Hernandez v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corp.

• Decision Date: 23 December 1991
• Citation: 78 N.Y.2d 687,585 N.E.2d 822,578 N.Y.S.2d 510
• Parties: , 585 N.E.2d 822 Magali HERNANDEZ, as Administratrix of the Estate of Laura Morales, Deceased, Respondent, v. NEW YORK CITY HEALTH AND HOSPITALS CORPORATION, Appellant, et al., Defendants.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 510

578 N.Y.S.2d 510

78 N.Y.2d 687, 585 N.E.2d 822

Magali HERNANDEZ, as Administratrix of the Estate of Laura Morales, Deceased, Respondent, v. NEW YORK CITY HEALTH AND HOSPITALS CORPORATION, Appellant et al., Defendants.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Dec. 23, 1991.

[78 N.Y.2d 688] Victor A. Kovner, Corp. Counsel (Fred Kolikoff and Larry A. Sonnenshein, New York City, of counsel), for appellant.

Philip Hoffer and Rose L. Hoffer, New York City, for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

KAYE, Judge.

In this wrongful death action, the complaint was served after expiration of the one-year 90-day Statute of Limitations then applicable to claims against the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation. The action was dismissed as untimely by the trial court and reinstated by the Appellate Division. This appeal requires us to determine whether the Statute of Limitations was tolled by the infancy of the sole distributee of decedent's estate.

I.

In March 1987, Laura Morales--the decedent--was admitted to North Central Bronx Hospital, a facility owned and operated by defendant Health and Hospitals Corporation. ¹ Decedent died intestate on April 8, 1987, leaving her infant son as her sole distributee. Also surviving were several of decedent's siblings and her mother.

Letters of guardianship were issued to Margarita Colon, the infant's grandmother, on December 22, 1987. Upon issuance of the letters of guardianship, the guardian renounced her right to letters of administration and sought leave of court to have Magali Hernandez, decedent's niece, appointed administratrix of the estate. On December 31, 1987, the Surrogate issued limited letters of administration to Magali Hernandez, granting her authority to commence the present action.

In February 1988, plaintiff was granted leave to file a late notice of claim, and the present action was commenced on December 16, 1988. Thereafter, defendant moved to dismiss the claim as time-barred, asserting that the action was not commenced within one year and 90 days of death as required by McKinney's Unconsolidated Laws of N.Y. § 7401(2) (New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation Act § 20[2] [L.1969, ch. 1016, § 1]. Plaintiff responded that the limitations period was tolled during pendency of the motion for leave to file a late notice of claim and by the infancy of decedent's sole distributee. Supreme Court granted defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that pendency of the motion would have tolled the Statute of Limitations for only one month (from January to February 1988), and that the infancy toll was inapplicable because there were other distributees who could have promptly filed for letters of administration.

The Appellate Division modified, reinstating the complaint as to defendant. 169 A.D.2d 535, 564 N.Y.S.2d 387. The court held that the Statute of Limitations on the wrongful death claim was tolled until the guardian was appointed; where the sole distributee is an infant, no one is eligible to receive letters of administration and bring a wrongful death action as personal representative of the estate until a guardian is appointed. Further, the court noted Supreme Court's error in concluding that there were other distributees as neither decedent's siblings nor her mother were entitled to share in the estate under the distribution scheme set out in the Estates, Powers and Trusts Law. Finally, the court overruled its own prior decision in Cruz v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 61 A.D.2d 915, 402 N.Y.S.2d 842, to the extent inconsistent with its holding in the present case.

The Appellate Division granted leave to appeal, certifying the following question: "Was the order of this Court, which modified the order of the Supreme Court, properly made?" We now answer that question in the affirmative, concluding that the Statute of Limitations was tolled until the appointment of the infant's guardian.

II.

Under the EPTL, plaintiffs have two years, measured from the date of death, in which to bring a wrongful death action (EPTL 5-4.1). At the time the present action was commenced, however, a one-year 90-day Statute of Limitations applied to actions brought against this municipal defendant (Unconsolidated Laws § 7401[2]; Brennan v. City of New York, 59 N.Y.2d 791, 464 N.Y.S.2d 731, 451 N.E.2d 478). ² Unless that limitations period was tolled, plaintiff's action--commenced one year and eight months after decedent's death--was not timely.

Under the CPLR, where the "person entitled to commence an action is under a disability because of infancy * * * at the time the cause of action accrues" the Statute of Limitations is tolled (CPLR 208). ³ The problem arises in the application of this toll to the wrongful death cause of action. The "person entitled to commence" a wrongful death action is not the decedent's distributee--who is the beneficiary of the claim--but the decedent's personal representative (see, EPTL 5-4.1). Is the infancy of the sole distributee a disability attributable to the "person entitled to commence an action" in the unusual situation where no personal representative can be appointed to bring a wrongful death action until the infant obtains a guardian?

