Hennessy v. Santiago

• Decision Date: 20 February 1998
• Citation: 708 A.2d 1269
• Parties: Margaret HENNESSY, Appellant, v. Dr. Jose SANTIAGO, Nancy Albert and Mercer County, Appellees.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

Page 1269

708 A.2d 1269

Margaret HENNESSY, Appellant, v. Dr. Jose SANTIAGO, Nancy Albert and Mercer County, Appellees.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Oct. 28, 1997.

Filed Feb. 20, 1998.

Susan S. Jackson, Butler, for appellant.

William G. McConnell, Sharon, for Dr. Jose Santiago, appellee.

Timothy Lijewski, Pittsburgh, for Nancy Albert & Mercer County, appellees.

Before POPOVICH, HUDOCK and HESTER, JJ.

HUDOCK, Judge:

This is an appeal from the order of the trial court granting Appellees' preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

The pertinent facts and procedural history of this case can be summarized as follows: Margaret Hennessy (Appellant) was employed by Dr. Jose Santiago (Santiago) as a habilitative counselor. Appellant counseled clients of both Santiago's individual practice and the corporation of which he controlled fifty percent, the Alliance for Behavioral Developmental Disability (ABDD). ABDD provided community living arrangements for Mercer County residents pursuant to contracts with Mercer County Mental Health/Mental Retardation (MH/MR). Additionally, Mercer County residents living in ABDD group homes received behavior intervention services from Santiago. Nancy Albert (Albert), Assistant Mercer County Administrator, apparently oversaw the activities of Mercer County MH/MR.

On August 12, 1995, Appellant received a telephone call from a local hospital. She was informed that one of the ABDD residents had been raped by another resident. At the hospital, a report had been given to the police. It is disputed by the parties whether the police were planning to continue their investigation.

Appellant spent the next five days conducting her own investigation. She talked to the rape victim, called a rape hotline and contacted the Mercer County District Attorney (D.A.). On August 16, 1995, Appellant called Santiago and told him that she was taking the victim to the D.A. the next day. Appellant alleges that Santiago not only didn't object to this decision, he actually encouraged it. After the victim met with the Mercer County D.A.'s Office, it agreed to file charges and the perpetrator was arrested.

On August 17, 1995, Santiago informed Appellant that she was to see him the next day. Later that same day, Appellant learned from an undisclosed source that Albert issued a directive ordering Appellant and one other caseworker off the rape victim's case. For his part, Santiago removed Appellant from all ABDD work the next day and then terminated her on August 25, 1995. Despite the fact that Santiago proffered six independent reasons for her termination, Appellant believes and avers that Albert instructed Santiago to terminate her in retaliation for her decision to assist the rape victim.

At issue in this appeal is Appellant's three count second amended complaint. Count One asserts a claim for wrongful discharge against Santiago. Count Two alleges that Albert, Mercer County and Santiago deprived the plaintiff of her civil rights under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. Count Three contends that Albert tortiously interfered in Appellant's employment relationship with Santiago.

The preliminary objections of all defendants were filed with respect to Appellant's first amended complaint. The parties, however, stipulated that they would be judged against the second amended complaint. On April 1, 1997, the trial judge entered an opinion and order sustaining the preliminary objections of all defendants and dismissing Appellant's second amended complaint. At that point, this appeal followed.

In this appeal, Appellant is challenging the order sustaining Appellees' preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer. We first note our scope and standard of review:

Our scope of review from an order which sustains preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer is plenary. We must determine the legal sufficiency of the Appellant's complaint and decide whether sufficient facts have been pled which would permit recovery by the plaintiff if ultimately proven. We must accept as true all well-pleaded facts contained in the complaint together with all reasonable inferences which may be deduced therefrom. We will sustain the trial court's demurrer if the facts pled in the plaintiff's complaint could not possibly state a cause of action permitting recovery.

Kaplan v. Cablevision of Pa., Inc., 448 Pa.Super. 306, 671 A.2d 716, 718-19 (1996), alloc. den., 546 Pa. 645, 683 A.2d 883 (1996) (citations omitted). Moreover, where doubt exists as to whether a demurrer should be sustained, the doubt should be resolved in favor of overruling it. Willet v. Pennsylvania Medical Catastrophe Loss Fund, 549 Pa. 613, 619, 702 A.2d 850, 853 (1997) (citing Mahoney v. Furches, 503 Pa. 60, 66, 468 A.2d 458, 461-62 (1983)).

