Hentges v. State
| Decision Date | 23 January 2017 |
| Docket Number | A16-0643 |
| Parties | John Mark Hentges, petitioner, Appellant, v. State of Minnesota, Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).
Affirmed
LeSueur County District Court
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Mark D. Nyvold, Special Assistant Public Defender, Fridley, Minnesota (for appellant)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Brent Christian, LeSueur County Attorney, Michelle M. Zehnder Fischer, Special Assistant County Attorney, St. Peter, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and Kirk, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant challenges the district court's order denying postconviction relief from his conviction of felony failure to pay child support, arguing that (1) he did not waive his right to counsel, (2) his right to a fair trial was violated by a witness testifying to prejudicial information, (3) the jury instructions amounted to a directed verdict, (4) the evidence was insufficient to convict him, and (5) various acts of fraud were committed against him throughout his case. We affirm.
Appellant John Mark Hentges lived in Colorado with his wife, C.W., and their five children. Hentges's marriage to C.W. was dissolved in March 2006. A Colorado court awarded sole physical custody of the children to C.W. Hentges was awarded parenting time and required to pay $1,717.92 per month in child support. When Hentges later moved to Minnesota, the Colorado child-support order was registered in Minnesota for enforcement purposes. Hentges was in arrears in paying his child-support obligation at that time. Hentges appealed the registration but, due to procedural defects, this court dismissed his appeal.
Because Hentges continued to ignore his obligation to pay child support, the LeSueur County Attorney's Office initiated an action in district court to hold Hentges in contempt. After Hentges evaded service of the order to show cause, the county child-support enforcement supervisor sought criminal action against Hentges. A trial date of November 22, 2010 was set. The county attorney's office subsequently filed a felony complaint warrant charging Hentges with nonsupport of a child under Minn. Stat. § 609.375, subd. 2a (2008). After Hentges was arrested, the district court appointed counsel to represent him. Counsel argued on Hentges behalf that the Colorado order was invalid. At Hentges's first appearance, the LeSueur County attorney informed the districtcourt that he was removing himself due to Hentges's allegation that he had a personal interest in the matter. The Chief Deputy Nicollet County Attorney handled the prosecution thereafter. At the omnibus hearing, Hentges requested that the substitute prosecuting attorney be removed. The district court denied Hentges's request. Hentges also challenged probable cause and sought dismissal of the charges. Because Hentges failed to provide the state with notice of his motions, the omnibus hearing was continued.
When the omnibus hearing resumed, counsel stated that Hentges wanted to file motions on his own and that it might be appropriate for him to act as standby counsel to allow Hentges to do so. In response, the district court explained to Hentges that he could represent himself if he desired to, but that the district court was "not sure that it's a wise decision" to do so. In its omnibus order, the district court found sufficient probable cause to support the charges and denied Hentges's motion to dismiss. The district court also stated that any motions to dismiss based on Hentges's assertion that the Colorado order was defective were without merit and denied.
At the pretrial hearing on November 9, 2010, Hentges refused to enter the courtroom, claiming that the county attorney had committed a crime against him. After the district court denied Hentges's motion to remove the county attorney, Hentges entered the courtroom. Hentges then informed the district court that he had filed a lawsuit naming the judge as the defendant. Counsel again inquired as to whether it may be more appropriate for him to serve as Hentges's standby counsel, given Hentges's insistence on filing his own motions. The district court set a new trial date of February 28, 2011, butadvised the parties that no further continuances would be granted. Hentges fired counsel in a December 24, 2010 letter.
On the first morning of trial, the district court granted Hentges's request for court-appointed counsel, and the public defender's office reassigned the same attorney. Hentges refused to accept the attorney as his counsel or as advisory counsel, and the public defender's office refused to provide Hentges with a different public defender. Hentges represented himself at trial and testified that he did not owe any child support because he had already paid for his children's future needs, the Colorado child-support order was not valid, and he had not seen his children in almost four years and that he had not communicated with them in more than two and one-half years.
