Henson v. Cradduck

• Decision Date: 23 January 2020
• Docket Number: No. CV-19-341,CV-19-341
• Citation: 2020 Ark. 24,593 S.W.3d 10
• Parties: Geraldine HENSON, as Personal Representative of the Estate of David Henson, Deceased, Appellant v. Kelley CRADDUCK, Individually and in His Official Capacity; Keith Ferguson, Individually; Jeff Robins, Individually and in His Official Capacity; Jeremy Guyll; Olin Rankin; Janna Hulett (Identified as Janna LNU in Amended Complaint); Michele Wills; Warren Lafferty; Association of Arkansas Counties; Benton County Jail; Benton County Sheriff’s Office; Benton County, Arkansas ; and John or Jane Does 8-25, Appellees
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

2020 Ark. 24

593 S.W.3d 10

Geraldine HENSON, as Personal Representative of the Estate of David Henson, Deceased, Appellant

v.Kelley CRADDUCK, Individually and in His Official Capacity; Keith Ferguson, Individually; Jeff Robins, Individually and in His Official Capacity; Jeremy Guyll; Olin Rankin; Janna Hulett (Identified as Janna LNU in Amended Complaint); Michele Wills; Warren Lafferty; Association of Arkansas Counties; Benton County Jail; Benton County Sheriff’s Office; Benton County, Arkansas ; and John or Jane Does 8-25, Appellees

No. CV-19-341

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Opinion Delivered: January 23, 2020

Rehearing Denied April 2, 2020

Morris W. Thompson Law Firm P.A., by: Morris W. Thompson ; Little Rock and Brett D. Watson, Attorney at Law, PLLC, by: Brett D. Watson, for appellant.

Jason Owens Law Firm, P.A., by: Jason E. Owens, for appellees.

COURTNEY RAE HUDSON, Associate Justice

Appellant Geraldine Henson, as personal representative of the estate of David Henson, appeals the Benton County Circuit Court’s dismissal of her complaint as being barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. Appellees are former Benton County Sheriff Kelley Cradduck; former Benton County Sheriff Keith Ferguson; Jeff Robins, Jeremy Guyll, Olin Rankin, Janna Hulett, Michele Wills, Warren Lafferty, all of whom work at the Benton County Detention Facility; Association of Arkansas Counties; Benton County Jail; Benton County Sheriff’s Office; Benton County, Arkansas; and John or Jane Does 8-25. For reversal, appellant argues that (1) her complaint is not barred by any statute of limitations, (2) her complaint contains facts sufficient to state a claim, (3) appellees are not immune from tort or vicarious liability, and (4) the law-of-the-case doctrine precludes this court from reconsidering its ruling that the circuit court had subject-matter jurisdiction. We affirm.

On September 29, 2012, officers with the Rogers Police Department arrested David at his home. He had been drinking heavily that morning and in the days before his arrest. David was transported to the Benton County Detention Facility, where he was surrendered into the custody and control of the Benton County Sheriff. David remained in custody until sometime before noon on October 5, 2012, when he was released from custody due to his deteriorating medical condition. Although David was released, when guards called his wife, she advised them that she was at least eight hours away in Iowa and did not know of anyone locally who could assume responsibility for him. Consequently, David was placed into a "detox" cell while detention center officials attempted to find someone to assume responsibility for him. Shortly after 8:00 p.m. that night, detention center officials called for an ambulance to transport David to a hospital. David was transported to Northwest Medical Center where he was hospitalized and died the next day from alcohol withdrawal and chronic alcoholism.¹

Appellant was appointed administratrix of David’s estate on August 14, 2014. As personal representative of David’s estate, she filed a pro se wrongful-death complaint on October 5, 2015.² Appellant’s original complaint named as defendants the Benton County Jail; the Benton County Sheriff’s Office; Kelly Cradduck, individually and in his official capacity; and John Doe #1, John Doe #2, and John Doe #3, individually and in their official capacities. Appellant later obtained counsel and filed amended complaints on November 16, 2015, March 30, April 15, and May 9, 2016, incrementally adding some defendants and claims and abandoning others. Several motions to dismiss were filed, including two motions to dismiss the fourth amended complaint. In short, the defendants argued in their motions that the only remaining claims in the original complaint were brought against Cradduck in his official capacity and that those claims were barred by a two-year statute of limitations. See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-109 (Repl. 2005). The defendants further argued that all other claims brought in subsequent amended complaints were barred by a three-year statute of limitations, Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-56-105, or were otherwise improperly brought. After a hearing, the circuit court entered an order granting the motion to dismiss "for the reasons set forth in the motion and at the hearing." Appellant filed her first appeal, and this court dismissed the appeal without prejudice, concluding that the circuit court was not clear as to which motion to dismiss was granted and that the circuit court’s August 10, 2016 order was not final because there were still claims pending against some defendants.

