Herrada v. City of Detroit

Decision Date25 October 2001
Docket NumberDEFENDANT-APPELLEE,PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,No. 00-2244,00-2244
Citation275 F.3d 553
Parties(6th Cir. 2001) ELENA HERRADA,v. CITY OF DETROIT, Argued:
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit. No. 00-71570--George E. Woods, District Judge.

Stephen F. Wasinger (briefed), Rita M. Lauer (briefed), Gregory D. Hanley (argued), Wasinger, Kickham & Hanley, Royal Oak, MI, for Appellant.

John P. Quinn, Arkon, OH, Joanne D. Stafford 9argued and briefed), City of Detroit Law Department, Detroit, MI, for Appellee.

Before: Boggs, Gilman, and Bright, Circuit Judges.*

OPINION

Gilman, Circuit Judge

Elena Herrada filed this suit on behalf of herself and other similarly situated individuals, alleging a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by the City of Detroit. Herrada contends that the City's method of issuing citations for parking violations deprives motorists such as herself of procedural due process by virtue of the citations containing allegedly false statements that exaggerate the penalties for refusing to pay the fines. After finding that the City's procedures did not deprive vehicle owners of their property without due process of law, the district court granted the City's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual background

The City's police officers are authorized to place a "parking violation notice or citation" (citation) on any automobile found in a location that violates the City's parking laws. Detroit City Code § 55-2-22. A citation constitutes "an allegation of a civil infraction" rather than a conclusive finding of guilt. Id. As such, the citations must specify the deadline for the automobile's owner to respond to the allegation before additional penalties apply, the method of responding, the location and hours of operation of the bureau or court in which a response would be proper, and the amount of the proposed fine. Id. The citations must also state that the City has the authority to take further actions if the owner does not respond within the prescribed time. Id.

Pursuant to these requirements, the citations contain the address to which payments should be mailed and inform the recipient that he or she has 30 days in which to (1) admit responsibility and pay the fine, (2) admit responsibility with an explanation of why he or she should not be obligated to pay the fine, or (3) deny responsibility and request a hearing. Furthermore, the citations state that "[f]ailure to respond may cause a penalty to be added, court action taken or your vehicle booted and impounded," and that "[l]ate payment will cause penalties to be added to the original fine." The final paragraph of the citations provides the address and telephone number of the City's parking violations bureau, to which requests for additional information may be directed.

If the City determines that an individual has failed to respond to a citation, it issues an overdue notice to the registered owner of the automobile in question. The overdue notice provides payment instructions, including the address to which payments should be mailed or personally delivered, and states the following consequences of failing to respond: (1) a citation "will be filed in court," (2) the owner's driver's license "may be withheld," and (3) the owner's automobile "may be booted and towed."

Herrada contends that the threatened penalties for refusing to respond to citations and overdue notices are false and misleading. Although both the citation and the overdue notice refer to potential court action against the violator, she points out that the City has not filed any judicial actions for parking law offenses since 1996. Herrada also claims that, in contrast to the notices' representations, vehicles can be booted and towed only if they have six or more unanswered parking violations, and that the City has no authority to withhold a driver's license. According to Herrada, this erroneous information leads persons like herself to pay parking fines based upon a mistaken belief about the legal consequences of failing to respond. This deception, Herrada argues, results in a deprivation of property without due process of law.

B. Procedural background

Herrada brought this class action lawsuit in Michigan state court, seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. After removing the action to federal court, the City filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court concluded that Herrada's complaint properly alleged the deprivation of a property interest, which it defined as "the right to keep monies subject only to rightful actions by the government that comport with due process." In addressing whether this deprivation violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the district court also assumed for the purposes of its analysis that the citations and overdue notices contained false information. It nonetheless concluded that the notices did not violate due process because Herrada was fully informed of her right to a hearing, and she voluntarily paid her fine without a hearing. As a result, the district court granted the City's motion to dismiss. This disposition eliminated the need for the district court to decide whether Herrada's lawsuit satisfied the requirements for a class action.

II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of review

A district court's dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is reviewed de novo. Jackson v. City of Columbus, 194 F.3d 737, 745 (6th Cir. 1999). When considering a motion to dismiss, "[t]he court must construe the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, and accept all of the factual allegations as true." Id. (citation omitted). "A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) should not be granted 'unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'" Buchanan v. Apfel, 249 F.3d 485, 488 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); see also Jackson, 194 F.3d at 745 (noting that dismissal is proper only "if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations") (citation omitted).

B. Procedural due process claim

Herrada claims that the City's inclusion of false and misleading statements regarding potential penalties in the citations and overdue notices results in an unconstitutional deprivation of property without due process of law. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits states from depriving citizens of "life, liberty, or property" without "due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV. A two-step analysis guides our evaluation of procedural due process claims. We must first determine "whether there exists a liberty interest or property interest which has been interfered with by the defendants." Jackson, 194 F.3d at 749 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Second, if such a deprivation occurred, we must decide whether the procedures that accompanied the interference were constitutionally sufficient. Buchanan, 249 F.3d at 490.

1. Whether the City's actions deprived Herrada of a property interest

According to Herrada, the property right at issue in this case is her right to retain possession of her money, subject only to lawful actions by the City that comport with due process. Herrada clearly has a property interest in her money. See Hampton v. Hobbs, 106 F.3d 1281, 1287 (6th Cir. 1997) (concluding that prisoners have a property interest in their money).

Determining whether the City improperly interfered with or deprived her of this interest, however, presents a more difficult question. The City argues that because Herrada voluntarily paid her parking ticket, no government action interfered with her property interest. This position finds support, at least by way of analogy, in two decisions from the Tenth Circuit. See Garcia v. City of Albuquerque, 232 F.3d 760, 770 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that the defendant did not deprive the plaintiff of a property interest in his continued employment because the plaintiff voluntarily resigned when he refused to report to work after being transferred to a new position); Yearous v. Niobrara County Mem'l Hosp., 128 F.3d 1351, 1356 (10th Cir. 1997) ("If Plaintiffs resigned of their own free will, even as a result of Defendant's actions then they voluntarily relinquished their property interests and, thus, Defendant did not deprive them of property without due process of law.").

The problem with the City's position is that Herrada contends that the City interfered with her property interest by making false and misleading statements in the citation and overdue notice she received. If these notices failed to comport with the requirements of procedural due process, the City arguably violated Herrada's rights, because she paid her fine only after receiving the notices. We must therefore determine whether the notices that she received were constitutionally sufficient.

2. Whether the City's actions failed to comport with the requirements of procedural due process

"An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 13 (1978) (citation omitted). Although the citation and overdue notice might have contained false and misleading information regarding the penalties for failure to respond,...

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