Over Hentges's objection, the district court granted the state's request for a jury instruction informing the jury that the Colorado order and the Minnesota registration order were valid and enforceable. The jury found Hentges guilty of nonsupport of a child.
Following trial, Hentges moved for judgment of acquittal, to vacate the judgment, and for a new trial. The district court denied the motions for judgment of acquittal and to vacate the judgment, but reserved ruling on the motion for a new trial until after a hearing. When Hentges failed to appear for the presentence investigation and the sentencing hearing, the district court denied his motion for a new trial and issued a warrant for his arrest.
Hentges was arrested several months later and was appointed a public defender, but the public defender's office withdrew after Hentges refused to speak with anyone from that office. Hentges was sentenced and released from jail. Approximately two months later,Hentges violated his probation, and a warrant was issued for his arrest when he failed to appear at a probation-violation hearing. Hentges timely filed a direct appeal of his conviction. The state moved to dismiss Hentges's appeal because he was a fugitive from justice due to the outstanding warrant, but this court denied the motion in a special term order. The Minnesota Supreme Court granted the state's petition for review, adopted the fugitive-dismissal rule, applied the rule to Hentges's appeal, reversed this court's order, and remanded to this court with directions to dismiss Hentges's appeal if he did not surrender to law-enforcement officials within ten days after the opinion was filed. State v. Hentges, 844 N.W.2d 500, 506-08 (Minn. 2014). When Hentges failed to timely surrender, this court dismissed Hentges's direct appeal.
Hentges subsequently petitioned for postconviction relief. The postconviction court denied the petition on the grounds that it was procedurally barred pursuant to State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 243 N.W.2d 737 (1976), and because no legal basis existed for relief. On appeal, this court held that Knaffla did not apply, because Hentges's direct appeal was dismissed and not considered on the merits, and we reversed and remanded. Hentges v. State, No. A15-0726 (Minn. App. Nov. 30, 2015). On remand, in a detailed and thorough order, the postconviction court denied relief. This appeal follows.
This court reviews the denial of postconviction relief for abuse of discretion. Matakis v. State, 862 N.W.2d 33, 36 (Minn. 2015).
We review legal issues de novo, but on factual issues our review is limited to whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to sustain the postconviction court's findings. We willnot reverse an order unless the postconviction court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings.
Id. (quotations and citations omitted).
Hentges contends that the district court failed to obtain a proper waiver of his right to counsel. The postconviction court found that Hentges waived his right to counsel when he fired counsel and forfeited his right to counsel through his dilatory conduct. We will not reverse a district court's finding that a defendant waived his right to counsel unless that finding is clearly erroneous. State v. Jones, 772 N.W.2d 496, 504 (Minn. 2009).
Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to counsel. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6. But "[a]n indigent defendant does not have an absolute constitutional right to the counsel of his choice." State v. Krejci, 458 N.W.2d 407, 413 (Minn. 1990). The right to counsel can be "relinquished in three ways: (1) waiver, (2) waiver by conduct, and (3) forfeiture." Jones, 772 N.W.2d at 504. Waiver of counsel is valid if it is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Id. A written waiver of counsel is required in felony cases, unless the defendant refuses to sign the waiver. Minn. Stat. § 611.19 (2014); Minn. R. Crim. P. 5.04, subd. 1(4). Additionally, before a defendant can waive his right to counsel, a district court must fully advise the defendant of (1) the nature of the charges, (2) the possible punishment, (3) that there may be defenses or mitigating circumstances, and (4) all other facts necessary to understand the consequences, includingdisadvantages of waiving counsel. Minn. R. Crim. P. 5.04, subd. 1(4); see Jones, 772 N.W.2d at 504.
Hentges argues that he did not waive counsel because the district court did not obtain a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel in writing or on the record. The state appears to agree that the district court did not obtain a written or...
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