Henderson v. Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 30 April 1884
• Parties: HENDERSON, Administrator, v. THE WABASH, ST. LOUIS & PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

81 Mo. 605

HENDERSON, Administrator,

v.THE WABASH, ST. LOUIS & PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

April Term, 1884.

Appeal from Ray Circuit Court.--HON. G. W. DUNN, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Wells H. Blodgett for appellant.

The judgment should be reversed, because, 1st, The word cattle was not used in the statute in its broadest sense and cannot properly be construed as including horses, mules and swine. 2nd, The words “or other animals,” as employed in the statute, do not enlarge the signification so as to make the statute include swine or any animals other than horses, cattle and mules which are therein specifically enumerated. Grumley v. Webb, 44 Mo. 445; City of St. Louis v. Laughlin, 49 Mo. 559; State v. Crenshaw, 22 Mo. 447; Potter's Dwarris on Statutes, p. 236; 2 Parsons Cont., (5 Ed.) 502.

MARTIN, C.

This action was commenced before a justice of the peace, in Ray county, to recover double the value of a certain hog, owned by plaintiff, and which it was alleged got upon defendant's track and was killed, in consequence of defendant's failure to erect and maintain fences on the sides of its railroad at the point where said animal got upon said track and was killed, etc. The action was brought under what is now section 809, of the Revised Statutes. The plaintiff had judgment for double damages before the justice, from which the company appealed to the circuit court. In the circuit court the plaintiff again recovered judgment for double the value of the animal, and from that judgment the company appealed to this court.

The only question for determination is, as to whether the statute, section 809, subjects railroad companies to the payment of double damages for the killing of hogs which get upon their tracks and are, in consequence thereof, killed by their engines and cars. The statute in question, after defining the kind of fences and cattle-guards that shall be erected and maintained by railroad companies on the sides of their roads, provides as follows: “And, until fences, openings, gates and farm crossings, and cattle-guards, as aforesaid, shall be made and maintained, such corporations shall be liable in double the amount of damages which shall be done by its agents, engines or cars to horses, cattle, mules or other animals on said road, or by reason of any horses, cattle, mules or other animals escaping from, or coming upon said lands, etc., etc.”

The position of the learned counsel for appellant may be stated in his own language: “Only when used in its broadest sense does the word ‘cattle’ include sheep, goats, horses, mules, asses, swine and persons; in this statute the word ‘cattle’ cannot be construed as including, or meaning the same thing as the words ‘horses and mules,’ therefore, the word cattle was not used in its broadest sense, and not being used in its broadest sense it cannot be construed as meaning or including swine.” The word “cattle” is a collective name for domestic quadrupeds, including “the bovine tribe, also horses, asses, mules, sheep, goats and swine; but especially applied to bulls, oxen, cows and their young.” Worcester. The argument of the appellant is, that the legislature must have intended to use the word in its special signification, otherwise it would not have employed the use of other words to include horses and mules which the word “cattle,” if used alone, would have included. The result of the language employed is that sheep and swine must be excluded from the operation of the act, or the words “horses and mules” are redundant designations of animals sufficiently expressed in the word “cattle,” or the words “other animals” must include animals of a class not mentioned in the enumeration of animals which precedes them. Either the legislature has intended to deny the remedial effects of the law to the owners of sheep and swine, or they have been guilty of a slight repetition in the words specially referring to horses and mules, or have used the word “other” in a broader sense than usually conceded to it by the rules of interpretation.

The rule that words of general signification are restricted in their application by the use of special words pointing to a special meaning, in which the words of general signification may be used, is only a rule of interpretation. It is to be followed as an aid to ascertain the true meaning of the author. It is not an absolute rule which must be followed irrespective of consequences or results. Vattel says: “In applying rules for interpreting statutes to questions on the effect of an enactment, we can never safely lose sight of its object. That must be the truest exposition of a law, which best harmonizes with its design, its objects and its general structure.” Vattel, B'k 2, ch. 17, § 285. In construing a statute Lord Mansfield says: “Let us consider what are the mischiefs intended to be remedied, and the provisions of the act for remedying them.” Pray v. Edie, 2 T. R. 313. Indeed the fundamental rule underlying all rules of interpretation of statute...