Defendant argues that we answered that question in Ratka v. St. Francis Hosp., 44 N.Y.2d 604, 407 N.Y.S.2d 458, 378 N.E.2d 1027, and Mossip v. Clement & Co., 256 App.Div. 469, 10 N.Y.S.2d 592, affd., 283 N.Y. 554, 27 N.E.2d 279. However, neither case decided the issue before us.

In both Mossip and Ratka, the decedents were survived by adult distributees. In Ratka, this Court affirmed an Appellate Division decision that held no infancy toll was available to the surviving child where there existed, at the time of decedent's death, next of kin who were under no disability to receive letters of administration (44 N.Y.2d at 608, 407 N.Y.S.2d 458, 378 N.E.2d 1027, affg., 54 A.D.2d 587, 387 N.Y.S.2d 162).

The parties differ on the meaning of "next of kin" as used in Ratka. Plaintiff would limit those words to distributees; defendant would read them to include a decedent's relatives--here, for example, her mother, siblings and niece.

Ratka, like judicial opinions generally, should be read in light of its facts (see, e.g., Crane v. Bennett, 177 N.Y. 106, 112, 69 N.E. 274) and limited to situations where--as in that case--there are other distributees who qualify for letters of administration. Indeed, the definition of "distributee" replaced that of "next of kin" in the relevant statute (compare, former Decedent Estate Law § 134 ["next of kin" defined as those entitled under the relevant distribution laws to share in the assets of the decedent], with EPTL 1-2.5 [defining "distributees" as those entitled to share in the property of a decedent under the governing distribution statutes]; see also, Rohan, Practice Commentary, McKinney's Cons.Laws of N.Y., Book 17B, EPTL 1-2.5, at 14). Clearly, the Court in Ratka referred to the adult distributee when it noted that other "next of kin" were under no disability to receive letters of administration.

Nor is Mossip dispositive of the question we now confront. Mossip held that a " 'right of action belongs to or is vested in the person or persons who has or have the lawful right to prosecute it.' " (256 App.Div. at 473, 10 N.Y.S.2d 592, supra, quoting Matter of Meng, 227 N.Y. 264, 277, 125 N.E. 508.) It followed that no infancy toll could apply where the person entitled to bring the wrongful death action was the personal representative, not the infant distributee. However, in Mossip there was another eligible distributee, who had a right to letters of administration and thus the right to become personal representative. The rationale of Mossip does not control the present case, where no one had or could have had the "lawful right to prosecute" the action until a guardian was appointed for the person otherwise entitled to assume that role.

The question before us thus remains an open one in this State. ⁴

III.

In resolving the question, we look first to the relevant statutory scheme. The wrongful death cause of action in New York is exclusively statutory, the first such statute having been enacted in 1847 (L.1847, ch. 450; see also, N.Y. Const., art. I, § 16). We have no common-law cause of action for wrongful death (see, Ratka v. St. Francis Hosp., 44 N.Y.2d 604, 612, 407 N.Y.S.2d 458, 378 N.E.2d 1027, supra ).

Under the wrongful death statute, a decedent's personal representative may maintain the action for the benefit of the distributees of the estate (EPTL 5-4.1; see also, 5-4.4). "Personal representative" is defined as "a person who has received letters to administer the estate of a decedent" (EPTL 1-2.13).

Under the SCPA, distributees have a prior right to letters of administration (SCPA 1001); an infant, however, is ineligible to receive such letters (SCPA 707[1][a]. Thus, as the Appellate Division observed, "where the sole distributee is an infant, no one is eligible to receive letters of administration until such time as a guardian is appointed." (169 A.D.2d 535, 536, 564 N.Y.S.2d 387; see also, SCPA 1001[2], [6].) It follows that in the present case, at the time of decedent's death, no one could be granted letters of administration--and consequently no one could commence the wrongful death action--until a guardian was appointed for the child.

The confluence of the pertinent EPTL, SCPA and CPLR provisions in this case thus gives rise to an unusual--perhaps unique--problem. EPTL 5-4.1 grants the personal representative procedural authority to bring the wrongful death claim; SCPA 1001 and 707 make it impossible for anyone to assume that role until a guardian is appointed for the infant sole distributee; and CPLR 208 speaks of tolling the Statute of Limitations when the person entitled to bring the action is under a disability at the time of accrual. In that a wrongful death action accrues at the time of death, mechanical application of CPLR 208 is impossible unless...