Hernandez v. N.M. Racing Comm'n

• Docket Number: A-1-CA-39606
• Decision Date: 20 July 2023
• Parties: JOSE FABIAN HERNANDEZ, Petitioner-Appellant, v. NEW MEXICO RACING COMMISSION, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico

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JOSE FABIAN HERNANDEZ, Petitioner-Appellant, v. NEW MEXICO RACING COMMISSION, Respondent-Appellee.

No. A-1-CA-39606

Court of Appeals of New Mexico

July 20, 2023

Corrections to this opinion/decision not affecting the outcome, at the Court's discretion, can occur up to the time of publication with NM Compilation Commission. The Court will ensure that the electronic version of this opinion/decision is updated accordingly in Odyssey.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY LISA C. ORTEGA DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Chavez Law Offices, PA Gene N. Chavez Albuquerque, NM for Appellant

Park &Associates, LLC Alfred A. Park Geoffrey D. White Albuquerque, NM for Appellee

MEMORANDUM OPINION

KRISTINA BOGARDUS, JUDGE

{¶1} Petitioner Jose Fabian Hernandez appeals the district court's order dismissing his petition for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction. The petition asked the district court to enjoin the New Mexico Horse Racing Commission (the Commission) from enforcing penalties imposed as a result of an initial administrative ruling while an administrative appeal remained pending before the Commission. In dismissing the petition the district court stated that Petitioner had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Petitioner argues the district court incorrectly determined that he had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, pointing out that he requested the Commission to stay the initial ruling and contending there are no other administrative remedies available to stay the penalties while his administrative appeal is pending. We affirm the district court's dismissal based on the doctrine of finality.

BACKGROUND

{¶2} Following positive tests for a banned substance by several of Petitioner's horses, the Sunland Park Racetrack board of stewards (the stewards) held a disciplinary hearing. After the hearing, the stewards issued several "[i]nitial [r]uling[s]," one for each horse that tested positive. Each initial ruling imposed various penalties, including a fine, and specified that failure to pay the fine would result in Petitioner's suspension.

{¶3} Petitioner appealed the stewards' rulings to the Commission. Petitioner also asked the Commission's Executive Director (the Executive Director) to stay the fines imposed by the stewards' ruling and the suspension of his horse racing license that would result from non-payment of the fines, which the Executive Director denied. It is undisputed that Petitioner failed to pay the fines, and his license was suspended.

{¶4} Following the denial of this stay, and while the administrative appeal to the Commission was pending, Petitioner filed a petition in the district court for a TRO and preliminary injunction (the petition), pursuant to Rule 1-066 NMRA. The petition asked the district court to enjoin the Commission from suspending his license due to non-payment of the fines imposed by the stewards. The district court dismissed the petition, reasoning Petitioner had "administrative remedies available and therefore, has an adequate remedy at law available," and had "failed to exhaust his administrative remedies."

DISCUSSION

The District Court Did Not Err in Dismissing the Petition

{¶5} Petitioner argues the district court erred in dismissing the petition because the court incorrectly determined that he had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. See City of Las Cruces v. N.M. Pub. Regul. Comm'n 2020-NMSC-016, ¶ 22, 476 P.3d 880 (stating that under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies "a party is ordinarily required to pursue relief from an administrative agency, where available, before seeking redress from the courts"). Petitioner argues that he has exhausted the administrative remedies available to stay enforcement of the stewards' rulings by requesting such a stay from the Executive Director. See 15.2.1.9(B)(10)(a) NMAC (providing that "[a] person who has been disciplined by a ruling of the stewards may apply to the agency director for a stay of the ruling"). The Commission responds that Petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because his administrative appeal before the Commission was pending when he filed his petition in the district court.

{¶6} Petitioner fails to address the impact of his pending administrative appeal on the district court's authority to dismiss the petition and acknowledged in the petition that he had yet to receive a final order from the Commission. The narrow issue, then, is whether the district court could properly dismiss the petition where the Commission had yet to issue a final order. See Khalsa v. Levinson, 1998-NMCA-110, ¶ 12, 125 N.M. 680, 964 P.2d 844 ("Whether an order is a 'final order' within the meaning of the statute is a jurisdictional question that an appellate court is required to raise on its own motion."); see also White v. Farris, 2021-NMCA-014, ¶ 23, 485 P.3d 791 ("The district court's appellate jurisdiction, like our own, is generally confined to appeals from final judgments."). Under this circumstance, we decline to unnecessarily decide whether Petitioner exhausted his administrative remedies because we conclude that the district court properly dismissed the petition based on the related doctrine of finality. See Callahan v. N.M. Fed'n of Tchrs.-TVI, 2005-NMCA-011, ¶ 16, 136 N.M. 731, 104 P.3d 1122 (noting that "[t]he exhaustion doctrine is closely related to the finality doctrine"), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 2006-NMSC-010, ¶ 3, 139 N.M. 201, 131 P.3d 51. We explain.

