Henry Morrison Flagler Museum v. Lee

• Decision Date: 11 August 1972
• Docket Number: No. 71--547,71--547
• Citation: 268 So.2d 434
• Parties: HENRY MORRISON FLAGLER MUSEUM, a Florida corporation, Appellant, v. W. Howard LEE, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 434

268 So.2d 434

HENRY MORRISON FLAGLER MUSEUM, a Florida corporation, Appellant, v. W. Howard LEE, Appellee.

No. 71--547

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Aug. 11, 1972.

Kirk Sullivan, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Frederick H. Hope, Palm Beach, and John R. Beranek of Jones, Paine & Foster, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

MAGER, Judge.

Defendant Flagler Museum appeals a final judgment entered pursuant to a jury verdict awarding plaintiff, W. Howard Lee, compensatory and punitive damages. Essentially, defendant contends that it was error for the trial court to submit the issue of punitive damages to the jury and to permit the jury to hear testimony relating to the plaintiff's mental pain and suffering. Defendant urges this court remand the case for a new trial on Both the compensatory and punitive damages issues apparently conceding the issue of liability.

The suit arose as a result of the defendant's termination of plaintiff's services as Executive Director of the Museum in August 1967. There was no written contract as such evidencing the agreement, ¹ however the evidence reflects that the plaintiff was to be employed as Executive Director for a period of three years beginning in November 1967. There is also apparently no dispute as to the amount of annual salary to be paid plaintiff. Included in this arrangement was an understanding that plaintiff and his family were to have rentfree use of a residence known as Lotus Cottage.

On or about February 15, 1969, the services of the plaintiff were terminated. Subsequently, in May of 1969, defendant instituted proceedings in the County Court of Palm Beach County to recover possession of Lotus Cottage asserting the plaintiff's refusal to leave the residence after termination of employment. On June 3, 1969, the County Judge entered a final judgment granting possession of Lotus Cottage to defendant and ordered plaintiff to vacate. On the same day a writ of possession was issued by the County Judge and in pursuance of said writ the petitioner was evicted from Lotus Cottage.

As a result of the foregoing, plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant asserting a breach of the contractual relationship. The complaint contained two counts. Under Count I plaintiff sought compensatory damages resulting from the breach of contract including vacation pay, personal automobile expenses and the rental value of the residence.

Under Count II of the complaint plaintiff additionally sought compensatory And punitive damages for defendant's 'willful and malicious acts' resulting from the direct breach of the contract, i.e., evicting the plaintiff and his family from their residence asserting that plaintiff's 'personal goods and belongings were openly and notoriously placed on the public streets'; exposing plaintiff to 'notorious and detrimental publicity' causing 'the Plaintiff and his family severe embarrassment and humiliation . . . which has affected the mental and physical health of the Plaintiff'.

The instructions given by the trial judge (to which defendant objected) fairly tracked Counts I and II of the complaint. We find no fault with the trial court's instruction with respect to the statement of the law of damages under Count I. This instruction was, in our opinion, consistent with the evidence in the record. The verdict of the jury awarding compensatory damages under Count I is affirmed, in part, as will be hereinafter more fully explained.

With respect to Count II we are off the opinion that it was error to submit the issue of punitive damages to the jury as well as to permit admission into evidence testimony relating to plaintiff's mental pain and suffering resulting from embarrassment and damage to his reputation. ² It is important to note and separate the presence of two distinct elements contained in Count II as amplified by the trial court's instructions to the jury. The trial court's instructions with respect to Count II proceeded on a dual theory: (1) that if the defendant breached the employment contract the jury could award Compensatory damages if the greater weight of the evidence reflected that the defendant had acted with 'malice and in a willful and intentional manner to cause the plaintiff to suffer great embarrassment, humiliation, adverse publicity and public ridicule as a direct and proximate result of said breach of contract'; (2) if the defendant 'acted with malice, moral turpitude, wantonness and willful or reckless indifference to the rights of others' the jury could assess Punitive damages against the defendant as a punishment and a deterrent to others.

In other words, under Count II the jury was to consider the evidence with respect to the award of Compensatory damages for the mental anguish suffered as a result of the breach of contract as well as the award of Punitive damages if such breach was with malice or with willful and reckless indifference to the rights of the plaintiff.

With respect to that portion of Count II relating to mental pain and suffering and the instructions thereon, the general rule is that recovery for such items is not allowed in actions for a breach of contract; the courts being of the view that mental suffering which accompanies a breach of contract is too remote for compensation. 22 Am.Jur.2d, Damages, § 195. The leading Florida case supporting this proposition is Hazen v. Cobb, 1928, 96 Fla. 151, 117 So. 853, where the court refused to approve an attempt to recover damages for a breach of a special contract of employment where it was alleged that the termination was 'to the great damage and humiliation of plaintiff'. In this context the Supreme Court of Florida held in Kirksey v. Jernigan, Fla.1950, 45 So.2d 188, 189:

'This court is committed to the rule, and we re-affirm it herein, that there can be no recovery for mental pain and anguish unconnected with physical injury in an action arising out of the negligent breach of a contract whereby simple negligence is involved. Dunahoo v. Bess, 146 Fla. 182, 200 So. 541, following International Ocean Telegraph Company v. Saunders, 32 Fla. 434, 14 So. 148, 21 L.R.A. 810.'

The court, however, went on to state:

'But we do not feel constrained to extend this rule To cases founded purely in tort, where the wrongful act is such as to reasonably imply malice, or where, from the entire want of care of attention to duty, or great indifference to the persons, property, or rights of others, such malice will be imputed as would justify the assessment of exemplary or punitive damages. . . .' (Emphasis added.)

See also Levine v. Knowles, Fla.App.1967, 197 So.2d 329; Slocum v. Food...