Hendrickson v. Saratoga Harness Racing, Inc.

• Citation: 170 A.D.2d 719,565 N.Y.S.2d 610
• Parties: Keith HENDRICKSON, Appellant, v. SARATOGA HARNESS RACING, INC., Respondent.
• Decision Date: 07 February 1991
• Court: New York Supreme Court Appellate Division

Page 610

565 N.Y.S.2d 610

170 A.D.2d 719

Keith HENDRICKSON, Appellant, v. SARATOGA HARNESS RACING, INC., Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division,

Third Department.

Feb. 7, 1991.

Harper & Pozefsky (Martin W. Pozefsky, of counsel), Saratoga Springs, for appellant.

Roemer & Featherstonhaugh (E. Guy Romer, of counsel), Albany, for respondent.

Before MAHONEY, P.J., and CASEY, WEISS, MERCURE and HARVEY, JJ.

HARVEY, Justice.

Appeals (1) from that part of an order of the Supreme Court (Brown, J.), entered August 30, 1989 in Saratoga County, which imposed sanctions upon plaintiff's counsel, and (2) from an order of said court, entered November 13, 1989 in Saratoga County, which, inter alia, denied plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction.

Plaintiff is the owner and trainer of two horses that are stabled, trained and raced at Saratoga Raceway in Saratoga County, which is owned and operated by defendant. On April 20, 1989, defendant presented plaintiff with a letter purporting to bar plaintiff from entry onto defendant's property. The notice states no reason for this prohibition, although the record strongly suggests that differences of opinion between the parties prompted defendant's action. Plaintiff originally commenced an action against defendant in April 1989 by way of a summons with notice which was eventually dismissed without prejudice for failure to serve a complaint. Sanctions were imposed against plaintiff's counsel in the amount of $250, apparently for the failure to serve a timely complaint, and Supreme Court also denied plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. Plaintiff appeals that part of the order imposing sanctions. The court denied plaintiff's subsequent motion for a preliminary injunction pending appeal. Plaintiff then commenced a new action alleging, among other things, breach of contract (stemming from the limitation of use of plaintiff's prepaid parking privileges and box seat) and violations of plaintiff's constitutional rights. Plaintiff again moved for a preliminary injunction in September 1989 and this motion was denied. Supreme Court also imposed a sanction against plaintiff's counsel in the amount of $250 as part of the denial of that motion. This sanction was apparently imposed for repeatedly moving for a preliminary injunction. Plaintiff appeals from this order in its entirety.

Initially, we reject plaintiff's contention that Supreme Court abused its discretion in denying plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction. A preliminary injunction is appropriate only where the moving party sufficiently demonstrates "(1) a likelihood of success on the merits, (2) irreparable injury to him if the relief is not granted, and (3) a balancing of the equities in his favor" (Clark v. Cuomo, 103 A.D.2d 244, 245, 480 N.Y.S.2d 61, affd. 63 N.Y.2d 96, 479 N.Y.S.2d 971, 468 N.E.2d 1108). The purpose of this relief is to preserve the status quo until a decision is reached on the merits (see, Tucker v. Toia, 54 A.D.2d 322, 325-326, 388 N.Y.S.2d 475). Accordingly, a reviewing court must "act cautiously" when examining a motion for a preliminary injunction "lest [it] finally determine the merits" (Clark v. Cuomo, supra, 103 A.D.2d at 245, 480 N.Y.S.2d 61; see, Wiederspiel v. Bernholz, 163 A.D.2d 774, 558 N.Y.S.2d 739).

Looking to the first prong of the test for a preliminary injunction and applying it to the facts at bar, it appears that plaintiff has demonstrated little likelihood of success on the merits. Specifically, aside from plaintiff's cause of action alleging breach of contract, the remaining claims center around an allegedly wrongful exclusion of plaintiff from defendant's property. However, in Arone v. Sullivan County Harness Racing Assn., 90 A.D.2d 137, 457 N.Y.S.2d 958, this court ruled that the operators of a privately owned and State-licensed horse racing track could exclude any person, including horse owners and trainers, from the track grounds for any reason not related to illegal discrimination. Insofar as defendant herein is a privately owned race track of the type described in Arone, it was hardly unreasonable for Supreme Court to conclude that plaintiff had not demonstrated likely success on the merits of his noncontract claims.

As for the contract cause of action, we note that there is no documented proof in the record whatsoever of the...