Herring v. Dunning
Decision Date | 10 June 1994 |
Docket Number | No. A94A0450,A94A0450 |
Citation | 446 S.E.2d 199,213 Ga.App. 695 |
Parties | HERRING v. DUNNING. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
L.B. Kent, Columbus, for appellant.
Buchanan & Land, Benjamin A. Land, Clay D. Land, Columbus, Divine, Wilkin, Raulerson & Fields, Richard W. Fields, Albany, Self, Mullins & Robinson, Ronald W. Self, Layfield, Rothschild & Morgan, W. Donald Morgan, Jr., Columbus, for appellee.
Plaintiff Janie Herring stopped her automobile in a southbound lane of Interstate 185 near Columbus, Georgia, and successfully avoided a multi-vehicle collision ahead of her which had completely blocked the highway. Nevertheless, Herring was struck from the rear with a vehicle driven by defendant Patrick Dunning. In the ensuing tort action against Dunning, as well as against drivers of the vehicles involved in the initial crash, Herring's counsel of record discussed with Dunning's attorney the possibilities of settlement based upon the extent of Dunning's insurance coverage. When a written release was submitted to Herring, she declined to sign it, claiming that it was too late. Dunning moved to enforce the alleged settlement agreement and the trial court entered judgment on his behalf, awarding him a "Full and Final Release of any liability in this case upon payment of the policy limits of $15,000." This direct appeal followed.
The following undisputed chronology is relevant to the disposition of this appeal: On January 22, 1993, Clay D. Land of the Law Firm of Buchanan & Land, Dunning's attorney, wrote to L.B. Kent, Herring's attorney, and offered to compromise the lawsuit by paying the $15,000 coverage limits of Dunning's automobile liability insurance policy. In return, the defendant would require a complete release of Dunning for any and all liability to Herring. This letter also inquired after the existence of any hospital liens which would need to be extinguished and asserted the need for a release of Dunning as to any potential crossclaims. Without acknowledging the initial defense inquiry, on May 17, 1993, Kent sent to Land a written "offer to settle this case at this time for the limits of your liability insurance policy." This offer, which did not state an amount and invited confirmation of the policy limits, would expire after 15 days. Also on May 17, 1993, Kent sent to Land a separate "offer to settle this case for $15,000." This offer granted the defendant 30 days to accept or reject the offer. On May 27, 1993, Land wrote to Kent reciting that in a telephone discussion Kent had extended an oral amended offer to settle the case for the policy limits in return for a release of Dunning from any and all liability. The May 27 letter of confirmation did not purport to be an acceptance of this oral amended offer, in that Land would discuss it with his client and respond later. This letter further invited immediate correction by Kent of any misapprehension on the part of Land. The next day, May 28, 1993, Benjamin A. Land of the law firm of Buchanan & Land wrote to "accept your offer to settle the above-referenced case with [Mr.] Dunning for the policy limits of $15,000.00 in exchange for a full and final release of Dunning." It is this purported acceptance that Dunning asked the trial court to enforce. Three weeks later, on June 17, 1993, Benjamin A. Land of the law firm of Buchanan & Land tendered to L.B. Kent a draft in the amount of $15,000 and a proposed written release, with instructions that Kent should return the original release when executed by his client Ms. Herring. By fax communication sent to Benjamin A. Land on June 21, 1993, Kent acknowledged receipt of the proposed release but objected to certain language purporting to release Dunning and hold him harmless for any medical expenses. Stating that "we cannot release anything about Ms. Herring's medical bills," Kent requested of Land that he "[p]lease change the release." On July 23, 1993, Land forwarded a revised release which no longer contained the objectionable language regarding a release of liability for medical bills. By fax, this release was rejected on the ground that Ms. Herring
In further support of his motion to enforce settlement, Dunning proffered the affidavit of Clay D. Land, who authenticated the various communications sent and received and added that L.B. Kent had not returned the draft for the $15,000 despite his letter of July 26, 1993, rejecting the proffered release. In opposition, Kent submitted his own affidavit denying that he had entered into any oral offer and denying that his offer had been properly accepted because the defendant had insisted on additional and material conditions. Held:
Plaintiff enumerates as error the trial court's enforcement of a non-existent settlement agreement, contending that no binding contract was ever entered into by the attorneys.
Smith v. Smith, 36 Ga. 184, 191 (1867). In considering the enforceability of an alleged settlement agreement, however, King Cotton v. Powers, 200 Ga.App. 549(2), 550 409 S.E.2d 67 (1991). The settlement agreement alleged to have been created in the case sub judice would have been the product of the attorneys for the parties. As the existence of a binding agreement is disputed, the proponent of the settlement must establish its existence in writing. LeCroy v. Massey, 185 Ga.App. 828, 366 S.E.2d 215 (1988). See also Abrams v. Abrams, 262 Ga. 170(2), 416 S.E.2d 88 (1992). " Stevens v. McCarty, 198 Ga.App. 412, 413(1), 414, 401 S.E.2d 605 (1991).
