Henderson-waits Lumber Co. v. Croft

• Decision Date: 18 February 1925
• Parties: HENDERSON-WAITS LUMBER CO. v. CROFT.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

103 So. 414

89 Fla. 119

HENDERSON-WAITS LUMBER CO. v. CROFT.

Florida Supreme Court, Division B.

February 18, 1925

Error to Circuit Court, Washington County; D. J. Jones, Judge.

Action by W. F. Croft, for the use of the First National Bank of De Funiak Springs, against the Henderson-Waits Lumber Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.

Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

Statutes making persons issuing checks in payment for labor redeemable in merchandise liable for cash value in money held valid. The statutes (sections 2522, 2523, 2524, Rev Gen. Stats. 1920) under which persons, firms, or corporations issuing checks, coupons, or other similar devices in payment for labor, redeemable wholly or partially in goods or merchandise, at their or any other place of business, are made liable on demand of any legal holder of such checks coupons, or tokens, on or after the ninetieth day succeeding the day of issuance, for the full cash value thereof in current money, notwithstanding any contrary stipulation contained therein, with legal interest from the time of demand, with an attorney fee of 10 per cent. of the amount thereof in case of suit to enforce collection of same, are valid and enforceable.

Whether title of act is broad enough to cover provisions contained therein of no importance after statute has been embodied in Revised General Statutes. The question of whether the title of an act is broad enough to cover certain provisions contained in it is of no moment when the statute containing such provision has been subsequently embodied in the Revised General Statutes.

Statute permitting recovery of attorney fee on checks issued in payment of labor held valid. The provision of the statute (section 2524, Rev. Gen. Stat. 1920) authorizing the recovery by plaintiff of an attorney fee of 10 per cent. of the amount when suit is brought by the legal holder thereof for the face value in current money of checks, coupons, or other tokens issued in payment for labor is not invalid.

COUNSEL

C. R. Mathis and A. W. Weeks, both of Bonifay, W. W. Flournoy, of De Funiak Springs, and W. H. Albritton, of Andalusia, Ala., for plaintiff in error.

Carter & Carter, of Sarasota, for defendant in error.

OPINION

WEST, J.

This action is by the alleged owner and holder to recover from the defendant issuing company the face value of certain coupons issued by it in the conduct of its business in payment for labor and services rendered by its employees. It is alleged that the coupons stipulate that they are redeemable by the issuing company in merchandise only; that the nominal plaintiff, who was a merchant, had received them in payment for merchandise sold by him to the laborers and employees to whom issued, and that, after the expiration of 90 days from the issuance of said coupons, they were presented to the issuing company for payment, but payment in money at their face value was refused. Thereupon suit was brought for the face value of the coupons, with interest from the date of demand, and attorney fees. The issues having been made, the cause was submitted upon an agreed statement of facts. The issuance of the coupons by defendant, delivery to its employees, and transfer to and ownership by plaintiff are not denied. There was a finding and judgment for plaintiff. Writ of error was taken from this court.

By statute persons or corporations issuing coupons or other similar devices in payment for labor are made liable, on demand of any legal holder thereof, 'on or after the ninetieth day succeeding the day of issuance,' for the full face value thereof in current money of the United States, notwithstanding any contrary stipulation or provisions which may be therein contained, together with legal interest from demand and an attorney fee of 10 per cent. where suit is required to enforce payment. Sections 2522, 2523, 2524, Rev. Gen. Stats.

Discussion of the several questions presented in briefs and oral argument would amount to no more than a reiteration of principles settled in former cases in this and other jurisdictions, and, no reason having been presented for a change of the views formerly entertained by this court holding this statute valid, it is not conceived that a journey over the same route would be profitable.

The judgment is therefore affirmed on authority of Prairie Pebble Phosphate Co. v. Silverman, 80 Fla. 541, 86 So. 508; Regan v. Tremont Lbr. Co., 134 La. 199, 63 So. 874; Harbison v. Knoxville Iron Co., 103 Tenn. 421, 53 S.W. 955, 56 L. R. A. 316, 76 Am. St. Rep. 682; Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, 183 U.S. 13, 22 S.Ct. 1, 46 L.Ed. 55.

Since the holding that the title of the act was insufficient to include the provision authorizing recovery of an attorney fee, the statute including this provision has been incorporated in the Revised General Statutes of Florida.

Affirmed.

WHITFIELD, P.J., and TERRELL, J., concur.

TAYLOR, C.J., and ELLIS and BROWNE, JJ., concur in the opinion.

CONCURRING

WHITFIELD J. (concurring).

The statute appears to contemplate that the 'checks, coupons, punch-outs, tickets, tokens or other devise in payment for labor' may be acquired in a continuous course of dealing by the laborers or by others who are given the same rights of action upon failure of payment as stated in the act, and such a continuous course of dealing is indicated by the declaration in this case; therefore a lack of jurisdiction in the circuit court, which is a court of general jurisdiction, does not appear under the principles announced in Burkhart v. Gowin, 86 Fla. 376, 98 So. 140, and authorities cited.

The liberty of contract secured by organic law is not absolute. It is subject to a great variety of restraints by governmental authority in the interest of the general welfare. 'But freedom of contract is, nevertheless, the general rule and restraint the exception; and the exercise of legislative authority to abridge it can be justified only by the existence of exceptional circumstances.' Adkins v. Children's Hospital of District of Columbia, 261 U.S. 525, text 546, 43 S.Ct. 394, 397 (67 L.Ed. 785, 24 A. L. R. 1238). Whether restriction or other regulation of the freedom of contract is justified as provided in particular enactments or as shown in particular cases is to be determined by the courts upon judicial consideration of the particular facts and circumstances and the object designed, having in view the organic right and a full appreciation of the principle that the regulation must not be merely arbitrary, and that the exceptional facts must warrant the particular regulation imposed to conserve right and justice. 'Where the constitutional validity of a statute depends upon the existence of facts, courts must be cautious about reaching a conclusion respecting them contrary to that reached by the Legislature; and, if the question of what the facts establish be a fairly debatable one, it is not permissible for the judge to set up his opinion in respect of it against the opinion of the lawmaker.' Radice v. People of State of New York, 264 U.S. 292, text 294, 44 S.Ct. 325, 326 (68 L.Ed. 690). See Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations of State of Kansas, 262 U.S. 522, 43 S.Ct. 630, 57 L.Ed. 1103, 27 A. L. R. 1280.

It is stipulated in this case that the laborers 'were to receive an agreed amount per diem to be paid in cash on the second and fourth Saturdays in each month,' and that the coupon books redeemable only in merchandise were issued as a convenience and an accommodation. Obviously the Legislature deemed the laborer to be at some disadvantage under existing circumstances in taking the coupon books, redeemable only in merchandise at the employer's store, the books to be used to conserve the laborer's current needs between pay days; and the legislation was designed to place the employer and the laborer on equal grounds in paying and receiving wages. The statute gives to the coupon books a value they would not otherwise have. This is simple justice to the laborer, and is no injury to the employer who agreed to pay or is required to pay money for the labor. The enactment is a reasonable and not a mere arbitrary provision of law.

The language of the statute indicates the unequal ground upon which employer and laborer stood, and the provisions enacted under the police...