Appellant presents four issues for our review:

1. Whether Count I of [Appellant's] Second Amended Complaint sets forth facts sufficient to support a claim against [Santiago], for wrongful discharge.

2. Whether Count II of [Appellant's] Second Amended Complaint sets forth facts sufficient to state a cause of action against [Albert] and Mercer County for violation of [Appellant's] Civil Rights.

3. Whether Count II of [Appellant's] Second Amended Complaint sets forth facts sufficient to support a claim against [Santiago] for violation of [Appellant's] Civil Rights.

4. Whether Count III of [Appellant's] Second Amended Complaint sets forth facts sufficient to state a cause of action against [Albert] for Tortious Interference with Contract.

Appellant's Brief at 3.

A. WRONGFUL DISCHARGE

We first address Appellant's allegation that Count I of her second amended complaint sets forth facts sufficient to support a claim for wrongful discharge against Santiago. It is well established that Pennsylvania recognizes the at-will employment doctrine. Shick v. Shirey, 456 Pa.Super. 668, 691 A.2d 511, 513 (1997) (en banc ), alloc. granted, --- Pa. ----, 704 A.2d 639 (1997). As this Court has noted, however, there are a few, narrow public policy exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine:

[T]hese exceptions fall into three categories: an employer (1) cannot require an employee to commit a crime, (2) cannot prevent an employee from complying with a statutorily imposed duty, and (3) cannot discharge an employee when specifically prohibited from doing so by statute.

Shick, 691 A.2d at 513 (citation omitted and numbers added).

Instantly, Appellant is claiming that she falls within exception number two. She alleges that Pennsylvania law, regulation and her profession's code of ethics all required her to report the rape to the authorities. ¹ In order to achieve this end, however, she has asked this Court to engage in an extremely expansive reading of the law.

Principally, Appellant relies upon Field v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 388 Pa.Super. 400, 565 A.2d 1170 (1989), in support of her argument. We find Field inapposite. There, federal regulations required the plaintiff, a nuclear plant worker, to report violations of federal law. Plaintiff, after alerting company officials through proper channels and seeing that they took no action, reported the violations to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Very soon thereafter, he and his wife were fired.

Appellant's case is very different. She may be correct that these mandates require a "safe habilitative environment" for mental healthcare patients. Appellant's Brief at 19. We disagree, however, with her conclusion that they also impose an affirmative duty upon all mental healthcare workers to investigate and report possible crimes involving their patients. This would be particularly true where, as in this case, the alleged crime had already been reported to the proper authorities.

Therefore, unlike the facts in Field, it is not clear that Appellant was required to do anything at all. Additionally, we note that none of the laws or regulations cited by the Appellant are similar to 23 Pa.C.S.A. section 6311, "Persons required to report suspected child abuse." As its title suggests, this section requires certain people, including mental health professionals, to report suspected child abuse. This section demonstrates that our legislature has chosen to place affirmative reporting duties upon mental healthcare professionals in some situations, but not in others. Unfortunately for Appellant, the facts of her case squarely place her in the latter category. Since no authority required Appellant to act as she did, we find no authority for us to reverse the trial court's decision to grant Santiago's preliminary objections as to Count I of the second amended complaint, wrongful discharge.

B. MUNICIPAL LIABILITY UNDER 42 U.S.C. SECTION 1983

Second, Appellant is claiming that Mercer County has liability for Albert's alleged decision to order the firing of Appellant under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. ² When an appellant alleges a deprivation of her rights under section 1983, a court must determine: (1) whether the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) whether this conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See, e.g., Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682, 685 (3d Cir.1993). The Third Circuit has clearly enunciated the standard that Appellant must meet in order to show municipal liability under section 1983:

A government entity may not be held liable under section 1983 under the respondeat superior doctrine. To obtain a judgment against a municipality, a plaintiff must prove that the municipality itself supported the violation of the rights alleged. [Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 692-95, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2037-38, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).] Thus, section 1983 liability attaches to a municipality only when "execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be...