Henson v. Cradduck , 2017 Ark. 317, 530 S.W.3d 847 ( Henson I ). On remand, the circuit court entered another order of dismissal and an amended order of dismissal, finding that appellant’s claims were time-barred by the applicable statutes of limitations and granting all motions to dismiss. The circuit court specifically dismissed each defendant with prejudice and ordered that no claims or defendants remained. Appellant filed a timely appeal.

In reviewing a circuit court’s decision on a motion to dismiss, we treat the facts alleged in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Worden v. Kirchner , 2013 Ark. 509, 431 S.W.3d 243. We look only to the allegations in the complaint and not to matters outside the complaint. Ark. State Plant Bd. v. McCarty , 2019 Ark. 214, 576 S.W.3d 473. We treat only the facts alleged in the complaint as true but not a plaintiff’s theories, speculation, or statutory interpretation. Id.

The standard of review for the granting of a motion to dismiss is whether the circuit court abused its discretion. Dockery v. Morgan , 2011 Ark. 94, 380 S.W.3d 377. This case, however, also involves the issue of whether appellant’s original pro se complaint constitutes the unauthorized practice of law. We employ a de novo standard of review for issues addressing the unauthorized practice of law. DeSoto Gathering Co. LLC v. Hill , 2017 Ark. 326, 531 S.W.3d 396. A party’s failure to timely object to the unauthorized practice of law does not prevent our review. Id.

Although it is appellant’s final point on appeal, we first consider her claim that the law-of-the-case doctrine prevents this court from reconsidering its ruling that the circuit court had subject-matter jurisdiction. The law-of-the-case doctrine prohibits a court from reconsidering issues of law and fact that have already been decided on appeal. Cannady v. St. Vincent Infirmary Med. Ctr. , 2018 Ark. 35, 537 S.W.3d 259 (internal citations omitted). The doctrine provides that a decision of an appellate court establishes the law of the case for the trial upon remand and for the appellate court itself upon subsequent review. Id.

In this instance, the law-of-the-case doctrine does not bar our consideration of any issue in this case. This court in Henson I stated that "we cannot decide whether the circuit court lacked jurisdiction without a final order," and that "[w]e cannot conclude that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction when we lack appellate jurisdiction." Thus, the premise of appellant’s argument, i.e. that there is any ruling to reconsider, is erroneous. Henson I did not decide any issue other than whether this court obtained appellate jurisdiction. Because we lacked appellate jurisdiction, we could not have decided any other issue.

Having determined that the law-of-the-case doctrine does not preclude our review of any issue, we turn to appellees’ argument that appellant’s original complaint was a nullity and that all subsequent complaints were time-barred. The circuit court concluded that appellant’s complaint was barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. Appellant’s core argument is that our three-year statute of limitations applies to her claims. Appellant reasons that her first complaint was filed within the three-year statute of limitations and that all of her amended complaints relate back to that original complaint. Appellees respond that because appellant’s first complaint was filed pro se, it constituted the unauthorized practice of law, and was therefore a nullity. Although this case involves a question as to the applicability of different statutes of limitations, appellant’s original pro se complaint is the only complaint that was filed within the three-year statute of limitations. Therefore, resolution of this appeal turns on the validity of appellant’s original complaint.

Appellees contend that appellant’s unauthorized practice of law in filing her first complaint rendered it a nullity and that all other complaints were filed after three years, rendering them time-barred under any applicable statute of limitations. Appellant filed her initial complaint as the estate’s personal representative. An administrator acting on behalf of an estate does so in a fiduciary capacity. Ark. Bar Ass'n v. Union Nat'l Bank , 224 Ark. 48, 273 S.W.2d 408 (1954). In Union Nat'l , this court determined that a bank acting as the personal representative of an estate had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. We also held that a person who is not a licensed attorney and is acting as an administrator cannot practice law in matters relating to his or her trusteeship on the theory that they are practicing for themselves. Id. In bringing a suit for wrongful death, a personal representative acts only as a "trustee of conduit," and any proceeds recovered are held in trust for the benefit of the beneficiaries and not the estate. Brewer v. Lacefield , 301 Ark. 358, 362, 784 S.W.2d 156, 158 (1990). Amendment 28 to the Arkansas Constitution provides that "[t]he Supreme Court shall make rules regulating the practice of law and the professional conduct of attorneys at law." The unauthorized practice of law falls within this court’s constitutional authority to control and govern the practice of law. DeSoto Gathering , ...