Hennefer v. Blaine Cnty. Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 30 March 2015
• Docket Number: No. 41286.,41286.
• Citation: 158 Idaho 242,346 P.3d 259
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Parties: Dennis Ray HENNEFER and Maryann Hennefer, individually, and as the parents of Austin Hennefer, deceased, Plaintiffs–Respondents–Cross Appellants, v. BLAINE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT # 61, Defendant–Appellant–Cross Respondent, and Sergio Lopez–Rodriguez, Defendant.

158 Idaho 242

346 P.3d 259

Dennis Ray HENNEFER and Maryann Hennefer, individually, and as the parents of Austin Hennefer, deceased, Plaintiffs–Respondents–Cross Appellants,

v.BLAINE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT # 61, Defendant–Appellant–Cross Respondent,andSergio Lopez–Rodriguez, Defendant.

No. 41286.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, January 2015 Term.

March 30, 2015.

Rehearing Denied April 23, 2015.

Anderson, Julian & Hull LLP, Boise, and Powers Tolman Farley, PLLC, Boise, for appellant. Brian K. Julian argued.

Jeffrey J. Hepworth, P.A. & Associates, Twin Falls, for respondents. Jeffrey J. Hepworth argued.

J. JONES, Justice.

The appellant, Blaine County School District # 61 (School), appeals from a jury verdict and post-trial orders favoring the respondents, Dennis and Maryann Hennefer, the parents of Austin Hennefer, who died in a T-bone type automobile accident while performing a three-point turnabout at the instruction of Jeffrey Mecham, a School driver training instructor. The jury returned a special verdict, finding Austin's death resulted from Mecham's reckless conduct. It found Mecham 100% responsible for the death and the School, Mecham's employer, liable for non-economic damages totaling $3.5 million. The School timely appealed.

I.FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Austin Hennefer died in a motor vehicle accident on October 26, 2010, on Highway 20 in Blaine County. At the time, Austin was in a Driver's Education vehicle under the supervision of a School driver training instructor, Jeffrey Mecham. Another student, Jennifer Mares, was also a passenger in the vehicle. Prior to this accident, Austin had regularly driven a motorcycle, four-wheeler, and/or small pickup to help feed cattle on his family's farm. However, Austin had logged only 3.33 hours of driving on highways with an instructor.

The day of the accident, Austin and Mares were scheduled to begin their drive at 7:00 a.m. As their parents drove each student into Carey, there was snow on the ground and the roads were slick. Austin was to be the first driver of the morning and was to drive west from Carey on Highway 20, a 65 mph highway. Mares testified that as they left the school to begin the drive, the roads looked slick and it was foggy and cloudy. She said the roads stayed about the same throughout the drive. All witnesses who were present at the scene of the accident testified that the roads were slick, though their specific descriptions of the conditions varied.

The general consensus among the witnesses was that the lighting conditions were very poor due to the time of day. The testimony varied on how much traffic was present around the time of the accident. Heading west from Carey, Highway 20 eventually intersects with Highway 75, and the Driver's Education vehicle reached this intersection roughly thirty minutes into the drive. Mecham instructed Austin to proceed through the intersection on Highway 20 and they would shortly turn around and switch drivers.

Shortly after the Driver's Education vehicle passed the intersection, Mecham instructed Austin to pull to the side of the road, perform a three-point turnabout, and switch drivers. Though she had her eyes closed at the time, Mares testified she could feel Austin begin the first stage of the three-point turn by turning left across both lanes of the highway. She then felt him perform the second stage of the three-point turn by reversing back across the lanes. She opened her eyes again when Austin was shifting gears into Drive to go into the final stage of the three-point turn. When she opened her eyes, she looked out her window from the back seat on the driver's side of the vehicle and saw the headlights of Lopez–Rodriguez' car coming straight toward them, approximately forty feet away. At the speed Lopez–Rodriguez was estimated to be traveling, it would have taken less than one second for Lopez–Rodriguez' car to drive the remaining forty feet before colliding with the Driver's Education vehicle.

Lopez–Rodriguez' account of the accident was taken in a police statement and introduced at trial through Officer Ornelas. Lopez–Rodriguez believed the Driver's Education vehicle was parked on the side of the road when he first saw it and then pulled out right in front of him at the last second. Contrary to Lopez–Rodriguez' perception of the circumstances, the majority of the evidence at trial showed the Driver's Education vehicle was in the middle or final stages of the three-point turn when Lopez–Rodriguez first saw it. The Hennefers called Joellen Gill, a human-factors expert, to explain why Lopez–Rodriguez may have thought he saw the Driver's Education vehicle to the side of the road and then pulling out in front of him.

