actions and omissions deprived them of their constitutional right to be free from injury by subjecting them to the physical and emotional trauma resulting from an attack upon their wife and mother, respectively. In the third claim, Randy and the children asserted that Gunther and Price deprived them of their constitutional right to be free from injury by informing the news media that Henderson was being held hostage before informing them.

The Amended Complaint Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5). The trial court granted the motion, holding that there was no "allegation that [Henderson] was held in the correctional facility against her will, was subjected to involuntary servitude, was denied due process, or deprived of any other constitutional right when her supervisor failed to act to protect her after being informed of the danger." The Plaintiffs appealed both the trial court order dismissing the original complaint and the order dismissing the amended complaint. ⁶ The court of appeals affirmed both orders in Henderson, 910 P.2d at 55.

After the Plaintiffs' petition for rehearing was denied, Henderson alone petitioned this court for certiorari asking that we review the court of appeals decision only with respect to her § 1983 claim against Gunther, Price, and Wager (collectively, the Facility Defendants) in their individual capacities. ⁷ We granted certiorari to decide the following issue: "Whether the court of appeals erroneously affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Henderson's claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for injuries and damages arising from a denial of substantive due process."

II.

Because Congress was concerned that state officials were depriving citizens of their federal constitutional rights, it enacted § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, currently codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). Section 1983 is an enforcement mechanism for the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. Ngiraingas v. Sanchez, 495 U.S. 182, 187, 110 S.Ct. 1737, 1740-41, 109 L.Ed.2d 163 (1990). Section 1983 provides in relevant part: "Every person who, [under color of law], subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured...." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).

Hence, in order to prevail under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that the defendants, under color of state law, deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1912-13, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31, 106 S.Ct. 662, 664-65, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986). In this case, Henderson claims that the Facility Defendants violated her rights to substantive due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments ⁸ by failing to protect her from Sojka's attack.

The constitutional guarantee of due process does not convert all common law duties owed by government actors into constitutional torts. See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 335, 106 S.Ct. at 667. Rather, this guarantee has been applied only to "deliberate decisions of government officials to deprive a person of life, liberty or property." Id. at 331, 106 S.Ct. at 665 (alteration in original).

Thus, the governing principle by which we must evaluate § 1983 claims is that the Due Process Clause is designed to prevent arbitrary exercise or abuse of government power. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196, 109 S.Ct. 998, 1003-04, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989); Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 1068-69, 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992).

Nothing in the Due Process Clause itself requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private citizens. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195, 109 S.Ct. at 1002-03. Rather, the purpose of the Due Process Clause is "to protect the people from the...