As a preliminary matter, we must decide whether a plaintiff's "offer to settle" an existing lawsuit for his personal injuries "for the limits of liability coverage" is an offer capable of acceptance. " " Poulos v. Home Fed. S & L Assn., 192 Ga.App. 501, 502(2), 385 S.E.2d 135 (1989). See also Manget v. Carlton, 34 Ga.App. 556, 560(3), 130 S.E. 604, supra. " Hale v. Lipham, 61 Ga.App. 191, 193, 6 S.E.2d 115 (1939). Therefore, an offer to compromise is an offer to terminate the controversy. In litigation, "Compromise" is synonymous with "Settlement." See Parris v. Hightower, 76 Ga. 631, 633(2), 634 (1886). "Settlement" is defined in part as "an agreement by which parties having disputed matters between them reach or ascertain what is coming from one to the other." Black's Law Dictionary (4th ed.) "A settlement is an agreement to terminate or forestall all or part of a lawsuit." Gorman v. Holte, 164 Cal.App.3d 984, 211 Cal.Rptr. 34, 37 (2 Dist.1985). Sorenson v. Bowen, 199 Or. 607, 263 P.2d 766, 768 (1953). In the case sub judice, plaintiff's "offer to settle" contained no express promise to release or discharge the defendant upon tender of the policy limits. Nevertheless, a promise to terminate the controversy or the litigation is a necessary implication to the "offer to settle." It is the quid pro quo. Indeed, that promise is the very definition of an "offer to settle." An implicit contractual provision exists where such provision is necessary to effect the full purpose of the contract and is so clearly within the contemplation of the parties that they apparently deemed it unnecessary to state it. See Ellis v. Brookwood Park Venture, 161 Ga.App. 242, 243, 288 S.E.2d 308 (1982). Since the plaintiff's written offer to settle her pending tort claim with the tortfeasor for the limits of the latter's automobile liability coverage necessarily contained her implied promise to execute some instrument terminating the controversy as to that settling defendant, such an offer is sufficiently definite to be capable of acceptance and so to create a mutually binding and enforceable contract. Poulos v. Home Fed. S & L Assn., 192 Ga.App. 501, 385 S.E.2d 135, supra.
The next question is whether defendant properly accepted plaintiff's offer to settle the case for the policy limits so as to create a binding agreement. The letter of May 28, 1993, recites: "We hereby accept your offer to settle the above-referenced...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Yim v. Carr
...(2011) (settlement offer did not specify how controversy would be terminated in return for the policy limits); Herring v. Dunning , 213 Ga. App. 695, 698, 446 S.E.2d 199 (1994) (whole court) (settlement offer was "silent as to the particular form by which [the plaintiff would] terminate the......
-
Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp.
...or by the actual doing of the thing.'" Moreno v. Strickland, 255 Ga.App. 850, 567 S.E.2d 90, 92 (2002) (quoting Herring v. Dunning, 213 Ga.App. 695, 446 S.E.2d 199, 199 (1994)). However, "`[t]he offer must be accepted in the manner specified by it; and if it calls for a promise, then a prom......
-
Camacho v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.
...of the parties, its acceptance [could] not result in an enforceable agreement,” rendering settlement impossible. Herring v. Dunning, 213 Ga.App. 695, 446 S.E.2d 199, 202 (1994) (quoting Poulos v. Home Fed. S & L Assn., 192 Ga.App. 501, 385 S.E.2d 135 (1989) (internal quotations omitted)).Na......
-
Torres v. Elkin
...voluntarily dismissing the action). 22.SeeOCGA § 5–6–30; Sellers, 262 Ga. at 207(1)(b), 415 S.E.2d 908. 23.See Herring v. Dunning, 213 Ga.App. 695, 699, 446 S.E.2d 199 (1994) (“An offer may be accepted ... either by a promise to do the thing contemplated therein, or by the actual doing of t......
-
Settlement Agreement Basics
...immaterial). [29] Compare Frickey v. Jones, 280 Ga. 573, 594, 630 S.E.2d 374 (2006) (condition; no agreement), with Herring v. Dunning, 213 Ga. App. 695, 697-98, 446 S.E.2d 199, 20203 (1994) (precatory; agreement found). See also Torres v. Elkins, 2012 WL 284977 *5 (Ga. App.) (no agreement)......