The fall semester when the accident occurred was the first and only time Mecham taught Driver's Education, having become certified the summer preceding the accident. It appears that the snow on the day of the accident was the first snow of the fall, so Mecham had never had the opportunity to teach driving in snowy conditions before the day of the accident. The course to become certified in teaching Driver's Education was taught by Brian Johns, who testified at trial. Johns testified he teaches that three-point turns are inherently hazardous and should be used rarely. Mecham admits he was taught and understood this information on three-point turns.

Following the accident, Hennefers filed a wrongful death action against the School, Mecham, and Lopez–Rodriguez, though the claim against Mecham was later dropped.¹ The Hennefers did not pursue a case theory that involved Lopez–Rodriguez' negligence.²

Both the School and the Hennefers called accident reconstructionists to testify about the accident. Each reconstructionist had conducted test three-point turns to determine approximately how long such a maneuver takes, and they agreed the turnabout may have taken someone of Austin's experience level twenty-five seconds or more under the conditions.

At trial, the Hennefers proceeded under a theory that Mecham's conduct in causing the accident was "reckless," which would allow them to exceed the cap on non-economic damages in Idaho Code section 6–1603. The jury returned a special verdict, finding Mecham 100% responsible for causing the accident and that his conduct in doing so was reckless. To Austin's father, the jury awarded approximately $7,500 in economic damages and $1.5 million in non-economic damages. To Austin's mother, the jury awarded $2 million in non-economic damages. The School thereafter moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and for a new trial. Hennefers moved for attorney fees. All three motions were denied. The School appealed and the Hennefers cross-appealed.

II.ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. Whether the School is entitled to judgment as a matter of law that Mecham did not act recklessly in causing the accident.

2. Whether the district court erred in instructing the jury.

3. Whether the district court erred in refusing to grant the School's motion for a new trial.

4. Whether the district court erred by allowing Joellen Gill to testify.

5. Whether the district court erred in denying the Hennefers' claim for attorney fees.

6. Whether the Hennefers are entitled to attorney fees on appeal.

III.DISCUSSION

A. The School is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of Mecham's recklessness.

Idaho Code section 6–1603 imposes a $250,000³ maximum limit on non-economic damages in tort actions seeking damages for personal injury or death. I.C. § 6–1603(1) & (2). However, this limitation on non-economic damages does not apply in cases where the cause of action arises "out of willful or reckless misconduct." I.C. § 6–1603(4) (a). This statute does not define "willful or reckless misconduct." See I.C. §§ 6–1601, 6–1603 ; Kuntz v. Lamar Corp., 385 F.3d 1177, 1186 (9th Cir.2004). The jury in this case returned a verdict far exceeding the statutory cap on damages. It also found that Mecham acted recklessly, meaning the cap does not apply. The School argues that throughout this case the district court employed an incorrect standard of "recklessness" under applicable Idaho law and that, had the correct standard been used, the School would have been entitled to judgment as a matter of law that Mecham did not act recklessly. The issues then become whether the trial court erred in the standard of recklessness it applied to the School's various motions and whether the School is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

1. Appropriate standard of "recklessness. "

With respect to the standard of recklessness that should apply under Idaho Code section 6–1603, the School argues that the correct standard involves an analysis of only the actor's subjective knowledge of a risk, subjective knowledge of the high probability that harm will result from that risk, and a conscious decision to proceed with the course of action despite that risk. The Hennefers argue a more objective test applies. We agree with the Hennefers.

Idaho Pattern Civil Jury Instruction 2.25 provides the definition of "willful and wanton," and the comment to this instruction provides that "[t]here appears to be no distinction between ‘reckless' and ‘willful and wanton.’ " The instruction says:

The words "willful and wanton" ... mean more than ordinary negligence. The words mean intentional or reckless actions, taken under circumstances where the actor knew or should have known that the actions not only created an unreasonable risk of harm to another, but involved a high degree of probability that such harm would actually result.

IDJI 2.25. In Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., where an instruction on the definition of recklessness was given that was substantively identical to IDJI 2.25, this Court discussed the definition of "willful or reckless misconduct" as it is used in Idaho Code section 6–1603. 152 Idaho 741, 751, 274 P.3d 1256, 1266 (2012). There, the Court affirmed the trial court's determination that "reckless or willful misconduct is simply a...