{¶7} Pursuant to Rule 1-066, Petitioner sought to stay enforcement of penalties imposed by the stewards' ruling by seeking a TRO and preliminary injunction. We recognize that "injunctions are common-law claims falling under district courts' original jurisdiction," Anderson v. State, 2022-NMSC-019, ¶ 21, 518 P.3d 503, and that "a stay pending appeal is a substantive right." Grassie v. Roswell Hosp. Corp., 2008-NMCA-076, ¶ 8, 144 N.M. 241, 185 P.3d 1091. Nevertheless, "restrictions on the time and place of exercising" such a right "are procedural and within the Supreme Court's rule making power." See Anderson, 2022-NMSC-019, ¶ 22 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We conclude that, although the petition seeking an injunction fell under the district court's original jurisdiction, Rule 1-075 NMRA placed "restrictions on the time . . . of" Petitioner's exercise of this right. See Anderson, 2022-NMSC-019, ¶ 22 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

{¶8} "Rule 1-075 provides the procedural mechanism to review decisions of 'administrative officers and agencies pursuant to the New Mexico Constitution when there is no statutory right to an appeal or other statutory right of review.'" Smith v. City of Santa Fe, 2007-NMSC-055, ¶ 22, 142 N.M. 786, 171 P.3d 300 (quoting Rule 1-075(A)); see also Madrid v. Vill. of Chama, 2012-NMCA-071, ¶ 5, 283 P.3d 871 ("Under Rule 1-075, when appeals arise out of administrative proceedings, the district court takes up the issues under its appellate jurisdiction.").^[1] Here, the issue on appeal-whether the district court had authority to stay enforcement of penalties imposed by the stewards' ruling pending Petitioner's administrative appeal-arises out of two administrative decisions provided for by the Commission's regulations. First, the stewards held a disciplinary hearing to determine whether Petitioner had violated horse racing rules based on positive drug tests of several horses. See 15.2.1.9(B)(1) NMAC (stating that the stewards may conduct a disciplinary hearing). The stewards then issued rulings, which resulted in suspension of Petitioner's license based on his failure to pay fines imposed by these rulings. See 15.2.3.8(B)(1)(a), (d) NMAC (stating that "[t]he stewards shall enforce these rules and the racing laws of this state" and that "[w]henever the stewards find any person culpable for any act . . . in violation of these regulations or . . . the Horse Racing Act, the person shall be subject to disciplinary action, which could include a fine, suspension . . . or any combination of these penalties"). Second, Petitioner requested that the Executive Director stay the stewards' fines and the suspension that would result from non-payment of these fines, and the Executive Director denied the request. See 15.2.1.9(B)(10)(a), (d) NMAC (stating that "[a] person who has been disciplined by a ruling of the stewards may apply to the agency director for a stay of the ruling" and that, "[o]n a finding of good cause, the agency director may grant the stay"). Only after the Executive Director's denied Petitioner's request for a stay did he seek this remedy in the district court. In effect, Petitioner appealed the Executive Director's denial of his stay request to the district court.

{¶9} Rule 1-075 specifically contemplates review by the district court of such an administrative denial of a stay request. Indeed, Rule 1-075 provides a procedural mechanism whereby a party may petition the district court to stay enforcement of an administrative order after the agency has denied the party's request for a stay. See Rule 1-075(Q)(1) (providing that, "[u]pon motion, the district court may stay enforcement of the order or decision under review" and that the motion "must . . . state that a request for stay was previously made to the agency and was denied, or explain why seeking a stay from the agency in the first instance would be impracticable"). Rule 1-075 thus more specifically addresses the administrative origin of Petitioner's action in the district court than Rule 1-066. See Madrid, 2012-NMCA-071, ¶ 5. "[A]s a general rule, . . . when two statutes deal with the same subject, one general and one specific, the specific ...